State Immigration Laws and Immigrant Economic Incorporation Across the 50 United States by Apgar, Lauren
 
 
 
 
 
STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS AND IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC INCORPORATION 
ACROSS THE 50 UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Lauren Apgar 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Sociology, 
Indiana University 
August 2017 
  
ii 
 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Patricia A. McManus, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Arthur S. Alderson, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Jennifer C. Lee, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Dina G. Okamoto, PhD 
 
 
 
 
August 7, 2017  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2017 
Lauren Apgar  
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would not have been able to conceptualize this project without my time at Workers 
Defense Project, a membership-based organization in Austin, Texas that is dedicated to 
empowering Latino/a immigrant workers with the resources they need to improve their lives and 
working conditions. “Una vida justa y digna para todos,” or a just and dignified life for all, is 
their motto, and I hope that the findings from this dissertation can be used to ensure that end.  
This dissertation would not have been possible without the years of training, support, and 
encouragement that I received from my mentors at Indiana University. First, and foremost, I 
would like to thank Patricia McManus for being in my corner since Day 1 of graduate school 
(and even before). Patricia’s mentorship involves both breadth and depth – she is not afraid to 
dive into the details of my research, and I am thankful for the hours she spent with me 
investigating datasets, drawing out different state policy typologies, and looking up exact Stata 
commands. However, she also has an incredible ability to help me see the big picture and to 
synthesize my verbose paragraphs to pinpoint the main contribution of my work. Above all, 
Patricia pushes me to excel. When discussing my dissertation, she often says “When you write 
your book…” and points out how my research could inform a theory or speak to a different field 
in sociology. I cannot imagine writing a book, but know that I have come as far as I have 
because of her high expectations for me and her confidence that I will fulfill them.  
I also would like to give a big thanks to the members of my committee and the time that 
they dedicated to my growth. Jennifer Lee taught me to believe in my work and my findings (or 
to keep performing analyses until I do – after all, most of the work goes in the footnotes!). She 
helped me gain self-assurance in graduate school, and I appreciate her candid advice and 
encouragement throughout my time here. I am also very lucky that Dina Okamoto joined the 
v 
 
faculty at IU. Before committing to IU’s sociology program, I was tempted to attend UC Davis 
so that I could work with her. I am thankful that I had the opportunity, after all! From her, I’ve 
learned how to tackle data collection and measurement issues, all while keeping the big picture 
in mind. I have also benefitted from her reviews of my grant application drafts and her 
perspective on new assimilation theory’s bright and blurred boundaries. Art Alderson’s 
stratification seminar my first semester at IU set me upon my path to investigate stratification 
within the immigrant population. Art’s thoughtful feedback launched my master’s thesis, and I 
am thankful to receive it again at the end of my graduate school career. 
Others have contributed to my sociological training in various ways. Fabio Rojas helped 
me develop my skills in sample design, stratification, and weighting, as well as survey 
development. I am thankful for the time that I spent on his “small council.” Brian Powell 
exposed me to experimental survey methods, developed my writing style, and helped me survive 
my semester of teaching. I would also like to thank my undergraduate professors who inspired 
me to go on to graduate school and gave me the opportunity early on to engage in research: Dr. 
Sandi Nenga, Dr. Maria Lowe, and Dr. Edward Kain. 
I am also grateful for the financial support that I received for my dissertation work. I 
would like to thank the National Science Foundation for awarding me a Dissertation 
Improvement Grant and Indiana University’s Center for Research on Race and Ethnicity in 
Society (CRRES). This funding allowed me to advance my methodological training and funded 
the coding of state laws. Thanks to Carmen Vernon and Muna Adem for coding state laws and 
enduring multiple rounds of inter-coder reliability. I would also like to thank the Horowitz 
Foundation which provided support while I performed analyses and wrote my dissertation. For 
my analyses, I used Indiana University’s Karst high-throughput computing cluster. My ability to 
vi 
 
conduct analyses on Karst was supported in part by Lilly Endowment, Inc., through its support 
for the Indiana University Pervasive Technology Institute, and in part by the Indiana METACyt 
Initiative. 
I have counted on so many friends over the past years while working on my degree. My 
thanks go to the members of the immigration working group, Samuel Kye, Elizabeth Martinez, 
Tamara van de Does, Cara Davies, and Denise Ambriz, for their constructive thoughts and 
comments as this dissertation developed and for sharing in the highs and lows of graduate 
school. My thanks also go to Emma Cohen and her longstanding commitment to a work date 
every week during the academic year and during the summer. I was in good company when we 
tackled multiple imputation and other projects throughout the years. Aaron Ponce served as my 
guide through graduate school. He always let me know what was coming next and good ways to 
overcome the many milestones in the program. Lydia DiSabatino provided me with so much 
kind, generous, “similar other” support and kept me connected to the real world. I benefitted so 
much from our study sessions, Laughing Planet lunches, and laughs.  
I would not have made it through the dissertation process if it weren’t for my family. My 
parents always provided me with Texas brisket when it was dearly needed, cheered me on during 
graduate school, and provided a sympathetic ear. Your love has radiated across the Texas-
Indiana divide. Last, but not least, I thank my husband Jonathan, who was willing to embark on 
this adventure with me, is always there for me, and whose love endures all things (including 
papers and presentations!). I can’t wait for what’s next.  
  
vii 
 
Lauren Apgar 
STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS AND IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC INCORPORATION 
ACROSS THE 50 UNITED STATES 
  
States within the US have increasingly taken initiative regarding immigration matters by 
enacting laws that escalate state-level immigration enforcement, limit immigrants’ access to 
work and social benefits, or conversely, extend benefits to immigrants. These developments in 
immigration federalism have forced immigrants to navigate a greater range of contexts and raise 
the question of how variation in state policy portfolios impact the economic outcomes of first- 
and second-generation immigrants. This dissertation identifies four types of state-level 
immigration policy configurations: exclusionist states treat immigrants as criminals by ramping 
up state-level enforcement and denying them rights and benefits; rights restrictionist states limit 
immigrant access to rights, benefits, and jobs, but remain uninvolved in immigration 
enforcement; inclusionist states view immigrants as contributors and allocate additional rights 
and benefits to them; and noninterventionist states do not enact immigration laws. In my first 
empirical chapter, I use 2000-2015 American Community Survey data together with inferred 
legal status derived from cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI) to show that exclusionist 
states depress unauthorized women’s participation in the labor force. This finding challenges 
assimilation theories’ presumption that all anti-immigrant policies limit immigrant integration. 
Exclusionist states’ legal violence, or the ever-present fear resulting from immigration 
enforcement, may be key in blocking immigrant economic success. However, using 1998-2015 
Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) and CSMI, my 
second empirical chapter finds that state policy does little to alter the authorized-unauthorized 
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wage gap; this wage gap closed during the economic recession, across all state policy contexts. 
Using 1998-2015 CPS-MORG data, my third empirical chapter demonstrates that state laws do 
not affect the labor force participation and wages of the second generation or their wage gap with 
non-Hispanic, native-born whites. Therefore, despite highlighting the distinctive policy 
configurations that immigrants meet, this dissertation shows substantial homogeneity in 
immigrants’ economic outcomes across the fifty states. State policy effects may not be felt due to 
vertical differentiation in the context of reception. National economic trends may limit variation 
in wage offerings and local business practices may attenuate the impact of state policy on the 
employment of immigrant and second-generation workers.  
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Chapter One – Introduction 
The 2000s saw an upswing in the passage of US state-level immigration laws, or laws 
related to immigrant entry, immigrant exclusion, and the physical expulsion of immigrants. Upon 
signing one such law, Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act in 2011, 
Governor Nathan Deal stated, “This immigration reform measure fulfills my promise to 
Georgians to crack down on the influx of illegal immigrants into our state… we wish to partner 
with the federal government to enforce the current law of the nation.” Before 1996, state-level 
immigration laws such as Georgia’s violated the federal government’s plenary power, or sole 
authority, over immigration policymaking.1 In 1996, however, the federal Illegal Reform and 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) allowed for state participation in immigration enforcement through 
the 287g program, a program that trained state and local-level law enforcement officers in 
immigration enforcement. This piece of legislation marked the rise of immigration federalism, 
where the federal government redistributed and shared its immigration powers with the states. 
However, not all states have embraced their new role as immigration enforcers. States have 
prohibited state and local police from inquiring about a person’s immigration status and have 
refused to hold immigrants in custody to be transferred to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement. These state governors have expressed their frustration with the US immigration 
system; for example, Governor Jerry Brown proclaimed, “While Washington waffles on 
immigration, California’s forging ahead.”  
1 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal government 
had the sole control over immigration policy, or laws regulating immigrant entry and exit, but states could 
regulate immigrant integration. The federal government still maintains primary authority over 
immigration enforcement, but states have passed immigration laws. 
1
Similarly, states’ role in immigrant integration has expanded since 1996. That year, 
Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), which delegated decisions regarding immigrant welfare eligibility to the states. In 
response, state governments have taken initiative and passed immigrant social rights laws, or 
laws regulating noncitizens’ access to work and benefits. States have passed integrationist social 
rights laws that have increased legal immigrants’ access to state-funded welfare benefits and 
have gone even further by passing laws providing unauthorized immigrants with access to 
professional licensing opportunities, driver’s licenses, and higher education. Extending these 
rights to immigrants has been framed as a way to benefit the state community and economy. For 
instance, extending driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants generates revenue for states; 
allowing unauthorized immigrants to obtain in-state tuition increases society’s overall education 
level. But states have also restricted both legal and unauthorized immigrants’ access to work and 
public benefits. Proponents of restrictionist rights laws have framed immigrants as unfair 
competitors for jobs, threats to national security, and free-riders on the welfare system.  
The rise of immigration federalism has coincided with the geographic dispersion of 
immigrants across the United States. Historically, immigrants predominately settled in six US 
states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois (Portes and Rumbaut 
2006). Immigrants settled in these states because they were geographically close to their 
homelands and so reduced the cost of their journey; Asian immigrants frequently settled in 
California and other states along the west coast, Mexican immigrants often settled along the 
southwest border, and many Eastern European immigrants settled in the northeast. Concentration 
in these states continued through the operation of ethnic networks, as family and friends 
provided assistance to fellow coethnics (Liaw and Frey 2007; Massey et al. 1998). However, 
2
  
since the 1990s, immigrants have geographically dispersed across the United States (Massey 
2008). The largest absolute concentrations of immigrants remain in traditional migration states, 
but Southern and Midwestern states have seen the greatest growth in the size of their immigrant 
population (Marrow 2011; Massey 2008). The geographic dispersion of immigrants into “new 
destination” states resulted from selective border militarization along the U.S.-Mexico border, 
which shifted the migration path for many immigrants, and from local minimum wage and 
zoning ordinances, which pushed immigrants out of traditional destinations (Light 2006; Massey 
2008). Economic factors have pulled immigrants to new states, such as the expansion of 
employment opportunities and more affordable housing (Massey 2008; McConnell 2008).  
Taken together, geographic dispersion and immigration federalism have resulted in 
immigrants navigating a greater variety of contexts within the United States. These 
developments raise the question of how state policy context impacts the economic incorporation 
of immigrants. Immigration scholars have emphasized the importance of the context of 
reception, or the structural and cultural features of a location that affect immigrants’ 
incorporation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). As a form of native reception, policy, along with 
economic structure and coethnic community presence, influences immigrants’ economic success 
(Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Reitz 2002). Immigration research has shown 
the effects of federal policies on immigrants’ economic outcomes (Donato, Durand, and Massey 
1992; Donato and Massey 1993; Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 2008; 
Donato and Sisk 2012; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips 
and Massey 1999), but it has not yet systematically examined the influence of state-level policy. 
A consideration of state-level laws is important, as research has demonstrated the power of state-
level laws to reproduce or reduce racial and gender inequality (Beggs 1995; Kmec and Skaggs 
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2014; Stainback, Robinson, and Tomaskovic-Devey 2005). Further, the combination of 
immigration laws and social rights laws at the state level may result in unique contexts of 
reception. This project shifts the focus of immigration research to the state level and analyzes the 
effects of both immigration and social rights laws through the creation of a state typology. This 
dissertation is guided by the following research questions: 
1. Is US state policy context associated with the labor force participation of immigrants? 
 
2. Does US state policy context moderate the wage gap between authorized and 
unauthorized immigrant workers? 
 
3. Is US state policy context associated with the labor force participation and wages of 
second-generation immigrants? 
 
All analyses rely on a new measure of state policy context. To date, studies that have 
examined the effects of state-level policy on non-economic outcomes have used measures that do 
not differentiate between immigration and social rights policy or only examine one type of 
policy. For example, studies examining immigrant political incorporation have used counts of 
anti-immigrant legislation (Okamoto and Ebert 2010); those examining immigrant settlement 
used an internal border control measure that only includes enforcement and restrictionist rights 
laws (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013); and those examining education used a scale that 
only includes inclusionist rights laws (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011). This 
dissertation recognizes that states regulate both immigrant admission and rights (Tichenor 2002) 
and that these two types of policies may affect immigrant economic integration. It creates a state 
policy typology to capture states’ position on immigration and social rights policies.  
Analyses use multi-level quantitative methods on two large nationally-representative 
datasets, the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS), in 
conjunction with state-level contextual data. ACS and CPS are the most-often used data sources 
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for studying labor force and wage inequality, yet scholars have noted that the lack of information 
on immigrant status is a weakness of these data (Massey and Bartley 2005). This dissertation 
relies on cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI) to infer legal status in the ACS and CPS. 
CSMI predicts unauthorized status in the ACS and CPS by using the characteristics of known 
unauthorized immigrants in a “donor” sample, the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP). CSMI techniques are applied to the first and second analyses to assess the extent to 
which state laws promote or hinder immigrants’ economic success above and beyond, or in 
conjunction with, their legal status.  
Background 
 
Laws regulating immigrant entry and exit have been considered the domain of the federal 
government, but the passage of IIRIRA and PRWORA marked the beginning of a “new era of 
immigration federalism” (Suro 2015). IIRIRA established that states could participate in 
immigration enforcement, and states have passed immigration-type laws that seek to either 
exacerbate or buffer federal efforts. Laws regulating immigrant integration, through the 
designation or denial of social rights, have largely fallen under state domain. The passage of 
PRWORA, which disqualified authorized immigrants who had lived in the United States for 
fewer than five years from welfare benefits, transferred the authority to states to make additional 
immigrants eligible for benefits. This section reviews relevant federal and state immigration and 
social rights laws enacted since the 1980s.  
Immigration Laws 
 
In an attempt to control unauthorized migration, Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. IRCA provided amnesty to millions of unauthorized 
immigrants in the United States, but it also increased border enforcement and established 
5
  
employer sanctions, which allowed the federal government to fine employers when they 
knowingly hired undocumented workers. In 1996, Congress again increased border enforcement 
and amplified interior enforcement through IIRIRA. This act increased the number of Border 
Patrol agents to 10,000 and required the construction of a 14 mile-long fence along the Mexico-
U.S. border (Fragomen 1997). IIRIRA established the 287(g) program, which gave INS/DHS the 
authority to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies. These 
agreements allow state and local police to assist federal authorities in the arrest and detention of 
unauthorized immigrants. IIRIRA also increased the offenses for which migrants could be 
deported, including some misdemeanors, and expedited the removal of immigrants who 
attempted to enter through a port of entry with fraudulent documents. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) increased the number of immigrants subject to 
deportation; any immigrants who had ever committed a crime in the past, even those who were 
legal permanent residents, were subject to deportation. Finally, the 2001 Patriot Act authorized 
the Attorney General to deport any noncitizen, without a hearing or presentation of evidence, if 
they are suspected of committing, furthering, or facilitating acts of terrorism. Congress has yet to 
pass legislation that is not punitive against the unauthorized population.2   
 Many states and counties have entered agreements with DHS to enforce federal 
immigration law. In 2002, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement became the first 
enforcement agency to enter a 287(g) agreement (Meissner et al. 2013). States also cooperate 
with ICE by sharing the legal status information of unauthorized immigrants who have applied 
for state-level benefits or programs. Other states have pre-empted the federal government in 
                                                 
2 However, President Obama issued a 2012 executive order, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA), which offers temporary work permits to unauthorized immigrants who entered the country at a 
young age.  
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immigration enforcement by taking on enforcement officers’ responsibilities. In 2010, Arizona 
enacted SB 1070, which required state and local enforcement officials to ask about the 
immigration status of a person involved in a stop, detention, or arrest. SB 1070 also made it a 
crime not to carry immigration papers and allowed state police to arrest anyone that they had 
“probable cause to believe” had committed a crime and could be deported. While an injunction 
was filed on the law after it was passed, in 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the provision in 1070 
that allowed state and local law enforcement to check an individual’s immigration status during 
police procedures. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah have passed laws 
patterned after the Arizona law. States have also heightened their enforcement efforts by 
preventing unauthorized immigrants from obtaining bail, bond, or parole. These laws view 
unauthorized immigrants as a flight risk and keep them in custody to facilitate their deportation.  
 Instead of increasing immigration enforcement, other states have implemented sanctuary 
laws. Originally, the passage of IRCA led some cities to pass sanctuary ordinances in response to 
local law enforcement officers being involved in employer audits (Wells 2004). Sanctuary laws 
vary from state to state, but generally, these laws prohibit state employees from inquiring about a 
person’s immigration status or from disclosing information about an individual’s immigration 
status. Stronger state sanctuary laws are non-cooperation laws that prevent law enforcement 
officers from complying with an ICE detainer unless the detainee has been convicted of a felony. 
Some state sanctuary laws also prevent the use of state resources or institutions for the 
enforcement of federal immigration. Finally, some states have added protections for immigrants 
during the judicial process; these laws require courts to advise defendants of immigration 
consequences when pleading guilty or no lo contender. If found guilty, immigrants could be 
7
  
viewed as having committed an “aggravated felony,” which initiates removal proceedings for 
both legal permanent residents and undocumented immigrants.3   
Social Rights Laws at the Federal Level 
 
IRCA, IIRIRA, PRWORA, and the Real ID Act have delineated immigrants’ rights to 
work and rights to benefits at the federal level. IRCA’s employer sanctions require all employers 
to fill out I-9 forms to document that they verified the identity and immigration status of their 
new employees. To complete an I-9 form, employers examine a new employee’s documentation 
and determine if it “reasonably appears to be genuine.” Employers retain the I-9 form for their 
records and make it available for inspection by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) if 
they are audited. DHS fines employers who do not fill out an I-9 form for each employee or who 
employ individuals that they know are unauthorized to work in the United States. In 1996, 
IIRIRA piloted the “Basic Pilot” program. Instead of relying on employers’ determinations of 
immigrants’ legal status, the Basic Pilot program allowed employers to electronically verify new 
employees’ documentation with INS. Employer participation in the Basic Pilot program was 
voluntary and was available in five states: California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas. In 
2003, Congress expanded the program to all 50 states, and in 2007, renamed the program to E-
Verify. In 2008, Congress required all federal contractors to use E-verify.  
Congress restricted immigrants’ access to welfare through PRWORA. Before PRWORA 
legal permanent residents, refugees and asylees, and immigrants residing under PRUCOL 
(“Permanently Residing Under Color of Law” – signifying that INS was aware of an 
undocumented person’s presence in the US but had no plans to deport him or her) were eligible 
                                                 
3 An “aggravated felony” does not need to be “aggravated” or a “felony” to be considered an aggravated 
felony as deemed by Congress. Examples of aggravated felonies include theft, falsifying a tax return, and 
missing a court date. 
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for federal benefits. PRWORA distinguished “qualified” from “not-qualified” immigrants. 
Qualified immigrants included lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, Cuban/Haitian 
entrants, abused immigrants and their children, and certain persons granted withholding of 
deportation and removal. Not-qualified immigrants included undocumented immigrants and 
authorized temporary immigrants. The law prohibits not-qualified immigrants from enrolling in 
federal benefit programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamps, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid. The law also implemented a “five-year 
bar,” which prohibits qualified immigrants who entered on or after the law’s passage on August 
22, 1996 from receiving these benefits for five years after securing qualified immigrant status. 
The benefit programs verify immigrant eligibility through the use of the Systematic Alien 
Verification for Entitlements (SAVE), where a copy of an immigrant’s documents are forwarded 
to DHS for verification in their database. PRWORA also designated nonimmigrants and 
unauthorized immigrants as ineligible for professional occupational licenses, and IIRIRA 
designated unauthorized immigrants as ineligible for postsecondary education benefits.  
In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which provided a set of requirements for 
state driver’s licenses if they were to be accepted by the federal government of for “official 
purposes,” such as boarding commercially-operated airline flights. The REAL ID Act resulted 
from the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and requires the inclusion biometrics and 
other machine-readable information on the ID cards in an effort to reduce the likelihood of 
counterfeiting. As part of the law, all noncitizen applicants for driver’s licenses or state 
identification cards must provide documentation of their lawful presence in the United States. 
States use the DHS’ SAVE system to verify the documents. States may issue driver’s licenses or 
identification cards to nonimmigrants (such as temporary guest workers and students) if the 
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license expires at the same time as their visa. REAL ID prevents unauthorized immigrants from 
obtaining drivers licenses. REAL ID has been implemented through phased enforcement, with 
half of the states in compliance as of this writing.  
Social Rights Laws at the US State Level 
 
In large part, states have extended or limited immigrants’ social rights in response to 
federal legislation. States have expanded on IRCA to increase the penalties for employers found 
to have hired unauthorized workers. States revoke business licenses, impose additional fines, or 
prevent businesses from receiving government contracts if they have been found to hire 
unauthorized workers. With the establishment of E-verify, states began mandating the use of the 
program to ensure that employers did not hire unauthorized workers. In 2006, Georgia and 
Colorado were the first states to pass E-verify laws that required verification of worker eligibility 
by public employers and contractors (National Conference of State Legislatures 2016). Only two 
states, California and Illinois, have passed laws prohibiting state and city governments from 
requiring employers to use E-Verify. In addition to using E-Verify, states have regulated 
immigrants’ access to the job market by serving as gatekeepers for immigrants’ access to 
professional and trade occupations. Many state boards of licensing require immigrants to submit 
proof of their authorized legal status before obtaining a license to practice, and some teaching 
licenses or certifications require immigrants to be naturalized citizens. However, PRWORA 
allows states to extend licenses to unauthorized immigrants if states pass a law doing so. 
California, Florida, and Illinois have opened occupational opportunities to unauthorized 
10
  
immigrants by providing a license to any immigrant who meets the qualifications, regardless of 
his or her legal status.4 
Many states have expanded immigrants’ rights to benefits, such as welfare, a college 
education, or a driver’s license. PRWORA allowed states to use their own funds to provide 
benefits to LPRs during the five-year bar. As of 2015, 15 states extended this benefit to LPRs. 
However, PRWORA also provides states with the option of providing LPRs and other eligible 
immigrants with benefits using federal funding after the five-year ban. Some states, such as 
Texas, Indiana, and South Carolina, have chosen to deny benefits to all of their noncitizen 
population, even after the five-year ban. States have also expanded immigrants’ rights by 
providing them with access to a college education by offering in-state tuition to unauthorized 
immigrant students, usually as long as they have graduated from high school in the state. In 
contrast, other states bar unauthorized immigrants from attending the state university system or 
from qualifying for in-state tuition. Without in-state tuition, many immigrants cannot afford to 
attend college. Finally, states have countered the REAL ID Act by allowing unauthorized 
immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses. By offering unauthorized immigrants drivers’ licenses, 
these immigrants will be less likely to be stopped for driving without a license, which could 
result in the start of the immigrant’s deportation process. On the other hand, some states not only 
require authorized legal status for a driver’s license, but they have also linked driver’s license 
expiration dates to the expiration date on immigrants’ green cards or visa.  
Finally, some states have gone one step further than the federal government by passing 
cultural regulations. The federal government requires English language proficiency for 
                                                 
4 Florida certifies unauthorized immigrants and Illinois certifies DACA recipients to practice law within 
their states. California offers all professional/occupational licenses to unauthorized immigrants.  
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immigrants to obtain citizenship, but it has not passed a law designating English as the official 
language of the United States. Many US states have designated English as the official language 
for state government documents, records, legislation, and hearings. English-only laws can 
prohibit non-English speaking immigrants from effectively representing themselves or obtaining 
state services. However, a few states have required some of their state agencies or programs to 
provide interpreters or interpreted materials to non-English speakers.  
Immigrant Economic Incorporation 
 
Economic and sociological theories explain immigrants’ economic incorporation in terms 
of individual, country of origin, and country of reception characteristics. Early theories of 
immigrants’ economic incorporation focus largely on the individual characteristics immigrants 
brought to the United States. Under human capital theory, immigrants’ individual characteristics, 
such as high levels of educational attainment, strong English language skills, and a greater 
amount of time in the United States, predict their likelihood of economic success and integration 
into the host society (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003). Selection theory builds on 
human capital theory by arguing that the conditions in immigrants’ country of origin either 
encourage the migration of immigrants low in human capital (negative selection) or high in 
human capital (positive selection). Positively-selected immigrants high in human capital will 
then be more likely to achieve economic success in the United States. The cultural transmission 
thesis highlights the cultural role of immigrants’ countries of origins. This theory argues that 
childhood socialization into gendered norms and values in the country of origin will continue to 
shape women’s attitudes towards work in the destination country; origin countries with 
conservative gendered norms will suppress female immigrants’ economic incorporation in the 
US. In contrast, both segmented and new assimilation theory recognize that immigrants’ 
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economic attainment depends on the context of reception they meet within the United States 
(Alba and Nee 2003; Marrow 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). A hostile government reception, 
poor economic times, or a lack of a coethnic community prevent immigrants from capitalizing on 
their education and skills. Researchers have applied these theories to a wide range of indicators 
of immigrants’ economic incorporation, including immigrants’ labor force status, occupational 
status, and earnings (Akresh 2008; Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1999; Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 
2004). 
Selection Theory 
 
Immigrants’ characteristics differ from those of nonmigrants in the country of origin, and 
the difference in the characteristics is the immigrants’ degree of selectivity. Immigrants may be 
positively or negatively selected; positively-selected immigrants have more education, skills, 
ability, or ambition than nonmigrants who remain in their country of origin; negatively-selected 
immigrants have less of these traits compared to those who remained (Borjas 1987). Because 
positively-selected immigrants have greater skills and ability, these immigrants are more 
successful in the destination country’s labor market than negatively-selected immigrants. 
However, negatively-selected immigrants are rare (Feliciano 2005); instead, the degree of 
positive selection indicates the extent to which an immigrant group has more skills, ability, or 
ambition than another migrant group in the US and explains their better economic outcomes. 
Economic, geographic, and political conditions in the country of origin influence the 
selectivity of the immigrant group. Immigrants from less-educated and developing nations are 
more likely to be positively selected (Feliciano 2005). Less-educated and developing nations 
commonly experience a “brain drain,” where individuals who have obtained a higher education 
and advanced skill sets migrate to more developed countries to better reward their skills. 
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Immigrants from countries that are geographically close to their destination countries are more 
likely to be negatively selected (Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Stewart and Dixon 2010; Van 
Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004). Immigrants who move greater geographic distances experience 
greater migration costs, so they must expect a large wage return to their education and skills. 
Consequently, individuals with more human capital will migrate, as they expect employers in the 
destination country will recognize their skills. Because the distance traveled is further, these 
immigrants are less likely to expect to return to their country of origin, and further invest in their 
human capital once settled. Political suppression or instability forces refugees to migrate, 
resulting in negative selection. In comparison to other legal immigrants, refugees have lower 
wages and occupational prestige (Akresh 2008; Connor 2010). However, immigrants from 
politically unstable countries, such as Iran, Cuba, and Vietnam, are positively selected (Borjas 
1987). Immigrants from politically unstable countries, especially those countries transitioning to 
a Communist regime, may be positively selected because they seek refuge within and prefer the 
market economy.  
Socialization & Cultural Transmission 
 
Under selection theory, the political and economic conditions in the country of origin 
influence who migrates and their success within the host country. In addition to the political and 
economic conditions in the country of origin, a country’s cultural norms influence immigrants’ 
work attitudes and behaviors. Immigrants learn gendered values, norms, and attitudes in their 
country of origin. After migrating to the United States, immigrants from gender conservative 
countries experience more gender equality and opportunities for labor force participation. 
However, people draw on their cultural “tool-kits” to accomplish action, and immigrants 
continue to construct their action on their cultural equipment in changing circumstances (Swidler 
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1986). Under the cultural transmission thesis, elements of the origin culture that conflict with the 
host society’s culture continue to influence behavior in new circumstances, especially if they are 
supported by social interaction. Immigrant women maintain gendered attitudes (Parrado and 
Flippen 2005), and immigrant women’s work hours in the United States are positively associated 
with labor supply in the country of origin (Blau, Kahn, and Papps 2011). These findings suggest 
that conservative gender values learned in the country of origin have a persistent effect on female 
immigrants’ workforce participation.  
Context of Reception 
 
Both segmented assimilation theory and new assimilation theory recognize that structural 
factors within the destination country provide opportunities for or restrict immigrant success 
(Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). A bifurcated economic structure, the lack of a 
coethnic community, or hostile societal reception and policy prevent immigrants from 
capitalizing on their education and skills. Research using the context of reception framework has 
compared immigrant group across different receiving nations to exploit variation in these factors 
(Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004), or has compared different national origin groups within 
the United States, as policy, societal reception, and coethnic community vary across groups 
(Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). 
Economic Structure 
 
The restructuring of the American economy in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in an 
hourglass-shaped labor market with many low-wage service jobs and high-wage professional 
jobs, but few mid-level, skilled manufacturing jobs (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Skilled 
manufacturing jobs provided a key middle step in the economic mobility of immigrant families; 
without these jobs, low-skilled immigrants and their descendants must bridge jobs requiring a 
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high school degree or less and jobs requiring a college degree within one generation. While 
fewer economic opportunities in manufacturing result in fewer opportunities for economic 
mobility, the overall health of the labor market, rather than the health of a specific sector, 
provides job opportunities to immigrants. The lower the native unemployment rate, the lower the 
immigrant unemployment rate (Chiswick, Yinon, and Zach 1997; Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 
2004). Additionally, many low-skilled immigrants have experienced upward mobility by 
breaking out from an informal labor market and ethnic economy into the formal labor market 
(Hagan, Lowe, and Quingla 2011).  
Coethnic Community 
 
The relative size of the immigrant group in the destination plays an important role in 
immigrants’ economic outcomes. Larger immigrant groups provide an ethnic community that 
assists immigrants’ adaptation to a new place. Large communities help new immigrants find 
jobs, often by practicing social closure (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). 
If an immigrant group has a large enough presence within a certain company or economic sector, 
immigrants ensure that any new positions are filled with fellow coethnics. They maintain control 
over new hires by ensuring that job openings are not formally posted. Instead, immigrants know 
when fellow coethnics plan to leave their jobs and recommend other coethnics to their hiring 
managers. Additionally, higher education levels of the immigrant group may benefit new 
immigrants. If the coethnic community has many professionals or entrepreneurs, immigrants 
may hire coethnic immigrants in their businesses or provide them with the financial capital to 
start their own business. Research has shown that larger group size benefits immigrants’ 
economic outcomes (Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004) and that immigrants in groups with 
high levels of education obtain higher wages (Levanon 2014). 
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Societal Reception: Boundaries & Social Closure 
 
Both segmented and new assimilation theory argue that how natives receive immigrants 
impact their integration. New assimilation theorists draw on a boundary processes framework to 
explain how native reception of immigrants matters for immigrants’ life chances. A boundary is 
a distinction made by actors to categorize people and separate them into groups (Lamont and 
Molnár 2002). In the United States, immigrants are distinguished from natives by their racial and 
ethnic differences and their noncitizen status (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; Zolberg and Long 
1999). These boundaries are socially-constructed; for example, racial boundaries highlight 
physical differences, but actors associate these physical traits with cultural or behavioral 
differences (Omi and Winant 1994); the native-immigrant boundary differentiates groups by 
their cultural practices; and citizenship differentiates groups on their birthplace, but birthplace is 
associated with “proof of belonging,” such as knowledge of a US history or the English language 
(Alba 2005). Over time, the boundaries and beliefs about each group become widely-agreed 
upon and shape how society is organized. Negative associations toward one group lead to social 
closure, or behavioral patterns resulting in unequal access and distribution of resources between 
groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). For example, racial minorities and immigrants are excluded 
from resources such as jobs, housing, or public accommodations. Group boundaries codified into 
law sustain between-group inequalities and further shape beliefs about the social categories.  
Because boundaries are socially-constructed, not all boundaries are alike, and they vary 
across space and time (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012). Bright boundaries clearly 
distinguish group insiders from outsiders, but blurred boundaries transform clear-cut dichotomies 
into gradients so that a person’s group membership is ambiguous (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; 
Zolberg and Long 1999). In turn, the type of boundary in place affects immigrant incorporation. 
17
  
Laws codifying bright immigrant-native boundaries facilitate the preservation of economic 
opportunities for native group members. To obtain these opportunities, immigrants must cross 
the boundary, either through naturalization or cultural assimilation. Laws blurring immigrant-
native boundaries facilitate immigrant integration by providing them with access to natives’ 
socioeconomic opportunities even without immigrant membership in this group. Evidence on the 
impact of boundaries has compared nations’ citizenship regimes. Ethnic citizenship regimes (e.g. 
Switzerland, Germany, Austria) draw bright boundaries between citizens and immigrants by 
basing citizenship on parental origin of birth and imposing difficulties in obtaining citizenship, 
while civic citizenship regimes (Australia, Canada, France, and the US) base citizenship on 
universal political rights and immigrants have an easier naturalization process, thereby blurring 
the lines between citizens and noncitizens (Brubaker 1992). Countries with laws preventing 
access to citizenship are associated with lower immigrant political and sociocultural integration 
(Alba 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Countries with blurred 
citizenship policies and lean welfare states have relatively higher immigrant labor market 
participation (Koopmans 2009). 
This dissertation focuses on state-sanctioned boundaries that differentiate immigrants 
from natives based on immigrants’ legal status. In the United States, federal legislation has 
established bright boundaries between the immigrant and native population, and within the 
immigrant population based on their legal status. IRCA brightened the boundary between the 
authorized and unauthorized immigrant population by heightening border enforcement and 
establishing employer sanctions, which allowed the federal government to fine employers when 
they knowingly hired undocumented workers. IIRIRA again increased border enforcement and 
increased the offenses for which migrants, both legal permanent residents and unauthorized 
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immigrants, could be deported. PRWORA shifted the boundary so that legal immigrants must 
have lived in the United States for five years before receiving benefits, such as Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families and Medicaid. PRWORA designated nonimmigrants and 
unauthorized immigrants as ineligible for welfare benefits and other public benefits such as 
student loans for postsecondary education and professional occupational licenses.  
Contributions 
 
Together, human capital, selection, cultural transmission, and context of reception 
theories go far in explaining immigrants’ economic performance in the United States. This 
dissertation contributes to research on immigrant incorporation by using the boundary processes 
framework to examine variation in immigrant reception by US state. Scholars have argued that 
“the striking [feature] of… the United States is not so much the variability of localities and 
regions, but the extent to which there is homogeneity in the enforcement of laws and regulations 
of the federal government” (Alba and Nee 2003:53). With the new era of immigration 
federalism, policy now differs across policy levels; the boundaries codified in state laws may 
either brighten or blur the native-immigrant boundaries within federal law, and federal and state 
laws may simultaneously affect immigrants (Marrow 2011).  
Research has shown that federal policies matter for immigrants’ economic incorporation, 
but state laws could matter as much or more because they are a more immediate context. This 
expectation is informed by policy research, which demonstrates that US state policies affect race 
and gender employment equality (Beggs 1995; Stainback, Robinson, and Tomaskovic-Devey 
2005). Qualitative immigration research suggests that state-level laws that brighten native-
immigrant boundaries, such as Arizona’s SB 1070 that heightened immigration enforcement, has 
resulted in employers refusing to hire immigrants (Menjívar and Abrego 2012). I build on this 
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research by comparing immigrants’ economic outcomes over time and across state policy 
contexts.  
This dissertation makes a second contribution to immigration research by analyzing the 
effects of policies that blur boundaries between natives and immigrants. Past immigration 
research in the US has focused on the effects of bright boundaries; for example, by examining 
how federal enforcement laws or federal welfare restrictions affect immigrants’ outcomes. 
However, cross-national policy research suggests that laws which blur native-immigrant 
boundaries, by ensuring equal access to citizenship and social rights, increase immigrants’ 
political and cultural integration. Therefore, I expect states that blur the native-immigrant 
boundary to promote immigrants’ economic integration and states that heighten or maintain the 
native-immigrant boundary to hinder immigrants’ economic incorporation. 
Effects of Bright Boundaries: Legal Status Stratification 
 
Because citizenship boundaries are a form of “legalized discrimination” (Wimmer 2008), 
they serve as a mechanism for social closure and limit opportunities for citizens. In the United 
States, citizenship boundaries at the federal level designate rights for each legal status immigrant 
group. Bean and colleagues (2015) suggest that the varying rights and forms of societal 
membership condition immigrant integration. Under the membership-exclusion framework, they 
proposed that unauthorized immigrants may not achieve certain kinds of integration because they 
are blocked from jobs and opportunities that require legal membership. Many empirical studies 
have shown that unauthorized immigrants are blocked from economic integration. For example, 
unauthorized Mexican workers earn anywhere from 3 to 40 percent less than authorized 
Mexicans (Donato and Massey 1993; Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 
2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Flippen 2012; Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Kossoudji and 
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Cobb-Clark 2002; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips and Massey 1999; Rivera-Batiz 
1999). The wage gap between documented and undocumented Mexican immigrants holds for 
other Latin American national-origin groups (Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002). 
The wage gap between authorized and unauthorized workers occurred after the 
implementation of the IRCA in 1986 (Donato and Massey 1993). IRCA brightened the boundary 
between authorized and unauthorized workers by effectively limiting the right to work to 
authorized immigrants. IRCA established employer sanctions, which allowed the federal 
government to fine employers when they hired unauthorized workers. These potential fines 
increased the cost of hiring unauthorized workers, which encouraged employers to lower their 
wages (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips and 
Massey 1999). Additionally, because unauthorized workers depend on their employer for their 
undetected presence in the United States, they accept lower wages to avoid being reported to 
immigration authorities (Rivera-Batiz 1999). More recent federal legislation, such as IIRIRA and 
the Patriot Act, which increased immigration enforcement and further brightened the authorized-
unauthorized boundary, also increased the gap between authorized and likely-unauthorized Latin 
American immigrants’ wages (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009). 
Research examining the impacts of IRCA, IIRIRA, and the Patriot Act has shown how 
“legal status distinctions shift and depend on where migrants reside… [and the] policymaking 
specific to that place and time” (Donato and Armenta 2011:535). These laws have brightened 
boundaries and limited the right to work to authorized immigrants, which increased legal status 
stratification. However, state laws have worked to uncouple immigrant legal status and rights. 
Status and rights often go together, but citizen membership can exist without rights, for example, 
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by restricting political rights for incarcerated citizens (Vink 2017). Similarly, US states have 
further restricted the rights offered to legal permanent residents, but have not revoked their legal 
status. On the other hand, states have also extended rights to noncitizens that were previously 
limited to citizens. By extending rights to noncitizens, states have adopted a type of postnational 
citizenship where noncitizens receive rights based on their personhood, rather than their legal 
status (Soysal 1994). This uncoupling of legal status and rights suggests that inequality between 
legal status groups will lessen in states with blurred citizen-noncitizen boundaries.  
Existing research on the effect of state-level laws has focused on the impact of E-verify 
laws on authorized and unauthorized immigrants. Economists have used CPS data in the 2000s 
and early 2010s to compare immigrants’ employment, labor force participation, and hourly 
earnings (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015). Because CPS does 
not include information on legal status, the authors treated foreign-born individuals who had a 
high school education at most, were not naturalized citizens, and who were either born in Mexico 
(Orrenius and Zavodny 2015) or identified as Hispanic (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2014) as 
likely-unauthorized immigrants. Findings are not consistent: Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 
(2014) found that E-Verify laws resulted in a decline in unauthorized men and women’s 
employment, but had no effect on authorized immigrants’ employment. This suggests that a law 
brightening the link between rights and legal status increases legal status stratification. In 
contrast, Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) found that E-Verify mandates did not affect unauthorized 
men’s employment, but did lower their earnings. For unauthorized women, E-Verify increased 
their labor force participation and employment, as a result of their spouse’s lower earnings. E-
Verify mandates also improved labor market outcomes for Mexican men who are naturalized 
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U.S. citizens, as their employment and earnings increased. This suggests a law brightening the 
link between rights and legal status increases legal status stratification for men’s wages only.  
Contributions 
 
This dissertation improves upon the legal status literature methodologically and 
theoretically. First, existing quantitative studies using CPS data rely on an indirect approximation 
of unauthorized legal status; all Hispanic, noncitizen immigrants with a high school degree or 
less are considered to be unauthorized (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012; Orrenius and 
Zavodny 2015). This dissertation’s CSMI technique improves upon these studies by using the 
characteristics of known unauthorized immigrants in the SIPP to predict unauthorized status in 
the ACS and CPS. Second, CSMI allows for the inclusion of unauthorized immigrants from 
outside of Latin America and Mexico in analyses so that I can test whether these immigrants 
similarly experience wage penalties. This is an improvement over existing studies that largely 
focus on Mexican immigrants. Finally, this dissertation further analyzes how legal status 
penalties shift based on context. It is the first study to consider how state policy contexts 
moderate the effect of unauthorized legal status. I expect that states who decouple rights from 
legal status and blur the citizen-noncitizen boundary will curb the wage gap between authorized 
and unauthorized workers. I expect states that brighten boundaries by revoking immigrant rights 
will exacerbate legal status stratification.  
Spill-Over Effects of Bright Boundaries: Second-Generation Economic Incorporation 
 
Second-generation immigrants’ economic incorporation has often been studied by 
comparing their outcomes across different source country groups and with third-generation and 
higher non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans, and Puerto Ricans (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean 
and Stevens 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Among second-generation 
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immigrants in New York City, South Americans are the most likely to be employed, whereas 
Dominicans and West Indians are the most likely to be unemployed (Kasinitz et al. 2008). In a 
comparison of second-generation Mexicans to third-generation non-Hispanic whites and African 
Americans, second-generation Mexicans were no less likely than whites to be employed and less 
likely than African Americans to be unemployed (Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). Many 
second-generation national origin groups’ wages are on par with those of native whites (Kasinitz 
et al. 2008), but second-generation Mexicans and Asian American men who do have high levels 
of education earn less (Bean and Stevens 2003; Kim and Sakamoto 2014; Waldinger, Lim, and 
Cort 2007). Overall, economic differences remain both between second-generation national-
origin groups and between second-generation groups and native whites. 
Some differences in second generation employment and wages could be due to the bright 
boundaries in policy. Much of federal policy explicitly targets unauthorized workers, but the 
anti-immigrant sentiment in federal policy “spills over” and negatively affects later generations 
of immigrants (Aranda, Menjívar, and Donato 2014). IRCA sanctions affect some employers’ 
hiring decisions and result in employment discrimination against legal immigrants and “foreign 
appearing” U.S. citizens (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995; U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) 1990).5 The U.S. GAO performed a hiring audit study and surveyed employers on their 
hiring practices. In the audit study, white and Hispanic pairs matched closely on their traits 
applied for low-skilled, entry level jobs in Chicago and San Diego. White job applicants received 
52 percent more job offers than Hispanic applicants. The employer survey determined that 14 
                                                 
5 Notably, Calavita (1990) argues that IRCA does not deter employer hiring of unauthorized or likely 
unauthorized workers. Under IRCA, employers must not “knowingly hire” unauthorized workers, but as 
long as employers check workers documents and fill out an I-9 form, they have complied with the law. In 
her interviews with employers, Calavita found that the widespread presence of false documents made 
employers’ compliance with IRCA relatively easy while still allowing them to hire unauthorized workers.  
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percent of employers reported that they began hiring only persons born in the United States 
because of IRCA.  
Lowell and colleagues (1995) supplemented the GAO employer survey with data on the 
percentage of an employer’s employees who were Hispanic so that they could examine how 
employer practices affected hiring. They found that the more aware employers were of IRCA 
employer sanctions, the more likely they were to examine the documents of employees who 
appeared foreign. In turn, employers practicing these discriminatory acts employed fewer 
Hispanics (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). In addition to national origin discrimination in 
hiring, Davila and colleagues’ (1998) analysis of NLSY found that wage returns to training were 
lower for Mexicans than whites in the post-IRCA period.6 Overall, evidence suggests that IRCA 
has increased employment discrimination against U.S.-born Hispanics (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 
1998; Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995; GAO 1990). 
IRCA sanctions and increased immigration enforcement may have resulted in 
discrimination against native Hispanics because employers feel that in order to avoid IRCA fines 
for hiring unauthorized workers, they should be able to differentiate between legitimate and 
forged documentation. Due to their inability to distinguish forged documentation, employers 
instead relied on other observed signals, such as skin tone or last name, to infer job applicants’ 
legal status and avoid hiring anyone who might be unauthorized (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 
1995). Qualitative research has described how many native-born, non-Hispanic whites associate 
brown skin tone and Spanish surnames with unauthorized status (Jiménez 2008). Even if 
employers are relatively unconcerned about being audited by DHS, they may be less likely to 
                                                 
6 Mexicans included both Mexican-Americans and long-term Mexican immigrants. The authors did not 
distinguish between the two groups in analyses.  
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hire Hispanics or authorized Latin American immigrants because of the cost of sorting through 
paperwork to determine an employee’s legality (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 1998). Alternatively, 
employers may be unsure of the future enforcement level of IRCA sanctions and so rely on 
observed signals when hiring to limit their hiring of unauthorized immigrants (Davila, Pagan, 
and Grau 1998).  
Contributions 
Research on second-generation immigrants’ economic outcomes usually has a national 
focus (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007) or only 
compares second-generation groups within one state, such as New York (Kasinitz et al. 2008). 
Yet second generation incorporation may differ across states. Because there is evidence that 
federal enforcement policy negatively impacts the work outcomes of US-born Hispanics, state 
enforcement laws might also result in employer discrimination against second-generation 
immigrants. This dissertation builds on research testing the spillover hypothesis. Current 
research suggests that second-generation Latinos living in cities that had passed an anti-
immigrant ordinance and had large shares of coethnics reported higher levels of discrimination 
(Ebert and Ovink 2014). Therefore, like federal immigrant legislation, state legislation may 
result in poorer economic outcomes for second-generation immigrants, even though laws do not 
target them.  
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation’s overarching objective is to determine how US state policy context 
impacts the economic incorporation of first and second generation immigrants. To analyze the 
impact of state policy context, it creates an innovative state policy typology that considers state-
level immigration and social rights laws. The dissertation then uses this typology to 1) 
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investigate the association between state policy context and first generation immigrants’ labor 
force participation; 2) examine if state policy context exacerbates or decreases the unauthorized-
authorized immigrant wage gap; and 3) explore whether the effects of immigration and 
immigrant rights laws spill over to second generation immigrants’ labor force participation and 
wages.  
Overall, the dissertation will advance thinking on immigrant incorporation. First, it 
moves the study of the effects of government policy on immigrant integration from an emphasis 
on national-level policy to focus on variations at a more proximate level of government. It 
directly tests the expectations of citizen-noncitizen boundary processes framework to determine 
whether bright boundaries at the state-level exclude immigrants from economic opportunities 
and whether blurred boundaries at the state-level integrate immigrants into the state economy. 
Second, by creating a state immigration policy typology, it recognizes greater complexity in 
policy effects. Past research largely focuses on the effects of immigration policy and does not 
account for the effects of immigrant social rights policy, despite these laws directly regulating 
immigrant access to work opportunities. Third, the dissertation contributes to legal status 
research by identifying whether a new source of stratification, state-level policy, exacerbates or 
ameliorates the disadvantages of unauthorized legal status. Finally, the project contributes to the 
literature on the unintended effects of anti-immigration policy, as it explores whether policies 
aimed at the immigrant population spill over to affect second-generation immigrants.  
The following chapter describes the methodological approach used by this dissertation. It 
includes a detailed description the creation of a state immigration typology which considers both 
immigration and social rights laws. Chapter 2 also includes details on how I performed CSMI 
and presents demographic comparisons of the characteristics of the unauthorized population 
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identified through CSMI with unauthorized populations from other data sources where legal 
status is directly measured. Chapters 3 through 5 present empirical results. Chapter 3 explores 
how blurred and bright boundaries, as measured through the state typology, influence first-
generation immigrants’ labor force participation. I use multilevel models on 2000-2015 
American Community Survey data and account for other state factors and individual 
characteristics. Chapter 4 examines how legal status stratification is curbed or exacerbated by 
blurred and bright boundaries. In this chapter, I use the 1998-2015 Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups of the Current Population Survey (CPS-MORG) to show the existing wage-gap between 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants and how it has changed over time. I then evaluate the 
interaction between state policy type and immigrant legal status. Chapter 5 tests whether the 
effects of bright or blurred citizen-noncitizen boundaries spill over to affect second-generation 
immigrants, even though these immigrants fall squarely within the citizen in-group. This chapter 
uses 1998-2015 CPS-MORG data to evaluate the association between state typology and second-
generation labor force participation and wages. The final chapter summarizes the main findings 
of the dissertation and outlines the main contributions made to immigration research. The 
dissertation ends with a discussion of the implications of the findings for future research and for 
immigration policymaking at the state and federal level.   
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Chapter Two – Methodology 
 Because my primary interest is understanding whether state-level immigration laws are 
associated with the economic well-being of immigrants and the second-generation, my empirical 
approach involves a comparison of immigrants’ economic outcomes over time and across US 
states. Analyses use multi-level quantitative methods on two large nationally-representative 
datasets, the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS), in 
conjunction with state-level contextual data. The methodological approach is motivated by two 
key considerations: first, how should we classify states based on the immigrant-native 
boundaries codified in their immigration laws? Second, how can we account for the varying legal 
statuses of the immigrant population, a piece of information that is not commonly collected by 
nationally-representative surveys? This chapter first describes the development of the key 
independent variable, a new measure of state policy context that captures state positions on 
immigration and immigrant social rights policies. It then goes on to describe how I account for 
immigrant legal status using cross-survey multiple imputation and detail the strengths and 
limitations of this method. 
State Immigration Typology 
Past Approaches to Measurement 
 To date, US states primarily have been seen in an anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant light. 
Political scientists have developed measures to examine why some states adopt laws hostile to 
immigrants while other states adopt welcoming laws to help them integrate (Chavez and Provine 
2009; Monogan 2013). These studies have used the National Conference of State Legislature’s 
(NCSL) compilation of state laws related to immigrants to count the number of anti- or pro- 
immigrant laws passed. Sociologists have examined the effects of state-level laws on immigrant 
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incorporation, usually outside the economic realm. For example, Okamoto and Ebert (2010) have 
shown that increased levels of threat, as measured by the number of anti-immigrant laws passed 
by the state, increased immigrant protest. However, pro- and anti-immigrant legislation counts 
do not differentiate between immigration laws and immigrant social rights laws, and not all laws 
included in these measures are directly or indirectly related to immigrants’ participation in the 
workforce.  
 Other scholars have measured state context by examining states’ social rights laws. Hero 
and Preuhs (2007) examined why states chose to extend welfare eligibility to immigrants and 
constructed a factor score for each state based on whether states provided TANF, general 
assistance, food stamps, SSI, and Medicaid to immigrants. They also constructed a 
multiculturalist factor scale that considered whether undocumented immigrants were eligible for 
a state driver’s license or resident tuition, captured the amount of state funding for limited 
English proficiency programs, and identified if the state had certification for bilingual and ESL 
instructors, English only laws, or a Cesar Chavez Day. Filindra and colleagues (2011) used these 
measures to show a positive association between welfare policies and high school graduation 
rates for children of immigrants, but a negative association between multiculturalism policies 
and graduation. Van Hook and colleagues (2006) used the Urban Institute’s “Safety Net” scale 
(Zimmermann and Tumlin 1999) to show that high benefit levels do not reduce the likelihood of 
immigrant naturalization, except in states with highly receptive native populations. However, all 
of these social rights measures omit any consideration of immigration enforcement and are 
limited to one point in time (1999).  
 Other scholars have examined the impact of state-level immigration laws, usually by 
comparing conditions before and after the passage of Arizona’s SB 1070. In this line of work, 
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Santos and Menjivar (2013) demonstrate that the passage of Arizona’s SB 1070 weakened 
immigrant youths’ sense of being American and reduced their psychological well-being. Toomey 
and colleagues (2014) show that mothers were less likely to utilize public assistance after SB 
1070 passed. In one of the most comprehensive measures, Leerkes and colleagues (2012) created 
a latent variable of internal border control. They included the percentage of firms that were 
enrolled in E-Verify; whether or not there were any state laws that intended to restrict 
unauthorized immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses, the labor market, and public benefits; and 
the percentage of counties involved in 287g. They went on to demonstrate that internal border 
control resulted in a negative effect on unauthorized residence in those states. However, this 
latent class measure fails to differentiate states who are welcoming to immigrants from states that 
are relatively uninvolved with immigration legislation. Further, this measure collapses states’ 
involvement in immigration enforcement with those who restrict immigrants’ rights. The 
measure assumes states who enact immigration enforcement regimes and deny immigrants with 
rights and benefits are similar to those states who only refuse to provide immigrants with rights 
and benefits. 
 Researchers have begun to identify states with certain combinations of immigration laws. 
For example, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram (2014) identified pro-integration states as those 
states who may have passed limits on detainers, limits on E-Verify, driver’s licenses for 
unauthorized immigrants, and in-state tuition and financial aid for unauthorized immigrants. 
Karoly and Perez-Arce (2016) at RAND identified states as unrestrictive, mixed, or restrictive 
based on whether they had passed omnibus immigration legislation, immigration-related law 
enforcement, E-Verify, in-state tuition, driver’s license, or health care access laws. RAND’s 
measure recognizes both immigration and immigrant rights laws, but this measure is limited to 
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one point in time (2015) and again does not recognize the unique combination of enforcement 
and rights laws.  
Current Approach 
 State-level immigration and immigrant rights laws are two distinct types of laws that 
could influence immigrants’ economic incorporation. Immigration laws signal the likelihood that 
unauthorized immigrants will be able to remain and have access to the labor market without the 
fear of being removed. Immigrant social rights laws enable or restrict immigrants’ access to the 
labor market, either directly, by preventing their hiring, or indirectly by making it easier to obtain 
a job; for example, immigrants may have higher LFP if they can more easily drive to their job, 
obtain needed higher education, or rely on benefits to use as a brief stopgap for unemployment.  
 This dissertation creates a state typology which classified states based on their bright and 
blurred immigration and immigrant social rights laws. I drew on the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (2016) and Ebert, Estrada, and Lore’s (2014) state immigration law databases 
to create a comprehensive list of all immigration laws passed between 1997 and 2015. This 
comprehensive list allowed me to identify immigration laws that related to states’ level of 
cooperation with ICE, level of enforcement of autonomy, treatment of immigrants within the 
court system, and view of the federal immigration system. I also identified social rights laws 
regulating immigrants’ access to the labor market, access to benefits, and recognition of cultural 
diversity. Specifically, I identified laws regulating the use of E-Verify for immigrant hiring and 
laws regulating immigrant access to professional and occupational licenses, state-funded 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),7 driver’s licenses, higher education, and 
                                                 
7 For TANF eligibility, I supplemented NCSL and SIP databases with Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules 
Databook. Urban Institute surveyed states caseworker manuals and regulations yearly to determine 
eligibility for states cash assistance programs for needy families.  
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access to language translation. Although the laws that I use are relatively detailed and 
encompassing of different immigrant integration realms, they are not exhaustive. However, I 
include some of the most-commonly adopted laws to serve as a signal of the overall state policy 
environment toward immigrants. Additionally, these laws all relate, either directly or indirectly, 
to immigrants’ ability to obtain a job within the state. Finally, each of these laws relates to the 
brightening or blurring of a boundary set in place at the federal level.  
I use 1997 as a baseline for this typology because IIRIRA and PRWORA’s passage in 
1996 signaled that the states should increase their participation in immigration and immigrant 
rights legislation. I relied on other sources to determine if states had passed immigration laws or 
immigrant rights laws prior to 1997. For cooperation with ICE, I referred to the DHS website’s 
(2016) list of active and expired 287g agreements. For professional and occupational license 
laws, I surveyed each state’s 1997 statutes to examine whether the state required citizenship or 
authorized legal status for four occupations: teachers, nurses, cosmetologists, and contractors. 
For driver’s licenses, I used the National Conference of State Legislatures’ (2015b) list of state 
laws providing access to driver’s licenses or cards, and for higher education laws, I used the 
National Conference of State Legislatures’ (2015a) list of tuition benefits for immigrants. For 
English official laws, I used data provided by two organizations that track English Only laws: US 
English and English First. 
After identifying what states had enacted these laws and when, the laws were coded 
based on two factors: first, whether the law brightened or blurred the federal-level boundary 
between immigrants and natives, and second, with a three-point scale recognizing the law’s 
potential scope. A law brightened the immigrant-native boundary if it sought to remove 
immigrants from the state or limited the resources, benefits, or rights an immigrant could obtain. 
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A law blurred the immigrant-native boundary if it disregarded immigrant status, either by 
preventing immigration enforcement, or by extending benefits, resources, or rights to a formerly 
excluded immigrant group. See Table 2.1 for a summary of the native-immigrant boundaries 
codified at the federal level. Scope scores quantified the law’s potential impact. A score of 1 
signified that the law affected many or most immigrants, 0.5 signified that the law affected some 
or a proportion of immigrants, while .25 signified that the law was symbolic.  
Refer to Table 2.1 
An example of a bright law with a scope score of 1 is Utah’s SB 81, passed in 2008. This 
law required county sheriffs to make a reasonable effort to verify the immigration status of 
confined foreign nationals. It brightened the boundary between immigrants and natives by 
mandating that local law enforcement try to identify a person’s immigrant status, and it received 
a scope score of 1 because it potentially affects all immigrants who come into contact with local 
law enforcement. In contrast, Kansas’ HB 2145 (2004) is an example of a blurred law of limited 
scope. HB 2145 extends in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants if they had graduated from a 
Kansas high school and filed an affidavit stating their intent to legalize when able to do so. This 
law blurred the boundary between immigrant and native by extending higher education 
opportunities to unauthorized immigrants. However, because only unauthorized immigrants who 
had graduated from Kansas high schools were eligible (disqualifying older unauthorized 
immigrants who may want to return to college for their degree), I coded the scope of the law as 
0.5. See Table 2.2 for a list of included laws, whether they blurred or brightened the federal 
boundary, and their scope scores.  
Refer to Table 2.2  
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Based on these laws, I created an aggregate score for each of the two dimensions so that 
states could be classified as having bright, blurred, or no immigration laws and bright, blurred, or 
no social rights laws (see Figure 2.1). I reclassified states whose scores resulted in a null score 
due to bright and blurred laws canceling out. In these cases, I prioritized states’ work-related 
laws and enforcement autonomy laws for their re-classification.8  After categorizing states on 
these two axes, I identified four types of states policy contexts related to immigration.  
Refer to Figure 2.1 
State Policy Contexts 
Exclusionist states brighten boundaries on both the immigration and social rights 
dimensions. These states deny rights to immigrants and actively seek to detain or deport the 
unauthorized immigrant population because they are viewed as lawbreakers or criminals. 
Arizona is the most-commonly known exclusionist state. Arizona has brightened boundaries 
through enforcement as it entered into 287(g) agreements and SB 1070 required its state law 
enforcement officials to attempt to determine and verify the legal status of immigrants pulled 
over on a stop or arrest. Further, Arizona has passed laws requiring its employers to use E-
Verify, penalizing employers through the revocation of their business license if they are found to 
have hired unauthorized immigrants, and upholding English as the official language for 
government business.  
Rights restrictionist states brighten boundaries on the social rights dimension but do not 
brighten or blur boundaries on the immigration dimension. These states are not actively involved 
                                                 
8 For the social rights typology, E-Verify laws were considered the most important, followed by driver’s 
license laws, access to TANF, access to college, access to occupational/professional licenses, and finally, 
language translation. For the immigration typology, enforcement autonomy laws and cooperation with 
ICE were the most important.  
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in immigration enforcement, but view immigrants as unfair competitors in the labor force, a 
drain on public services, or cultural threats. Instead of deporting immigrants, the environment in 
these states is unwelcoming and might encourage immigrants to “self-deport.” For example, 
Nebraska views immigrants as unfair competitors and brightened the boundary between 
immigrants and natives by requiring employers to use E-Verify. Texas views immigrants as a 
drain on public services and does not consider legal permanent residents past the five-year bar 
eligible for TANF benefits. Massachusetts views immigrants as cultural threats and passed an 
English-only law (in public schools).  
Noninterventionist states do not brighten or blur immigration and social rights 
boundaries. These states are hands-off on immigration issues and did not pass any laws this 
dissertation identified as key to immigrants’ economic outcomes. Some noninterventionist states, 
such as Idaho or Iowa before the year 2000, do not have a large immigrant population. Other 
noninterventionist states, such as Michigan and Minnesota, have sizeable immigrant populations, 
but largely remain uninvolved in immigration regulation. Because they do not take their own 
stance on immigration, noninterventionist states may reflect federal-level immigrant-native 
boundaries. 
Finally, inclusionist states blur social rights boundaries and reflect or blur immigration 
boundaries. These states view immigrants as complementary to the labor force, contributors to 
the tax base, or enrichers of US culture. For example, California passed laws prohibiting 
localities from mandating the use of E-Verify, providing legal permanent residents with TANF, 
and requiring state agencies or programs to provide translation services. Additionally, some of 
these states also blur immigration boundaries. States such as California, Oregon, and Connecticut 
have prohibited state law enforcement officials’ participation in immigration enforcement; these 
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states welcome immigrants’ presence and blur the line between authorized and unauthorized 
immigrants. Figure 2.2 shows how states were classified in the most recent year of the data. 
Refer to Figure 2.2 
Change over Time 
Overall, between 1997 and 2015, rights restrictionist states were the most common 
(43%), followed by inclusionist (26%), exclusionist (21%), and noninterventionist states (10%). 
However, this distribution shifted over time (see Figure 2.3). In 1997, most states were rights 
restrictionist, given that many states had passed English only laws in the 1980s and 1990s. By 
the early 2000s, however, many states transitioned into inclusionist states by extending welfare 
benefits to immigrants that had been excluded by PRWORA. 2002 saw an increase in 
exclusionist states, perhaps due to increased enforcement efforts from 9/11. From 2005 to 2015, 
the proportion of exclusionist states increased due to rights restrictionist states passing 
enforcement legislation. Meanwhile, from 2005 to 2012, the proportion of inclusionist states 
decreased, usually because states who had extended some kind of welfare benefit then restricted 
immigrant access to work through E-Verify or professional license laws (such as Nebraska) or 
rescinded benefits formerly extended to immigrants (such as Tennessee extending driver’s 
licenses to unauthorized immigrants then requiring authorized status a few years later). In 2013, 
inclusionist states begin to increase, largely due to an uptick in driver’s licenses laws being 
extended to unauthorized immigrants. By 2014, all states have taken some kind of stance on 
immigration and/or immigrant rights within their states. In 2015, states were closely split 
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between exclusionist (36%), rights restrictionist (30%), and inclusionist (34%) categories. 
Notably, only one-fifth of states remained in the same typology over the entire time period.9   
Refer to Figure 2.3 
Why State-Level Laws? 
 States are not the only actors involved in immigration and immigrant social rights 
legislation. An increasing number of counties and municipalities have also passed these types of 
laws. Counties often decide to enter into 287(g) agreements and municipalities have enacted 
sanctuary city policies, which usually declare that local law enforcement will not cooperate with 
federal immigration enforcement officers expect in cases of felony crimes (Varsanyi 2010). 
Some cities have passed ordinances penalizing local employers for hiring unauthorized residents, 
while others have extended municipal ID cards to immigrants to help them obtain city services. 
Local-level laws are important; however, I choose to focus on state laws because laws at 
the state level have a larger reach than local-level laws and potentially affect more immigrants 
(Wong and Garcia 2015). Immigrants cannot move as easily in and out of state jurisdiction as 
they can cities and counties; therefore, state laws will be more likely to have a consistent impact 
on the immigrant population. A focus on the state-level also complements the existing studies of 
immigrant integration, which have primarily examined immigrants’ outcomes in traditional 
immigrant-receiving metropolitan areas, such as New York and Los Angeles. Finally, the federal 
government views states as primary actors in immigration enforcement and immigrant 
integration – IIRIRA and PRWORA specifically delegate responsibility for immigration 
                                                 
9 States remaining in the same typology over the entire time period were: Arizona (exclusionist); 
Arkansas (rights restrictionist); Kentucky (rights restrictionist); Mississippi (rights restrictionist); New 
Hampshire (rights restrictionist); New Mexico (inclusionist); North Dakota (rights restrictionist); Oregon 
(inclusionist); Washington (inclusionist), and West Virginia (rights restrictionist).  
38
  
enforcement and immigrant integration to the states. Therefore, a consideration of state-level 
laws is a first step in determining the impact of multilevel immigration regimes on immigrant 
incorporation.  
Accounting for Unauthorized Status in American Community Survey and Current 
Population Survey Data 
 
 American Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS) data are 
commonly used for studying labor force participation and hourly wages. Unlike other surveys of 
immigrants, such as the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, the Children of 
Immigrants Longitudinal Study, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, ACS and 
CPS include a large number of immigrants from states across the country. Unlike the Mexican 
Migration Project and the Latin American Migration Project, ACS and CPS include data on 
immigrants from a wide variety of origin countries. And unlike the New Immigrant Survey, ACS 
and CPS include data on immigrants who are currently unauthorized. However, a weakness of 
these data is that they do not indicate immigrant legal status (Massey and Bartley 2005). Because 
the share of the unauthorized population grew before the advent of the 2008 economic recession, 
and because state laws have changed the awards and penalties for unauthorized immigrants, it is 
important to be able to distinguish this group to account for the legal disadvantages associated 
with this status.  
 Fortunately, Van Hook and colleagues (2015) have accounted for unauthorized legal 
status in ACS and CPS data using cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI). Researchers employ 
CSMI to impute variables that are missing in one dataset but observed in another. To reliably 
perform CSMI, the samples in the datasets should be drawn from the same universe and all other 
variables must be observed in both datasets. Following Van Hook, I used the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) modules from 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 to impute 
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unauthorized legal status in ACS and CPS data. The SIPP asks immigrants about their legal 
status with the following question: “When [respondent] moved to the United States to live, what 
was [respondent’s] immigration status?” Answer options included: 1) immediate relative or 
family-sponsored permanent resident; 2) employment-based permanent resident; 3) other 
permanent resident; 4) granted refugee status or granted asylum; 5) nonimmigrant (e.g. 
diplomatic, student, business, or tourist visa); 6) other. Publicly-available data collapse 
categories 1 through 3 into legal permanent residents (LPRs) and 4 through 6 into other, non-
LPR status. All respondents who were not LPRs were asked “Has [respondent’s] status been 
changed to permanent resident?” Immigrants in the non-LPR status whose status had not 
changed were assumed to be unauthorized immigrants. 
 One concern is that the SIPP sample does not sufficiently capture the unauthorized 
population, a population that can be difficult to reach and may not honestly report their 
unauthorized status. There may also be concerns that immigrants will simply not answer 
questions about their legal status. However, Bachmeier and colleagues (2014) show that only 13 
percent of noncitizen immigrants had an ambiguous legal status due to nonresponse and that 
nonresponse to legal status questions was not higher than nonresponse to other immigration-
related variables, such as place of birth or year of immigration. Second, comparisons of the 
characteristics of unauthorized immigrants in SIPP compare favorably to the characteristics of 
the unauthorized population produced using the residual estimation method. Under the residual 
estimation method, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines the total size of the 
foreign-born population living in the United States from ACS or Census data (Hoefer, Rytina, 
and Campbell 2006). Then, the DHS subtracts the legally-resident, foreign-born population size, 
as determined from Department of State administrative records, from the total size of the 
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foreign-born population. Comparisons showed that a similar share of unauthorized immigrants in 
DHS and SIPP are from Mexico (57 and 55 percent, respectively), lived in California, and were 
male (Bachmeier, Van Hook, and Bean 2014). These similarities suggest that misreporting of 
legal status is not so widespread in SIPP that it biases representations of the unauthorized 
population. 
CSMI Methodology: SIPP to ACS 
 
 To impute unauthorized status in ACS data, I follow Van Hook’s CSMI method. This 
method pools SIPP and ACS data and “treats the absence of an unauthorized status indicator in 
the latter as a missing data problem to be addressed by multiple imputation techniques” (339). I 
impute an indicator of unauthorized legal status for noncitizen immigrants using multiple 
chained equations. I use Stata 14 to create 5 datasets and perform analyses using mi routines. 
 To prepare SIPP data for CSMI involved four steps. First, I limited SIPP data to foreign-
born immigrants of non-US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with known birth country. Birth 
country and/or region significantly predicts unauthorized status and therefore is important for 
imputation. SIPP data list 114 birth countries, but collapses others into “elsewhere.” Immigrants 
in the elsewhere category are not missing on their country of birth; instead, SIPP did not provide 
the specific country, possibly because of small numbers. Immigrants from “elsewhere” were 
excluded (N=73). Second, I adjusted for the over-reporting of citizenship within the surveys.10 I 
reassigned respondents who reported they were naturalized citizens, but had lived in the US for 
fewer than 5 years (the requirement for naturalization), and were not born in a US territory, had 
migrated after the age of 17, and did not have US citizen spouse (N=265, or 2.8% of the foreign-
                                                 
10 Van Hook and Bachmeier (2013) showed that over-reporting of citizenship was common in the ACS. 
Misreporting is high among all immigrants who have lived in the US for fewer than five years.  
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born SIPP sample). Third, authorized and unauthorized legal status responses allocated by the 
Census Bureau due to nonresponse were set to missing. The Census Bureau allocated missing 
responses using hot-deck imputation, a method where Census researchers match a record with 
missing data to a record with similar characteristics and then replace missing values from the 
matched case. These cases are usually matched on sex, race, age, marital status, disability status, 
and the presence of own children in the household (Westat 2001). However, it is not clear if 
researchers match individuals on country of birth or year of arrival when they allocate missing 
legal status. Therefore, I treat these allocated values as missing (N=5,142).  
Fourth, SIPP immigrants were re-assigned from the unauthorized category to the 
LPR/authorized category if they had characteristics that suggested they were refugees or 
nonimmigrants. To identify possible refugees, I used data from the DHS’ Office of Immigration 
Statistics (2016) to determine the proportion of immigrants admitted from a given country in a 
given year who were admitted as refugees (proportion = number of refugees/number of LPRs).11 
I merged these proportions to each noncitizen in SIPP based on his/her country of birth and year 
of entry.12 For each noncitizen in SIPP, I took a random draw from a uniform distribution and 
compared it to the proportion refugee. If the proportion refugee exceeded the random draw, and 
the immigrant had not already identified as an LPR, he or she was reassigned to the 
LPR/authorized category (N=167). To identify possible nonimmigrants, I used criteria such as 
time spent in the US and the occupation/industry in which the individual worked. Table 2.3 lists 
                                                 
11 For data between 2001 and 2015, I use the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. For data before 2001, I 
use INS’ “Immigrants Admitted to the United States” data, available at ICPSR. 
12 SIPP does not provide exact year of entry and instead provides an interval range. Proportion refugee 
was calculated as an average across this range. SIPP 2008 did not release country of birth data for 
foreign-born respondents and instead provides birth region. Proportion refugee was calculated as the 
weighted average proportion of refugee from countries in the region (weighted by the total number of 
LPRs from each country). 
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the criteria used to identify nonimmigrants; a total of 327 individuals were reassigned as 
authorized.13 I also reassigned individuals who had military service (N=23), persons who worked 
in the public sector (N=125) or a job requiring legal immigrant status (N=4), and persons who 
likely qualified for IRCA legalization because they had lived in the US since before 1982 
(N=137).  
Refer to Table 2.3 
To prepare ACS data for CSMI, I limited the data to foreign-born immigrants of non-US 
citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with known birth country. Similar to SIPP, ACS data list 171 
possible birth countries, but collapses some into “other.” Immigrants in this category were 
excluded (N=1250).14 I adjusted for the over-reporting of citizenship common in government 
surveys using the same method as I used in SIPP (described above). 10,815 (or 0.4% of the 
foreign-born sample) were reassigned. I then generated a dichotomous unauthorized variable set 
equal to missing for all noncitizens.  
ACS and SIPP noncitizens were pooled and a weighted logistic regression model 
predicting unauthorized status was estimated separately for men and women. Because ACS data 
are cross-sectional over time, imputations were also performed separately by sets of matched 
survey years. ACS 2000-2003 data were matched to SIPP 2001 data, ACS 2004-2008 data were 
matched to SIPP 2004 data, and ACS 2009-2015 data were matched to SIPP 2008 data.15 Models 
were weighted using ACS person weights and SIPP person weights for wave 2. Predictors used 
                                                 
13 Rules used to identify nonimmigrants generously provided Dr. James Bachmeier.  
14 For CSMI, I only excluded ACS immigrants from “elsewhere.” Immigrants from an identified region 
but with an unspecified birth country (e.g., “Central America, not specified”) remained in the imputation 
sample. 
15 ACS 2000 data matched more closely to SIPP 2000 data than SIPP 1996 data. Wave 2 of SIPP 2008 
was largely asked in 2009, so characteristics of SIPP 2008 noncitizens more closely match ACS 2009 
noncitizens. 
43
  
for estimating unauthorized status included age and age-squared, education, race, birth region, 
English language ability, years lived in the US and its squared term, marital status, parental 
status, employment status and occupational status score, home ownership, income-to-poverty 
ratio, and health insurance coverage. Table 2.4 lists how these variables were operationalized for 
each imputation set and compares them to the variables used by Van Hook and colleagues. 
Because some variables used for imputation were not asked of individuals living in group 
quarters (income to poverty ratio, home ownership), I did not impute the legal status of 
individuals in group quarters (N=38,928). Years lived in the US and occupational status were 
sometimes missing in SIPP, so these data were also imputed. I used Stata 14’s mi chained routine 
to impute 5 datasets for each sex and time interval combination. All analyses in Chapter 3 use a 
fully imputed ACS 2000-2015 dataset that drops SIPP observations and appends ACS 
naturalized citizens.  
Refer to Table 2.4 
Evaluation of SIPP-ACS CSMI 
 
ACS and SIPP noncitizens display similar characteristics on average, suggesting that 
CSMI is appropriate for these samples (see Table 2.5). Noncitizens in both ACS and SIPP 
usually have less than a high school degree, are Latino/a, and were born in Central 
America/Mexico. They are married to noncitizen spouses and are parents with children in their 
household. Additionally, most men and women are employed (although the employment rate is 
lower for noncitizen women than men) in jobs with low occupational prestige. Noncitizens are 
unlikely to own their own homes, and men live in households with average incomes about 250 
percent above the poverty line, while women live in households with average incomes around 
230 to 240 percent above the poverty line.  
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Refer to Table 2.5 
However, differences between the noncitizens in ACS and SIPP suggest that ACS may 
capture slightly more unauthorized immigrants than SIPP. Noncitizen men and women in the 
ACS were more likely to hold less than a high school degree, to be non-white, to be born in 
Central America or Mexico, and to speak only some English. ACS noncitizens are also more 
likely to be single and less likely to be parents or own their own home. Because SIPP is a 
longitudinal survey, and immigration status is asked during the second wave, rather than the first, 
it is possible that SIPP has difficulty following the unauthorized immigrant population, and 
therefore captures fewer unauthorized immigrants.  
Table 2.6 presents comparisons between characteristics of the unauthorized population 
from the SIPP and ACS, after imputation, for years at the beginning, middle, and end of the 
sample. In addition, it presents a comparison of the SIPP and ACS data with residual based 
estimates published by the DHS. The residual method allows the DHS to report unauthorized 
immigrants’ years in the U.S., country of birth, state of residence, age, and gender. The DHS 
offers a comparison of the characteristics of the unauthorized population, with the caveat that 
these estimates include immigrants of all ages who migrated to the US since 1980.  
Refer to Table 2.6 
The ACS, SIPP, and DHS estimates of the unauthorized population are not radically 
different. ACS does include a slightly higher percentage of unauthorized immigrants than SIPP. 
Variation exists with respect to the duration of residence – a greater proportion of the 
unauthorized population in the SIPP and ACS have lived in the US for 5 years or less. This may 
be because SIPP and ACS estimates do not include younger immigrants, many who have lived in 
the US for much of their lives (as the 1.5 generation). In terms of region and country of birth, 
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Mexicans predominate, but compared to DHS estimates, ACS and SIPP estimates suggest that a 
larger share of the unauthorized population consists of immigrants from Asia. A larger share of 
the unauthorized population in the ACS and SIPP samples lives in two established destination 
states – California and New York – but also other states outside of established and common new 
destinations. Differences in location estimates may be due to populations moving after filing for 
legal status. Finally, the DHS provided the total population size falling within certain age groups 
by gender, so I that I could calculate the percent of the population age 25 to 54 falling within 
three age categories and the percentage of the population aged 25 to 54 that is female. The age 
breakdowns and percent female of the unauthorized populations are similar across the estimates. 
In sum, the ACS estimates of the unauthorized population are comparable to SIPP and DHS 
estimates. In instances where the estimates diverge, it may be due to the limited age range of the 
population in ACS or due to the fact that immigrants may have moved since they filed 
paperwork with the DHS. I find little to suggest that ACS CSMI estimates are greatly biased.  
CSMI Methodology: SIPP to CPS 
 Authors using the CSMI technique to infer immigrant legal status have not applied it to 
CPS-MORG data. However, Van Hook and colleagues (2015) used CPS-ASEC data, and CPS-
MORG data meet the requirements of CSMI – the samples in the databases are drawn from the 
same universe, the dependent variable for analyses (wages) is observed in both datasets, and 
most other variables used to predict immigrant legal status are jointly observed in both datasets.  
 I prepared SIPP data for CSMI to CPS using most of the same limitations and 
adjustments as used for the ACS CSMI. I limited SIPP data to foreign-born immigrants of non-
US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with a known birth country. I adjusted for the over-reporting of 
citizenship within the survey by re-assigning respondents’ legal status to missing if they reported 
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that they were naturalized but had lived in the US for fewer than 5 years, were not born in a US 
territory, had not migrated before the age of 17, and did not have a US citizen spouse. 
Authorized and unauthorized legal status responses allocated by the Census Bureau due to 
nonresponse were set to missing. Immigrants were re-assigned from the unauthorized category to 
the authorized category if they had characteristics that suggested they were refugees or 
nonimmigrants. As an additional step, I limited SIPP data to the wage-eligible population 
captured by CPS-MORG. Immigrants who were not in the labor force, unemployed, self-
employed, employed in the armed forces, or employed as unpaid family workers were dropped 
from the sample (N=8,323). Immigrants who earned less than $1/hour or more than $250/hour in 
1999 constant dollars were excluded from CSMI (N=172 or .01% of the final sample) so that 
outliers would not bias unauthorized status imputation.  
 I prepared 1998-2015 CPS-MORG data for CSMI by limiting the data to foreign-born 
immigrants of non-US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with known birth country. I adjusted for the 
over-reporting of citizenship by re-assigning respondents legal status to missing if they were 
naturalized but had lived in the US for fewer than five years and were not likely to receive 
citizenship through a parent or spouse (2,508 were reassigned, or 1.37 percent of the sample). 
CPS-MORG data were limited to the noncitizen, wage-eligible population. I then generated a 
dichotomous unauthorized variable set equal to missing for all CPS respondents.  
  I pooled CPS and SIPP data to impute unauthorized status using multiple chained 
equations. Imputations were performed separately for men and women, and were performed 
separately by sets of matched survey years: CPS 1998-2000 data were matched to SIPP 1996 
data, CPS 2001 to 2003 were matched to SIPP 2001 data, CPS 2004-2008 data were matched to 
SIPP 2004 data, and CPS 2009-2015 data were matched to SIPP 2008 data. Predictors used to 
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estimate unauthorized status included wage and occupation-related predictors, such as logged 
hourly wage, whether the immigrant held a professional occupation, whether the immigrant 
received his or her wages on an hourly basis, whether the immigrant was a member of a union or 
covered by a union in his or her workplace, potential years of work experience (age – 
educational attainment in years – 6), and work experience squared. Predictors also included 
financial well-being indicators, such as whether the immigrant had health insurance, the 
immigrant family’s income-to-poverty ratio, whether the immigrant owned his or her home, the 
number of people and number of families living in the household. A number of individual 
characteristics were included: the number of years lived in the US and its square term, 
educational attainment, birth region, marital status, and parental status. Indicators for US state or 
region and year were also included. Table 2.7 lists how these variables were operationalized.  
Refer to Table 2.7 
CPS-MORG does not include questions on health insurance or family income; however, 
these measures were included for the CPS respondents who were in the outgoing rotation group 
during the month of March, when respondents were asked the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC). Years lived in the United States, health insurance, income-to-poverty ratio, 
and hourly wages were sometimes missing, so these data were imputed in addition to 
unauthorized status. I imputed 10 datasets for each sex and time interval combination using Stata 
14’s mi chained routine.  
Evaluation of SIPP-CPS MORG CSMI 
 Noncitizen wage and salary workers have similar profiles in the SIPP and CPS data (see 
Table 2.8). Average noncitizen men and women have considerable work experience and low 
levels of educational attainment. These workers do not hold professional occupations, are not 
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union members, and are paid hourly. Noncitizen men and women are usually married to other 
noncitizens, are parents, and live in households with four other people. The average wage and 
salary worker earns low hourly wages but lives more than 200 percent above the poverty 
threshold. The similarities between wage and salary workers in the SIPP and CPS suggest that 
the samples are appropriate for CSMI.  
Refer to Table 2.8 
However, there are some differences between noncitizen workers in the SIPP and 
noncitizen workers in the CPS. Male and female noncitizens in SIPP are more financially secure 
than those in CPS. For example, men surveyed by SIPP earned slightly higher wages – about 
$14.10 per hour compared to $13.80 per hour in CPS. Women in SIPP earned $12.20 per hour 
compared to $11.60 per hour for women in CPS.16 Men and women also have higher income-to-
poverty ratios in SIPP than in CPS. Men and women in CPS are also less likely to have migrated 
from North American and Europe and are instead more likely to have been born in Central or 
South America. These differences suggest that men and women in the CPS may be slightly more 
likely to have unauthorized legal status. Again, this may be an artifact of the SIPP being a panel 
survey. The legal status question is not asked until the second module, at which point in time, 
unauthorized immigrants may have dropped out of the survey.  
                                                 
16 Hourly wage information is collected differently in CPS and SIPP. SIPP asks respondents their monthly 
earnings (including tips and overtime pay) and how many hours respondents worked per week. SIPP 
hourly wage is calculated as the monthly wage divided by the number of weeks in the month and the 
number of hours worked per week. CPS hourly wage is calculated by dividing weekly earnings by hours 
worked last week. Both estimates replaced the hourly wage rate reported by the respondent if he or she 
was an hourly worker and this rate was higher than the calculated hourly wage based on earnings and 
hours worked. However, higher SIPP hourly rates correspond with higher income to poverty ratios; the 
overall picture suggests that SIPP captures fewer unauthorized immigrants than CPS.  
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Table 2.9 presents weighted descriptive statistics for unauthorized wage and salaried 
workers after imputation.17 In 2001 and 2004 the unauthorized population makes up a larger 
share of the noncitizen population in CPS than it does in SIPP. However, the characteristics of 
the unauthorized population are similar across the two datasets. Many unauthorized immigrants 
have lived in the US for fewer than 5 years, except for 2009, when more unauthorized 
immigrants have lived in the US for 6 to 10 years (among CPS respondents). The smaller share 
of immigrants having lived in the US for fewer than five years in 2009 is not surprising given the 
decline in unauthorized migration to the US during the economic recession. Across both datasets, 
the largest share of unauthorized immigrants is from North America, more specifically, Mexico. 
Most unauthorized immigrants are usually younger (25 to 34) and male.  
Refer to Table 2.9 
In addition to comparing the unauthorized population’s descriptive characteristics across 
the two samples, I also evaluated the imputation of unauthorized status by graphing the 
convergence of the variable’s means and standard deviations across datasets. These diagnostics 
did not show any linear trends, suggesting that convergence was effective and 10 imputations are 
sufficient for analyses.  
Limitations of the CSMI Method, ACS, and CPS Data 
 
 There are some notable limitations of the CSMI method and using ACS and CPS data to 
evaluate immigrant labor force participation and wage levels. First, due to how legal status is 
measured in SIPP, CSMI cannot account for the specific legal status of immigrants in ACS and 
CPS. CSMI cannot identify nonimmigrants who have authorization to work, immigrants with 
                                                 
17 I do not present DHS residual-based estimates as a comparison because DHS statistics describe the 
entire unauthorized population, regardless of whether or not they are wage or salary workers.  
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temporary protected status, or immigrants who received DACA authorization. For the most part, 
these immigrants have characteristics similar to the unauthorized population. For example, many 
workers enter on H2-A or H2-B visas to work in low-skilled occupations or agriculture. 
Immigrants with temporary protected status are commonly Salvadorans or Hondurans who were 
granted this status due to violent conflict in their home countries. DACA recipients were 
formerly unauthorized immigrants who were granted temporary authorization to work. If these 
immigrants are imputed as unauthorized when they, in fact, have work authorization, the 
estimates for unauthorized status will be conservative; the addition of some authorized workers 
in the unauthorized group draws the unauthorized coefficient closer to that of authorized 
workers.  
 SIPP, ACS, and CPS survey design often undercount unauthorized immigrants. These 
surveys may miss unauthorized immigrants in their sample as many unauthorized immigrants are 
a mobile population and follow work around the country. For example, many unauthorized 
workers follow the crop harvest or wherever the weather is suitable for construction. Therefore, 
the unauthorized immigrants included in these surveys are more likely to be established and 
settled within their communities. Mobile unauthorized immigrant populations who follow work 
opportunities may be more likely to be employed than unauthorized workers who remain in one 
community. If the sampled unauthorized immigrants are less likely to be employed or participate 
in the labor force than the unobserved unauthorized immigrants and the authorized immigrants, 
then unauthorized coefficients may be over-stated for labor force participation models. At the 
same time, unauthorized workers who follow work have lower incomes (Hernandez, Gabbard, 
and Carroll 2016) and their wages may be lower. The unauthorized coefficient for wages 
estimates will then be a conservative estimate.  
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Unauthorized immigrants may also be less likely than authorized immigrants to 
participate in SIPP, ACS, and CPS surveys because of their fear of government authorities. 
These surveys are collected by the US Census Bureau, and unauthorized immigrants may assume 
that the survey asks about their legal status, and if so, that information will be shared with ICE. 
Therefore, the surveys may miss some of the most vulnerable unauthorized immigrants – those 
who are fearful of government officials may also be fearful of employers, and therefore not 
participate in the labor force, or accept exploitative working conditions and low wages. Again, 
this suggests that the unauthorized coefficient will be a conservative estimate. If immigrants are 
especially fearful to participate in the survey because of their state policy context (for example, 
unauthorized immigrants are more fearful in exclusionist states with strict enforcement regimes), 
the effect of state policy context on unauthorized immigrants will be limited. 
 I propose that the limitations of CSMI and ACS/CPS data result in mostly conservative 
estimates so that the effects of unauthorized status and state policy context will not be over-
stated. Meanwhile, the main strengths of CSMI are that it produces unbiased estimates, as long 
as certain conditions are met, and that it increases sample size and power. Increased sample size 
and power are necessary for producing estimates across US states. Until researchers can access 
immigration administrative records or surveys add questions about legal status, CSMI is a 
promising method for the evaluation of immigrants’ economic outcomes across state policy 
contexts. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I provided an overview of my main independent variable, state policy 
context, used in the empirical chapters of the dissertation. I argued that previous measures of 
state policy context overlook important distinctions between state laws that restrict immigrants’ 
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rights and laws that increase immigration enforcement. Often these measures only view state 
laws as pro or anti-immigrant, or only capture the effects of one law on the immigrant 
population. My proposed measure of state policy context improves on past measures by 
distinguishing two types of “anti-immigrant” states and accounting for the pro-immigrant 
policies of other states. This chapter also provided a detailed description of how I used CSMI to 
account for unauthorized legal status in ACS and CPS data. While CSMI and ACS/CPS data 
have some weaknesses, I argue that these weaknesses result in conservative estimates and that, 
overall, the characteristics of the unauthorized population in ACS and CPS data are remarkably 
similar to the unauthorized population in SIPP data and captured by DHS estimates. The 
following chapters apply this method and new measure to provide a better picture of how 
immigrant and second-generation labor market outcomes are associated with state policy.  
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Figure 2.1 Classification of US States by Immigration and Social Rights Laws 
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Figure 2.2 Immigration Typology for the US States in 2015 
Source: Author’s calculations from National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) and Ebert, Estrada, and Lore’s 
(2014) state immigration law databases  
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Figure 2.3 US State Immigration Typology, 1997-2015 
 Source: Author’s calculations from National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) and Ebert, Estrada, and Lore’s 
(2014) state immigration law databases   
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Table 2.1 Existing Federal-Level Boundaries between Natives and Immigrants 
 Federal Law Boundary 
Enforcement IIRIRA & AEDPA (1996) 
 
Authorized without criminal record vs. authorized 
with criminal record and unauthorized immigrants – 
increased the offenses for which migrants can be 
deported 
Labor market IRCA (1986) Authorized vs. unauthorized immigrants – 
established employer sanctions to prevent the hiring 
of unauthorized workers 
Occupational licenses PRWORA (1996) Authorized vs. unauthorized immigrants – 
established that unauthorized immigrants are not 
eligible for State public benefits, including 
professional licenses 
Federal TANF PRWORA (1996) Eligible immigrants (mainly LPRs who have lived 
in the US for at least five years, refugees/asylees) 
vs. ineligible immigrants (mainly LPRs who have 
lived in the US for fewer than five years and 
unauthorized immigrants – only eligible immigrants 
may qualify for federal TANF 
Driver’s licenses REAL ID Act (2005) LPRs vs. nonimmigrants and unauthorized 
immigrants – unauthorized immigrants cannot 
obtain driver’s licenses; driver’s licenses for 
nonimmigrants must expire at the same time as their 
visa 
Higher education PRWORA (1996) LPRs and refugees/asylees vs. nonimmigrants and 
unauthorized immigrants – nonimmigrants (except 
for T-visas or VAWA recipients) and unauthorized 
immigrants do not qualify for federal student loans 
Cultural recognition Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964  
Inclusive of all immigrants – protects from 
discrimination based on race, religion, national 
origin, and citizenship 
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Table 2.3 Rules to Identify Nonimmigrants in SIPP  
Visa Type How Identified # Identified 
A Visa: Diplomats 
& Foreign 
Government 
Officials 
Foreign government protection 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 10 years AND 
• Held manager/administer occupation in national security/ 
international affairs AND 
• Was employed or unemployed 
Personal aid 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 10 years AND 
• Was not a family member/related to household reference person AND 
• Was a nursing aid/orderly/attendant or held a personal service 
occupation who worked in national security/international affairs 
0 
FM Visa: Students • Migrated between the ages of 17 and 64 AND 
• Held at least a high school degree AND 
• Was enrolled in college, graduate, professional, or 
vocational/technical school in all four months of the reference period  
(asked of all respondents age 15+) AND 
• Worked fewer than 26 hours in research/development industry or at a 
college/university OR 
• Worked fewer than 20 hours in an industry other than 
research/development or college/university 
111 
J Visa: Exchange 
Visitors 
Professor/Research Scholar 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 5 years AND 
• Worked in research/development industry or at a college/university as 
a: college instructor, architect, surveyor/cartographer, aerospace 
engineer, chemical engineer, civil engineer, electrical engineer, 
industrial engineer, metallurgical engineer, mechanical engineer, 
petroleum/mining/geological engineer, or other engineer, computer 
scientist, computer software developer, actuary, operations and 
systems researcher, mathematician, agricultural/food scientist, 
biological scientist, forester/conservation scientist, medical scientist, 
physicist, chemist, geologist, other physical scientist, economist, 
psychologists, urban planner, social scientist, dentist, dietician, 
optometrist, physician, podiatrist, speech therapist, or veterinarian 
Health Workers 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND 
• Was not a private, for-profit employee AND 
• Worked in a hospital, nursing/personal care facility, or health services 
industry as a: dentist, physician, speech therapist, medical scientist, 
occupational therapist, physical therapist, respiratory therapist, speech 
therapist, other therapist, or other health/therapy occupation 
Physician Program for US Graduate Medical School Education 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 7 years AND 
• Was not a private, for-profit employee AND 
• Was younger than 35 AND 
• Worked fewer than 30 hours per week AND 
• Earned less than $11,460 in a year (1999 constant $) AND 
• Worked at a college/university as a: dentist, physician, speech 
therapist, medical scientist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, 
30 
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respiratory therapist, speech therapist, other therapist, or other 
health/therapy occupation 
Au-Pairs 
• Was not a family member related to the reference person AND 
• Had lived in the US for fewer than 4 years AND 
• Did not live with his/her mother, father, or spouse AND 
• Did not live with his/her own children AND 
• Worked as a child care worker or personal service worker 
H-1 Visa: Nurses Registered Nurses 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND 
• Was not a private, for-profit employee AND 
• Worked in a hospital, nursing/personal care facility, or other health 
services industry as a: registered nurse or licensed practical nurse 
Nursing Students 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 7 years AND 
• Was younger than 35 AND 
• Worked fewer than 30 hours per week AND 
• Earned less than $11,460 in a year (1999 constant $) AND 
• Worked in a college/university as a: registered nurse or licensed 
practical nurse 
0 
H-1B Visa: High-
Tech Workers 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 6 years AND 
• Was a private, for-profit worker or a non-profit worker AND 
• Held at least a Bachelor’s degree AND 
• Worked as a: accountant, financial specialist, surveyor/cartographer, 
aerospace engineer, chemical engineer, civil engineer, electrical 
engineer, industrial engineer, metallurgical engineer, mechanical 
engineer, petroleum/mining engineer, other engineer, computer 
systems analyst, computer software developer, actuary, statistician, 
mathematician, agricultural/food scientist, biological scientist, 
conservation scientist, medical scientist, physicist/astronomer, 
atmospheric/space scientist, chemist, geologist, physical scientist, 
economist, psychologist, urban planner, social scientist, high 
school/college instructor, editor, technical writer, engineer technician, 
physician, biological technician, chemical technician, other 
technician, airplane pilot, broadcast equipment operator, programmers 
of numerically controlled machine tools, precision tool and die 
makers 
160 
L-1 Visa: Intra-
Company 
Transfers 
Managers, Executives, or Specialized Knowledge Workers 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 5 years AND 
• Was a private, for profit worker or a non-profit worker AND 
• Worked as a: chief executive/public administrator, manager/specialist 
in marketing, financial manager, human resources manager, 
purchasing manager, material recording/scheduling/production clerk, 
service organization manager, other manager/administrator, 
purchasing agent or buyer of farm products, buyer/wholesaler of 
retail, personnel/HR specialist, operations systems researcher, 
management analyst, management support worker, accountant, 
insurance underwriter, other financial specialist, advertising or sales 
worker, salesperson, sales engineer, personal service job supervisor, 
117 
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supervisor of sales jobs, office supervisor, supervisor of construction 
work, supervisor of mechanics and repairers, or production supervisor  
G-1 Visa: 
Diplomatic Visa or 
International 
Organization 
Workers 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 5 years AND 
• Was a private, for profit worker or a non-profit worker AND 
• Worked in national security/international affairs as a: librarian, 
lawyer, secretary, typist, office machine operator, administrative 
support worker, telephone operator, telecom operator, computer 
operator, or chauffeur 
0 
R-1 Visa: 
Religious Workers 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND 
• Worked as a clergy or religious worker 
4 
O-1 & P-1 Visas: 
Athletes & 
Entertainers 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND 
• Did not live with his/her mother or father AND 
• Was a private, for profit worker or a non-profit worker AND 
• Earned less than $29,032 in a year (1999 constant $) AND 
• Worked in newspaper publishing, printing, motion pictures/theater, 
entertainment/research services, museum/art gallery, or professional 
services as a: art maker (painter, sculptor, etc.), designer, 
actor/director/producer, athlete/sport instructor/official, dancer, 
musician/composer, art/entertainment performer, writer/author, or 
photographer  
0 
TN Visa: NAFTA 
Professionals 
(Canadians) 
• Participated in the labor force AND 
• Had at least a Bachelor’s degree AND 
• Was born in Canada AND 
• Worked as a: accountant, computer systems analyst, architect, 
surveyor/cartographer, agricultural/food scientist, biological scientist, 
forester/conservation scientist, medical scientist, physicist/astronomer, 
chemist, geologist, economist, psychologist, urban/regional planner, 
social worker, lawyer, HS/college instructor, librarian, technical 
writer, dentist, dietician/nutritionist, pharmacist, occupational 
therapist, physical therapist, other therapist, veterinarian, registered 
nurse, insurance adjuster, timber/logging/forestry worker, dental lab 
technician, architect, biological technician, chemical technician, 
engineering technician, other science technician, or other technician 
10 
Note: An immigrant could fall under multiple visa categories. For example, immigrants identified as possibly on 
a J-1 visa were also commonly identified as possibly being on an H-1B visa. 
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Table 2.6 Comparative Profiles of the Adult Unauthorized Foreign-Born in the United States 
 2000 Comparison 2005 Comparison  
DHS 2000 ACS 2000 SIPP 2001 DHS 2005 ACS 2005 SIPP 2004 
% Unauthorized - 25.9% 23.1% - 26.6% 23.4% 
Years in US 
      
0-5 yrs - 51.0% 50.4% 29.2% 43.3% 43.9% 
6-10 yrs - 25.9% 26.3% 29.8% 30.9% 36.1% 
11-15 yrs - 17.3% 19.3% 19.9% 16.6% 10.6% 
16-20 yrs - 4.4% 3.3% 11.1% 7.4% 7.7% 
21+ yrs - 1.4% 0.7% 10.0% 1.8% 1.7% 
Region of Birth 
      
North America 72.6% 63.5% 65.5% 72.4% 70.3% 74.1% 
Asia 14.3% 20.6% 18.6% 12.4% 12.9% 10.9% 
South America 7.1% 6.2% 5.5% 7.6% 8.0% 8.1% 
Europe 3.6% 5.9% 6.5% 4.8% 5.3% 3.8% 
Other 2.4% 3.8% 3.9% 2.9% 3.5% 3.1% 
Country of Birth 
      
Mexico 55.3% 49.2% 52.2% 56.9% 57.9% 61.1% 
El Salvador 5.1% 3.9% 3.2% 4.5% 3.4% 2.6% 
Guatemala 3.4% 2.5% 1.8% 3.5% 2.5% 3.9% 
Honduras 1.4% 1.7% 2.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.0% 
Philippines 2.2% 2.2% 1.8% 2.0% 1.2% 0.8% 
India 2.1% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% 2.1% 1.5% 
Korea 2.4% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.6% 1.0% 
Ecuador 1.9% 1.0% 1.3% - 1.4% 0.7% 
Brazil 1.2% 0.8% 0.9% 1.6% 1.7% 2.5% 
China 1.9% 3.2% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.0% 
Other 23.0% 30.0% 28.9% 23.0% 24.4% 22.8% 
State of Residence 
      
California 29.7% 32.1% 32.8% 28.4% 26.8% 27.9% 
Texas 12.9% 11.5% 10.4% 14.0% 13.2% 12.2% 
Florida 9.5% 5.2% 5.2% 8.7% 6.5% 7.9% 
New York 6.4% 9.6% 11.5% 5.7% 8.3% 8.7% 
Illinois 5.2% 4.8% 3.4% 5.3% 3.7% 3.3% 
Georgia 3.9% 3.2% 3.5% 4.8% 4.1% 4.3% 
Arizona 2.6% 2.7% 2.0% 4.9% 4.6% 4.3% 
North Carolina 4.1% 2.5% 3.0% 3.7% 2.9% 3.8% 
New Jersey 3.1% 5.4% 3.9% 3.9% 3.2% 3.3% 
Nevada 2.0% 1.7% 2.6% 2.5% 1.4% 0.4% 
Other 20.7% 21.4% 21.7% 18.0% 25.2% 24.0% 
Age 
      
25-34 - 59.8% 61.0% - 58.2% 58.6% 
35-44 - 28.0% 25.3% - 30.2% 27.7% 
45-54 - 12.2% 13.7% - 11.7% 13.6% 
% Female, 25-54 - 46.9% 45.8% - 45.8% 48.5% 
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 2009 Comparison 2012 Comparison  
DHS 2009 ACS 2009 SIPP 2009 DHS 2012 ACS 2012 
% Unauthorized - 30.6% 27.9% - 28.9% 
Years in US 
     
0-7 yrs - 38.2% 50.7% 13.5% 32.7% 
8-12 yrs - 32.2% 28.4% 28.4% 31.6% 
13-17 yrs - 15.9% 12.3% 25.5% 20.3% 
18-27 yrs - 12.7% 8.3% 15.0% 14.4% 
28+ yrs - 1.0% 0.2% 17.5% 1.0% 
Region of Birth 
     
North America 79.4% 78.3% 82.8% 78.1% 77.7% 
Asia 9.3% 9.8% 7.4% 11.4% 11.2% 
South America 6.5% 6.3% 4.4% 6.1% 5.5% 
Europe 2.8% 3.3% 2.9% 2.6% 3.0% 
Other 1.9% 2.4% 2.5% 1.8% 2.6% 
Country of Birth 
     
Mexico 62.0% 59.0% - 58.8% 56.6% 
El Salvador 5.0% 6.3% - 6.0% 6.6% 
Guatemala 4.0% 5.5% - 4.9% 6.0% 
Honduras 3.0% 3.1% - 3.1% 3.6% 
Philippines 2.0% 1.0% - 2.7% 1.1% 
India 2.0% 2.4% - 2.3% 3.2% 
Korea 2.0% 0.9% - 2.0% 0.9% 
Ecuador 2.0% 1.5% - 1.5% 1.3% 
Brazil 1.0% 1.2% - 
 
.9% 
China 1.0% 1.3% - 1.8% 1.6% 
Other 15.0% 17.9% - 16.8% 18.3% 
State of Residence 
     
California 24.0% 27.2% 27.2% 28.0% 26.2% 
Texas 16.0% 10.6% 9.6% 18.2% 10.0% 
Florida 7.0% 5.9% 5.2% 7.3% 5.7% 
New York 5.0% 6.8% 4.7% 5.8% 7.2% 
Illinois 5.0% 4.5% 5.2% 5.4% 4.4% 
Georgia 4.0% 4.8% 4.2% 4.0% 4.5% 
Arizona 4.0% 3.0% 2.8% 3.5% 2.2% 
North Carolina 3.0% 2.9% 4.7% 3.6% 3.4% 
New Jersey 3.0% 4.2% 3.8% 4.3% 4.6% 
Nevada 2.0% 1.7% 2.4% - 1.6% 
Other 25.0% 28.4% 30.2% 20.1% 30.3% 
Age 
     
25-34 47.9% 51.3% 47.8% 43.7% 49.1% 
35-44 38.5% 36.2% 36.3% 39.6% 37.5% 
45-54 13.6% 12.5% 15.9% 16.7% 13.4% 
% Female, 25-54 41.9% 41.7% 43.5% 46.8% 45.2% 
Note: SIPP & ACS estimates are for the unauthorized population aged 25-54; DHS 
estimates are for the total unauthorized population (all ages) except for author-derived 
calculations for age and % female. ACS & SIPP estimates are weighted.  
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Table 2.7 Variables Used to Impute Unauthorized Status in SIPP-CPS CSMI 
Unauthorized Status 0=authorized 
1=unauthorized 
Work Experience in years  (age - educational attainment - 6) 
Work Experience Squared in years 
Educational Attainment 1=less than HS degree 
2=HS degree 
3=some college 
4=Bachelor’s degree 
5=advanced degree 
Years in the US in years (capped at 40) 
Years in the US squared in years 
Birth Region 1=North America/Europe 
2=Asia/Pacific Islands 
3=Africa/Caribbean 
4=Central/South America 
5=Mexico (before SIPP 2008) 
Marital Status 1=single 
2=married, citizen spouse 
3=married, noncitizen spouse 
Parental Status 0=no children (under age of 18) in household 
1=children in the household 
Household Size number of persons 
No. of Families in HH number of families 
Owns home 0=rents/does not own home 
1=owns home 
Income-to-poverty ratio* continuous (1 to 501) 
Has health insurance* 0=no health insurance 
1=health insurance 
Logged Hourly Wage in 1999 constant dollars ($1/hr to $250/hr);  
highest of weekly earnings or hourly wage 
Union Member 1=covered/member 
2=not covered/not member 
Professional Occupation 0=not professional  
1=professional 
Paid Hourly 1=paid hourly 
2=paid in another way 
State/Region of Residence 1=CA 
2=FL 
3=IL 
4=NJ 
5=NY 
6=TX 
7=Pacific/Southwest (AK, AZ, HI, NV, NM) 
8=Northwest (CO, ID, MT, OR, UT, WA) 
9=Midwest (IN, IA, KS, MN, NE, ND, OK, SD, WY) 
10=Great Lakes (MI, OH, WI) 
11=Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, PA, RI, VT) 
12=Mid-Atlantic (DE, MD, VA) 
13=Southeast (GA, NC, SC, WV) 
14=Deep South (AL, AK, KY, LA, MS, MO, TN) 
Year Dichotomous indicator for each year of data in the sample 
*Only available in CPS outgoing rotation groups surveyed in March, during the ASEC 
supplement. 
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 Table 2.9 Comparative Profiles of Unauthorized Wage and Salaried Workers, 1998-2015 
 1998 Comparison 2001 Comparison 2004 Comparison 2009 Comparison  
CPS 
1998 
SIPP 
1996 
CPS 
2001 
SIPP 
2001 
CPS 
2004 
SIPP 
2004 
CPS 
2009 
SIPP 
2009 
% Unauthorized 10.8% 12.9% 22.7% 21.6% 23.9% 21.6% 25.2% 25.6% 
Years in US 
        
0-5 yrs 55.2% 60.7% 43.0% 47.0% 45.5% 39.0% 26.3% 37.4% 
6-10 yrs 32.3% 31.4% 35.5% 29.1% 23.3% 39.0% 41.9% 35.0% 
11-15 yrs 11.6% 7.8% 13.2% 18.5% 22.8% 13.1% 14.6% 17.3% 
16-20 yrs 0.9% 0.1% 6.5% 4.3% 6.2% 7.2% 13.3% 7.8% 
21+ yrs 
  
1.8% 1.0% 2.2% 1.7% 4.0% 2.4% 
Region of Birth 
        
North America 67.4% 68.9% 71.0% 69.6% 76.0% 75.7% 76.9% 82.9% 
Asia 15.3% 15.4% 13.1% 11.5% 11.8% 10.9% 8.5% 6.4% 
South America 8.6% 7.8% 7.5% 6.4% 7.4% 7.8% 9.0% 5.3% 
Europe 5.8% 5.1% 6.8% 8.5% 3.4% 3.2% 2.7% 2.4% 
Other 2.9% 2.8% 1.6% 4.1% 1.3% 2.5% 3.0% 3.0% 
Country of Birth 
        
Mexico 44.3% 46.3% 52.6% 54.8% 59.1% 62.1% 57.8% - 
El Salvador 7.1% 9.8% 5.6% 3.2% 5.4% 3.2% 7.1% - 
Guatemala 5.2% 3.3% 2.8% 2.1% 2.9% 4.5% 4.3% - 
Honduras 0.9% 2.8% 1.8% 3.5% 2.7% 1.3% 3.1% - 
Philippines 3.0% 4.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.1% 0.9% - 
India 2.0% 2.1% 2.5% 2.1% 2.6% 1.2% 2.3% - 
Korea 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 0.4% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% - 
Ecuador 1.4% 2.6% 1.9% 2.2% 1.1% 0.7% 1.8% - 
Brazil 2.0% 0.7% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 1.5% 1.8% - 
China 2.6% 1.6% 2.3% 1.5% 2.1% 2.6% 1.6% - 
Other 30.9% 25.1% 26.6% 27.7% 20.5% 21.2% 0.6% - 
State of Residence 
       
California 35.0% 43.1% 34.3% 31.6% 26.0% 26.7% 26.4% 26.1% 
Texas 7.0% 7.8% 10.9% 10.4% 13.8% 12.9% 8.7% 9.2% 
Florida 3.3% 2.5% 7.2% 5.5% 4.8% 6.3% 4.3% 4.4% 
New York 11.1% 7.3% 12.2% 13.6% 7.5% 8.5% 9.8% 7.0% 
Illinois 10.1% 9.7% 4.7% 3.9% 3.5% 3.8% 4.2% 5.9% 
Georgia 0.6% 0.5% 2.5% 3.1% 4.7% 5.9% 4.7% 3.9% 
Arizona 2.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.0% 5.4% 4.3% 2.3% 3.1% 
North Carolina 0.5% 0.3% 2.1% 3.7% 5.9% 4.7% 3.8% 4.5% 
New Jersey 5.5% 6.9% 2.2% 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 6.0% 4.1% 
Nevada 0.9% 0.4% 0.8% 2.6% 1.7% 0.5% 1.3% 1.6% 
Other 23.4% 19.8% 21.4% 21.9% 23.7% 23.2% 28.5% 30.1% 
Age 
        
25-34 57.7% 63.0% 59.5% 63.8% 58.4% 58.9% 51.8% 46.7% 
35-44 31.4% 28.1% 29.6% 24.5% 31.0% 29.2% 33.0% 36.1% 
45-54 10.9% 8.9% 10.9% 11.6% 10.5% 11.9% 15.2% 17.2% 
% Female 36.3% 31.9% 29.7% 30.1% 31.6% 34.3% 28.9% 32.1% 
Note: Wage and salaried noncitizens aged 25-54. CPS & SIPP estimates are weighted. 
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 Chapter Three – Foreign-Born Labor Force Participation and State Policy Contexts of 
Reception 
 
 Immigrants to the United States have long been perceived as economic movers, 
motivated by better employment chances or higher wages. This view of immigrants takes their 
labor force participation as a given. Yet immigrants’ labor force participation within the US 
varies across states. Among male Mexican immigrants, for example, 96 percent participate in the 
labor force in Maryland, while 90 percent participate in Massachusetts (author’s calculations 
from ACS data). Among Chinese immigrant men, 94 percent participate in the labor force in 
New Jersey, but only 85 percent participate in Louisiana. There is even wider variation in among 
women: 68 percent of Mexican women participate in the labor force in Rhode Island, but only 51 
percent participate in Louisiana. Among Chinese women, 81 percent participate in the workforce 
in Hawaii, but only 63 percent participate in New Hampshire. Differing patterns of labor force 
participation across states suggest that immigrants’ labor market participation depends on other 
factors besides their incentive for migration. The receiving society in immigrants’ choice of 
destination provides them with unique opportunities and constraints for their labor force 
participation.  
Within the US, states have different structural characteristics that influence immigrant 
incorporation, and the landscape of opportunities and constraints for immigrants has become 
more varied since 1996. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which allowed for state participation in federal immigration 
enforcement. In the same year, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which devolved welfare allocation and decisions 
regarding immigrant eligibility to the states. These acts mark the rise of immigration federalism 
where the federal government redistributed and shared its immigration powers with the states 
72
 (Suro 2015).18 In response, state governments have taken initiative regarding immigration 
matters, and the 2000s saw an upswing in the passage of state-level immigration laws, or laws 
related to the enforcement of immigrant entry and exit, and immigrant social rights laws, or laws 
regulating immigrants’ access to education, work, health care, and public benefits (Varsanyi 
2010). States have passed two types of immigration laws with opposing objectives: enforcement 
laws aim to remove unauthorized immigrants from the state, while sanctuary laws aim to limit 
state law enforcement’s involvement with federal enforcement. Similarly, states have passed two 
types of immigrant rights laws: exclusionist laws limit work and benefits to U.S. citizens, while 
inclusionist laws facilitate immigrants’ access to work and extend other social rights to them, 
often regardless of their legal status. These developments in state immigration and social rights 
laws raise the question of how state policy context of reception impacts immigrant labor force 
participation. This chapter asks: how is state policy context associated with immigrant labor 
force participation? 
Immigrant Economic Incorporation 
Early theories of immigrants’ economic incorporation focus largely on the individual 
characteristics immigrants brought to the United States. Under human capital theory, 
immigrants’ educational attainment, English ability, and labor market experience increase their 
degree of success in the labor market (Borjas 1987). Selection theory draws on the human 
capitalist framework to argue that the conditions of immigrants’ country of origin encourage 
either the migration of immigrants low in human capital (negative selection) or high in human 
                                                 
18 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal government 
had the sole control over immigration policy, or laws regulating immigrant entry and exit, but states could 
regulate immigrant integration (immigrant rights laws). The federal government still maintains primary 
authority over immigration enforcement, but states have passed immigration laws, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has upheld state involvement in immigration enforcement. 
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 capital (positive selection), with negative selection resulting in poorer economic outcomes. A 
gendered perspective on immigration and labor force participation emphasizes the importance of 
household characteristics. In general, the presence of young children prevent women from 
entering the labor market and women may not enter the labor market unless necessitated by low 
household income. Further, immigrant women are frequently tied movers, which often results in 
a legal status that does not give them the authorization to work.  
Both new assimilation theory and segmented assimilation theory recognize that 
immigrants’ labor market outcomes also depend on the receiving society, or the “context of 
reception” (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993). Contextual factors, such as the size and 
education level of the coethnic community (Levanon 2014), natives’ view of immigrants 
(Waldinger and Lichter 2003; Waters 2009), and government policy (Donato, Durand, and 
Massey 1992; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), impact immigrants’ employment, occupational 
attainment, and wages. To understand how contextual factors like government laws influence 
immigrant incorporation, scholars have drawn on the boundary processes framework (Alba and 
Nee 2003; Alba 2005; Baubock 1994).  
Boundaries are distinctions made by actors to categorize people and separate them into 
groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). Immigrants are usually distinguished from natives based on 
their nonwhite race, cultural differences (such as speaking a language other than English), and 
non-citizenship status (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; Zolberg and Long 1999). As group boundaries 
become widely agreed upon, they result in stable behavioral patterns that reproduce unequal 
access to and distribution of resources between groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). Group 
boundaries then become coded into law, which continues to reproduce between-group 
inequalities (Omi and Winant 1994). However, not all boundaries are alike, and they vary across 
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 time and space (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012). While bright boundaries clearly 
distinguish group insiders from outsiders, blurred boundaries transform clear-cut dichotomies 
into gradients so that a person’s group membership is ambiguous (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; 
Zolberg and Long 1999). In turn, the type of boundary in place is theorized to affect immigrant 
incorporation. Laws codifying bright immigrant-native boundaries facilitate the preservation of 
economic opportunities for native group members (Alba 2005). To obtain these opportunities, 
immigrants must cross the boundary through naturalization or assimilation. Laws blurring 
immigrant-native boundaries facilitate immigrant integration by providing them with access to 
natives’ socioeconomic opportunities, even without immigrant membership in this group.  
 In the United States, federal legislation has upheld bright boundaries between the 
immigrant and native population. Over the past 30 years, the federal government has enacted the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the Illegal Immigration and Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA), and the Patriot Act, all of which have sought to remove unauthorized immigrants and 
authorized immigrants with a criminal record. The passage of laws that reinforce the bright 
boundary between immigrants and natives negatively impacted both authorized and unauthorized 
immigrants’ economic outcomes (Donato et al. 2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Gentsch and 
Massey 2011). However, not all boundaries are alike; variation in immigrant-native boundaries 
occurs at the state level. For example, state-level enforcement laws brighten the federal boundary 
between natives and immigrants by further discouraging noncitizens’ presence in the state. States 
also draw bright boundaries when immigrant rights laws prevent noncitizens from obtaining 
employment or benefits. Conversely, sanctuary laws blur the immigrant-native boundary by not 
differentiating unauthorized and authorized immigrants from the citizen population, and 
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 inclusionist social rights laws provide noncitizen immigrants with resources often reserved for 
citizens. 
I use a boundary processes framework to examine the extent to which state-level policies 
hinder or promote immigrants’ economic integration. The analysis is informed by policy 
research, which demonstrates that state policies affect race and gender employment equality 
(Beggs 1995). State laws could matter as much or more than national policy because they are a 
more immediate context (Marrow 2011). In fact, state policy context has affected immigrant 
political participation (Okamoto and Ebert 2010), naturalization (Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 
2006), educational attainment (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011), and settlement 
(Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013). I build on this research and consider labor market 
participation because labor market opportunities are key motivators for migration, but can be 
withheld due to law. Labor market participation is also a key factor for immigrant incorporation, 
as obtaining a job is a form of structural integration which can lead to entrance to other 
institutions of the host society and possible upward mobility (Gordon 1964). From a boundary 
processes framework, I form the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Bright boundaries, as codified by immigration enforcement and 
restrictive immigrant social rights laws, curb immigrants’ participation in the 
labor force.  
 
This dissertation makes a second contribution to immigration research by analyzing the 
effects of policy contexts based on the blurring and brightening of both immigration and social 
rights laws. Past immigration research has been mainly limited to examining the effects of 
enforcement laws (bright immigration laws) (Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992; Donato and 
Massey 1993; Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Gentsch and 
Massey 2011; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Phillips and 
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 Massey 1999) or welfare reform (bright social rights laws) (Van Hook and Balistreri 2006) 
because of its focus on federal law. Meanwhile, state-level research has mainly focused on the 
effects of anti-immigrant laws, including enforcement laws, laws preventing immigrant access to 
welfare benefits, laws mandating the use of E-Verify, and laws limiting unauthorized access to 
state tuition and driver’s licenses (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011; Leerkes, Bachmeier, 
and Leach 2013; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015; Van Hook, Brown, and 
Bean 2006). However, anti-immigrant states may differ in their effects depending on their 
involvement with immigration enforcement. In their study of the effects of state-level 
enforcement laws, Menjívar and Abrego (2012) identify these types of laws as forms of legal 
violence. Legal violence is “embedded in the body of law that, while it purports to have the 
positive objective of protecting rights or controlling behavior for the general good, 
simultaneously gives rise to practices that harm a particular social group” (Menjívar and Abrego 
2012:1387). The very implementation of the law results in suffering, pain, and unintentional 
negative consequences. For example, enforcement laws resulted in Central American immigrants 
having a pervasive sense of fear of social spaces, often preventing them from going to work or 
school. The legal violence and resulting fear of social spaces may especially be associated with 
bright immigration laws, rather than bright social rights laws, as immigrants voiced fears of 
deportation and separation from families – risks which are not associated with bright social rights 
laws. Legal violence research suggests that not all bright boundaries are equal; therefore, I 
propose a modified hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: Bright boundaries that are forms of legal violence, such as 
immigration enforcement laws, will have a larger negative impact on immigrants’ 
labor force participation than bright social rights laws.  
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 Data and Methods 
 For testing whether state policy context is associated with immigrants’ labor force 
participation, I use American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000 to 2015. The ACS is a 
cross-sectional survey collected by the Census Bureau, with each sample representing between 
.4% and 1% of the population. The large size of the ACS ensures adequate immigrant 
representation across states and includes many national-origin immigrant groups. Analysis 
begins in 2000, the earliest year ACS data are available.  
I restrict the ACS data to foreign-born adults, excluding those born abroad to American 
parents. I focus on the working-age population, between the ages of 25 to 54. Foreign-born 
adults whose country of birth is unspecified or listed as a general region (N=26,946, or 1% of the 
sample) were dropped from the sample. I also restrict my sample to the population living outside 
of group quarters (N living in group quarters=38,928, or 1.6% of the sample). Data on 
individuals living in group quarters were not collected by ACS before 2006, so I drop these 
individuals to have a consistent sample for the entire period of study.19 Finally, I restrict my 
sample to the non-student population, since students are less likely to participate in the 
workforce due to visa restrictions or time limitations (N of students=175,462 or 7.36% of the 
sample). After these limitations, my total sample size is 1,074,114 foreign-born men and 
1,135,986 foreign-born women. 
Dependent Variable 
 The outcome of interest is labor force participation. Individuals participated in the labor 
force if they: worked at all for pay in the last week; performed at least 15 hours of unpaid labor 
                                                 
19 Group quarters include institutionalized individuals, such as those living in correctional facilities, 
nursing homes, or mental hospitals and non-institutionalized individuals living in college dorms, military 
barracks, missions, or shelters. 
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 for a family business in the last week; had a job but were temporarily not at work due to illness, 
bad weather, industrial dispute, or vacation; or had been looking for work in the past four weeks. 
Otherwise, they are outside of the workforce.  
Independent Variable of Interest: State Policy Context of Reception 
 States are classified as either exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, or 
inclusionist. Exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states are both anti-immigrant, but 
exclusionist states have adopted immigration enforcement laws and have restricted immigrants’ 
social rights, whereas rights restrictionist states have only restricted immigrants’ social rights. 
Noninterventionist states do not have any immigration laws or immigrant rights laws on the 
books. Finally, inclusionist states have extended rights normally reserved for citizens to 
immigrants. State policy contexts of reception are merged to individuals with a one-year lag. 
State Control Variables 
Other time-varying state contextual variables control for other aspects of the context of 
reception, including the coethnic and economic contexts and native attitudes towards 
immigrants. A table summarizing the control measures is available in the Appendix. Correlations 
between state-level control variables and state policy context are presented in Table 3.1. 
Refer to Table 3.1 
Economic Structure  
The overall health of the labor market provides new job opportunities to immigrants. To 
measure labor market differences between states, I use the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (2016) 
yearly unemployment rate for each state. I use the gender-specific state unemployment rate (e.g., 
for immigrant men, I use the male state unemployment rate). I also control for demand for 
immigrant labor by using the percentage of total employment in the state in “immigrant” 
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 industries – for men, I control for the percentage of total employment in agriculture, 
construction, and computer technology; for women, I control for the percentage of total 
employment in accommodations, food services, and health (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). 
These industries were selected because immigrants were over-represented in the industry in 
2010.20 Because immigrants are bifurcated between the high-skill and low-skill workforce, I 
include one high-skill immigrant industry and two lower-skill immigrant industries in my 
measure.21 
Societal Reception: Native Attitudes 
A host society’s view of immigrants influences the employment opportunities offered to 
them; natives who hold negative attitudes toward immigrants rate them unfavorably on job 
applications (Blommaert, van Tubergen, and Coenders 2012). However, employers sometimes 
prefer immigrant labor if they view immigrants as hardworking and docile (Waldinger and 
Lichter 2003; Waters 2009). The General Social Survey, the American National Election 
Studies, and the 2006 Social Capital Community Benchmark survey have captured native 
attitudes towards immigrants, but they do not survey a large enough number of respondents to 
produce reliable state-level measures of attitudes toward immigrants. Further, these surveys are 
only available for selected years. As an alternative, I proxy native attitudes toward immigrants 
using Berry et al.’s (1998) measure of citizen ideology. This measure captures citizens’ position 
on a liberal-conservative continuum, ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating the most liberal 
views. Those with liberal views may be less likely to discriminate against immigrants and 
                                                 
20 In 2010, immigrants were 15.8 percent of the total employed population. An immigrant industry is 
defined as industry where immigrants were over-represented (where immigrants make up more than 15.8 
percent of the industry) (Singer 2012).  
21 Immigrants were over-represented in private households; however, BLS does not publish estimates of 
employment in private households. 
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 welcome their participation in the labor force. It has been shown to influence state adoption of 
immigrant welfare laws (Hero and Preuhs 2007) and has been used as a control for native 
attitudes when examining how social movements influence immigrant policy making (Steil and 
Vasi 2014). Data through 2013 were provided by Michigan State University’s Correlates of the 
State Policy Project (Jordan and Grossman 2016). Data were linearly extrapolated through 2015.  
Coethnic Community  
Larger coethnic communities can assist immigrants during their job searches and can 
ensure employment by practicing social closure within certain businesses or economic sectors 
(Levanon 2014; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Additionally, state policy contexts influence 
immigrants’ settlement decisions; anti-immigrant state legislation has resulted in smaller 
coethnic communities as immigrants moved out of hostile states (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 
2013). Outmigration either results in fewer coethnics to provide resources or less competition 
within the labor market. Further, coethnic group size influences how immigrants experience 
legislative effects. In counties with anti-immigrant ordinances and large shares of coethnics, 
Mexicans reported experiencing more discrimination (Ebert and Ovink 2014), which might 
discourage immigrants from job seeking. I measure the size of an immigrant group in the state 
relative to the total population of the state by aggregating individual-level information in the 
ACS and calculating the immigrant group’s share of the total adult-aged (25 years or older) 
population. Because of smaller sample sizes for some national-origin groups in each year, I 
calculate a five-year rolling average. For the year 2000 and earlier (used for lagged measures), I 
use Census aggregates and linear interpolations between 1990 and 2000.  
Further, if the coethnic community has many high-educated individuals, these 
communities usually have more entrepreneurs who are willing and able to hire fellow coethnics 
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 in immigrant businesses (Portes and Zhou 1993). Higher-educated individuals may also have 
more knowledge about the labor market and opportunities available. I calculate the percent of the 
adult-aged immigrant group with a bachelor’s degree or higher.22 I again aggregate individual-
level data in the ACS and calculate the percent based on five-year rolling averages, using Census 
aggregates and linear interpolations for the year 2000 and earlier. 
A well-established immigrant community may be more effective at finding and locating 
jobs for fellow immigrants than a less well-established or newer community. To account for 
differences between new and established destinations, I control for percent change in the foreign-
born population in the state in the previous decade (Malone et al. 2003; Migration Policy 
Institute 2017). Most states that experienced high levels of immigrant growth were new 
destinations where the immigrant population was not established.  
Local-Level Immigration Policy 
 I control for state immigration policy at lower levels of government using the percent of 
the state’s population living in a county with an active 287g agreement. DHS (2016) lists all 
counties that have ever entered into a 287g agreement on their website. If a city or town entered 
into a 287g agreement rather than a county, I included the entire population of the county/ies 
within the city. State and county population data are from Census 2000 (for years 2000-2005) 
and Census 2010 (for years 2006-2015). Census data were standardized to 2010 county lines 
(Minnesota Population Center 2016).  
                                                 
22 The percent of the coethnic community with a bachelor’s degree or more is calculated at the national 
average rather than the state average. Because there are 154 national origin groups in ACS 2000-2015 
data, many state-level estimates would be based on small sample sizes (less than 25), making them 
unreliable. I recognize that there may be state-level variation in the coethnic community’s level of 
education, as many high-educated immigrants may be drawn to the tech industry in California, for 
example.  
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 Although the definition of a sanctuary city or policy is contested, I consider a locality that 
limits compliance with ICE detainer requests as a “sanctuary” locality. The Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network (2014) provides a list of cities and counties that do not honor any ICE 
detainer requests, restrict compliance to cases where ICE has obtained a warrant from a judge, or 
only honors detainers when the locality will either be reimbursed for the costs of detention or if 
the individual has been convicted of a felony. The list also includes the year the locality adopted 
the sanctuary policy. I then calculated the percent of the state population living within a 
sanctuary county. If a city or town was listed, I included the entire population of the county/ies 
within the city for a given year. Population data are from Census 2000 and 2010, with counties 
standardized to 2010 boundaries.  
I use the percent of the state population living in a county with a 287(g) agreement or 
sanctuary policy, rather than a dichotomous indicator of whether the immigrant lives in a county 
with these policies, for two reasons. First, not all counties are identifiable in ACS. Counties are 
only identifiable if they are coterminous with a Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) or if they 
contained multiple PUMAs which did not extend into other counties. About 11 percent of the 
sample did not live in an identifiable county. Second, a dichotomous indicator measured at the 
county level would suggest the use of a three-level model to account for individual 
characteristics, county characteristics, and state characteristics. Because the focus of this 
dissertation is on the state level, rather than the local level, I use a state-level measure. 
Control Variables: Country of Origin, Individual-Level, and Household Characteristics 
I use country of origin fixed effects to account for possible selection effects and 
differences in gendered cultural norms related to work. Using a country of origin indicator 
captures group differences in the conditions in the country of origin that influenced outmigration, 
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 the level of selectivity of the immigrant group, and group attitudes toward female labor force 
participation. I control for the following countries and world regions: Canada, Mexico, El 
Salvador, other Central American countries, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republican, other 
Caribbean countries, Colombia, other South American countries, Germany, other 
Northern/Western European countries, Southern/Eastern European countries, India, China, 
Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, other Asian countries, Middle Eastern countries, African 
countries, and Oceanic countries. 
At the individual-level, I control for age in years and educational attainment in five 
categories: less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, college degree, or 
advanced degree. Additional controls account for immigrants’ familiarity with US culture and 
labor market institutions, including duration of residence in the United States in years and years-
squared and English language use and proficiency at home (speaks only English; speaks English 
very well; speaks English well; speaks English, but not well; does not speak English). I control 
for racial-ethnic group with dummy variables for white, non-Hispanic; black, non-Hispanic; 
Asian or Pacific Islander; Hispanic (any race); and other race or multiracial. I account for 
immigrant legal status (naturalized citizen, authorized immigrant, unauthorized immigrant; see 
methodology in Chapter Two for more information) through CSMI. Because multiple imputation 
does not allow me to identify refugees, I include a dichotomous indicator for whether an 
immigrant was born in a country whose migrants were usually refugees.23 Household controls 
include marital status with a dummy variable indicating if the respondent is married, children 
                                                 
23 The refugee variable was set equal to one if an immigrant was born in a country where 60% or more of 
the immigrant population between the years 1970 and 2015 were refugees. Countries included: Cuba, 
Bosnia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, USSR, Cambodia, Laos, Bhutan, Burma, Iraq, and Somalia 
(author’s calculations from Department of Homeland Security and Office and Immigration Statistics 
data).  
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 under the age of 5 currently living in the household, and, for women, the amount of other family 
income as an indicator of necessity for entering the labor force.  
Method of Analysis 
I use multilevel random intercept logistic regression to predict the likelihood of an 
immigrant being active in the labor market. I use a multilevel logistic regression model because 
immigrants are clustered within US states and because state-level variables are the main 
variables of interest. A simple logistic regression model would fail to take into account the 
multilevel structure of the data, neglect the error terms at the contextual level, and underestimate 
the standard errors of the coefficients. I write the multilevel random intercept model for the 
probability of labor force participation as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�Pr�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1| 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�� =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 +  𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes time. The probability of labor force 
participation is modeled as the function of an intercept (β0), a vector of person-level covariates at 
the time of the survey (Xijt), state-level covariates lagged one year (Zjt-1), and year fixed effects 
(Yt). ζj is the random intercept for state j, which accounts for unobserved time-constant 
characteristics of state j and assumed independent of the covariates. ɛij is a residual error term (or 
a person-level random effect). All state-level controls variables are mean-centered for each year. 
Age and years in the US are centered on the sample mean for men and women, respectively.  
This model yields a weighted average of within- and between-level estimates and is 
preferred to a fixed effects model so that I do not omit US states whose immigration policy 
contexts remain the same over the time period (10 out of 50 US states). I estimate models 
separately for males and females because of gender differences in labor force participation. To 
account for legal status, I estimate the model across 5 imputed datasets for men and 3 imputed 
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 datasets for women using Stata’s mi estimate command. 24 This command estimates the model on 
each imputed dataset and combines the results using Rubin’s rules.  
Descriptive Results 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the difference in immigrant labor force participation across state 
policy contexts for foreign-born men and women. Among foreign-born men, labor force 
participation is high across all state policy contexts, but exclusionist states show the highest rates 
of labor force participation (93 percent). Immigrant labor force participation is lower among 
foreign-born women than foreign-born men, but women in exclusionist states also have the 
highest labor force participation rates (about 64 percent). Women in inclusionist states 
participate at similar levels (about 63 percent). Higher labor force participation in exclusionist 
states could be due to demand for immigrant labor – exclusionist states also have the highest 
share of the employed population in immigrant industries. Immigrant characteristics are 
relatively similar across exclusionist, rights restrictionist, and inclusionist states, suggesting that 
differences in labor force participation may be due to state context rather than immigrant 
characteristics. The exception is immigrants in noninterventionist states, who have higher levels 
of education, are more likely to identify as white, non-Hispanic, have higher English language 
skills, and are less likely to be unauthorized immigrants.  
Refer to Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 
The Labor Force Participation of Foreign-Born Men 
Building on the descriptive analyses above, Models 1 through 3 in Table 3.4 present 
coefficients from the random-intercept logistic regression predicting foreign-born men’s labor 
                                                 
24 The computational power required for estimating these models is large. Although I used Indiana 
University’s Karst Computational System, my models for women’s labor force participation did not 
converge across five imputed datasets. Therefore, I use only three imputed datasets for women’s analyses.  
86
 force participation using five imputed datasets. Model 1 presents the likelihood of labor force 
participation by state context of reception while controlling for year fixed effects. Inclusionist 
states, where the largest share of immigrants live, serve as the reference category. Male labor 
force participation does not significantly differ across states, but we see a slightly negative 
coefficient for rights restrictionist states, as compared to inclusionist states. Model 2 shows the 
likelihood of labor force participation for foreign-born men once accounting for differences in 
state coethnic, economic, and attitudinal context. Incorporating other state characteristics 
presents a similar picture for immigrant men. Male labor force participation remains the lowest 
in rights restrictionist states, but it still does not differ significantly across state policy contexts.  
Refer to Table 3.4 
Model 3 accounts for individual-level characteristics. The addition of these 
characteristics to the model does not greatly alter the impact of exclusionist and rights 
restrictionist states. However, the likelihood of male labor force participation drops in 
noninterventionist states. Foreign-born men in noninterventionist states were more likely to have 
higher levels of education, English ability, and have authorized legal status. After accounting for 
these characteristics, noninterventionist states’ labor force participation rates are lower than 
expected based on the high human capital of their foreign-born men. However, coefficients for 
state policy context fail to meet statistical significance.  
If state policy context has little influence on male labor force participation, what other 
state characteristics influence immigrants’ employment behaviors? Model 3 indicates that 
coethnic group characteristics are the only contextual characteristics that are significantly 
associated with foreign-born men’s labor force participation. A larger coethnic group and a more 
highly-educated group decrease labor force participation. If the coethnic group grows from the 
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 smallest share of the state (less than 1 percent) to the largest share (around 15 percent), the odds 
of being in the labor force decline by a factor of 0.85 (p<0.001).25 If the coethnic group’s share 
of college-educated members increases from the lowest levels (about 3 percent with a college 
degree) to the highest level (about 76 percent with a college degree), the odds of being in the 
labor force decline by a factor of 0.75 (p<0.001).26 Instead of offering opportunities for social 
closure and ensuring work opportunities for coethnics, a larger, more-educated coethnic group 
could reflect higher competition for employment and discourage some foreign-born men from 
participating in the labor market.  
Individual-level factors explain much of male immigrants’ work behavior. Immigrant 
labor force participation increases with higher levels of education and English language ability. 
Latino and white immigrant men are more likely to participate than black and Asian immigrant 
men. Time in the US mostly increases labor force participation, with a dip in labor force 
participation when immigrants have been in the US for many years. Being married and having 
children increases men’s labor force participation. Compared to citizens or authorized 
immigrants, unauthorized men are less likely to participate in the labor force (p<0.001). We 
would expect unauthorized immigrant men to have some of the highest labor force participation 
rates, as men often migrate to the US to work (Borjas 2017). Examination of SIPP data shows 
that the negative relationship holds (see Supplemental Table 3.2) even without legal status 
imputations. Many unauthorized immigrants in SIPP reported not being in the labor force 
because they had a mental or physical disability that prevented them from working. One 
possibility is that if unauthorized immigrants formerly worked in a high-risk industry, such as 
construction or food assembly work, an injury on the job prevents them from working. Other 
                                                 
25 .85 = exp (-.011*15.2) 
26 .75 = exp(-.004*72.9) 
88
 unauthorized immigrants who were not in the labor force reported working in construction or 
landscaping, jobs that are seasonal and insecure from week to week (Flippen 2012).  
In sum, the labor force participation of foreign-born men is greatly impacted by coethnic 
competition in their state and their individual-level human capital. While the magnitude of the 
state policy context coefficients suggest that foreign-born men have lower levels of labor force 
participation in rights restrictionist and noninterventionist states, these differences failed to reach 
statistical significance thresholds. 
The Labor Force Participation of Foreign-Born Women 
Models 4 through 6 in Table 3.4 present coefficients from the random-intercept logistic 
regression predicting foreign-born women’s labor force participation using three imputed 
datasets. When controlling for year fixed effects, female labor force participation is lower in 
exclusionist states compared to inclusionist states and rights restrictionist states (see Model 4). 
Living in an exclusionist state decreases the odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 0.97 
compared to living in an inclusionist state, holding all other variables constant (p<0.05). Living 
in an exclusionist state also decreases the odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 0.97 
compared to living in a rights restrictionist state (chi-squared(1) = 6.19, p<0.05). Model 5 adds 
other state-level controls and foreign-born women’s likelihood of labor force participation 
remains lower in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states (p<0.05) and rights restrictionist 
states (chi-squared (1) = 5.10, p<0.05).  
In Model 6, with the addition of individual and household characteristics, the exclusionist 
state coefficient suggests that women’s labor force participation is lower in these states than in 
inclusionist states, but the difference is only statistically significant at the p<0.10 level. However, 
even with controls, women in exclusionist states remain less likely to participate in the labor 
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 force than women in rights restrictionist states (t statistic = -2.49, p<0.01), and the magnitude of 
the coefficient is similar; all else held constant, the odds of participating in the labor force for 
women living in exclusionist states decrease by a factor of .97 compared to women living in 
rights restrictionist states.27 The persistent difference in labor force participation between 
exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states highlights the role of bright enforcement laws 
suppressing women’s labor force participation. 
In addition to state policy context, other state characteristics influence women’s labor 
force participation. Model 3 indicates that, similar to men, a larger coethnic group and a more 
highly-educated group decrease immigrant women’s labor force participation. Additionally, 
living in a new destination, as indicated by a growing population, increases women’s labor force 
participation. If the foreign-born population increases at the largest rate (273 percent), the odds 
of immigrant women’s labor force participation increases by a factor of 1.21 (p<0.001).28 Past 
research suggests that the immigrant networks are less established in new destinations, making it 
more difficult to locate a job (Flippen and Kim 2015). Instead, women may be pulled into the 
workforce in new destinations – this measure may be capturing aspects of demand for immigrant 
labor not measured by immigrant industries (such as household employment or opportunities in 
food processing). Additionally, more liberal and positive attitudes towards immigrants, as 
indicated by citizen ideology, are associated with a higher likelihood of female labor force 
participation (p<0.05). Yet the magnitude of the effect is small; a 10 point increase on the 
ideology scale increases the odds of women’s labor force participation by a factor of 1.01.  
The likelihood of women’s labor force participation also increases with women’s 
individual human capital. Immigrant women are more likely to enter the workforce with higher 
                                                 
27 .97 = exp[.001 – (-.029)] 
28 1.21 = exp(.007*27.3) 
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 levels of education and English language ability and more time in the US. Unauthorized women 
are less likely than citizens and authorized immigrants to enter the labor force (p<0.001). Black 
immigrant women are the most likely to enter the workforce, while white immigrant women are 
the least likely to enter. Being married and having young children in the household decreases 
women’s labor force participation, while economic need increases the likelihood of LFP. 
In sum, state policy context, in addition to coethnic competition, native attitudes, and 
human capital, matters for immigrant women’s labor force participation. The difference in labor 
force participation in exclusionist versus rights restrictionist suggests that “anti-immigrant” states 
are not uniform. Instead, the combination of enforcement laws and rights restrictionist laws 
found in exclusionist states plays a greater role in reducing labor force participation among 
women than rights restrictionist laws on their own.  
Differing Immigrant Experiences  
 The immigrant experience is not uniform. Immigrants may experience state policy 
contexts differently based on their education level, legal status, and racial-ethnic group. This 
chapter goes on to examine how different immigrant groups experience state policy context. 
Policy Effects by Education Level 
 Highly-educated immigrants and immigrants with less than a high school education enter 
two different types of labor markets. Immigrants with lower levels of education enter a low-
skilled labor market often characterized by informal hiring processes (Flippen 2012; Waldinger 
and Lichter 2003). In response to employer sanctions in IRCA, many employers in immigrant-
intensive industries switched to the practice of subcontracting (Gentsch and Massey 2011). 
Under a subcontracting arrangement, an employer hires a subcontractor, who is usually a US 
citizen or legal permanent resident, to undertake a task. The subcontractor then provides the 
91
 workers to complete the task, and the employer avoids the liability for hiring unauthorized 
workers under IRCA. Subcontracting arrangements characterize entire industries, such as 
construction and garment manufacturing. In addition to subcontracting, immigrants can be hired 
but remain off-books and paid in cash (Catanzarite and Aguilera 2002; Flippen 2012). Therefore, 
immigrants with lower levels of education may not be discouraged from entering the labor 
market, even when laws are passed restricting immigrants’ rights or job opportunities, because 
many industries have adopted practices to ensure that low-skilled immigrants will continue to be 
hired. On the other hand, bright immigration enforcement laws may especially affect immigrants 
with lower levels of education. Because low-skill industries and workplaces are known for hiring 
unauthorized immigrant workers, state-law enforcement officials can target immigrants who 
drive to these workplaces. For example, Menjivar and Abrego (2012) noted that immigrants 
working in the service industry were afraid to go to work. 
In contrast, higher-skilled labor markets often have formalized and bureaucratic hiring 
procedures subject to restrictive hiring laws. Higher-educated immigrants may become 
discouraged from participating in the labor market in rights restrictionist states if there are no 
established ways to circumvent bureaucratic hiring procedures. Bright immigration enforcement 
laws may not have effects above bright social rights laws; workplaces and industries known for 
hiring highly-educated workers may not be targeted for enforcement because of the association 
between high-skill and employment authorization.  
Results by Education Level 
Table 3.5 presents the likelihood of labor force participation from random-intercept 
logistic regression models estimated separately for foreign-born men with less than a high school 
degree (Model 7) and foreign-born men with a college degree or more (Model 8). Among men 
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 with less than a high-school degree, state policy context coefficients suggest that labor force 
participation is lower in both exclusionist and rights restrictionist states than inclusionist states. 
However, these differences fail to reach statistical significance. Among highly-educated foreign-
born men, coefficients suggest that the likelihood of labor force participation is actually the 
highest in exclusionist states (see Model 8). Rights restrictionist states and noninterventionist 
states suppress labor force participation of highly-educated men compared to inclusionist states. 
Again, however, state policy context has no significant effects of men’s labor force participation. 
These findings do not offer strong support for the expectation that exclusionist states would 
suppress low-skilled immigrants’ labor force participation, while rights restrictionist states would 
suppress high-skilled immigrants’ labor force participation.  
Refer to Table 3.5 
 Models 9 and 10 in Table 3.5 show the same models estimated for women. In Model 9, 
among foreign-born women with less than a high school degree, those women living in 
exclusionist states are the least likely to enter the labor force (p<0.01). Living in an exclusionist 
state as compared to an inclusionist state decreases women’s odds of being in the labor force by 
7.5 percent.29 Further, living in an exclusionist as compared to a rights restrictionist state 
decreases women’s odds of being in the labor force by 8.8 percent (t statistic = -4.07, p<0.001).30 
Model 10 shows a different pattern among higher-educated women. Coefficients indicate that 
women in exclusionist states have lower likelihoods of entering the labor force, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. The results in Table 3.5 support the expectation that 
lower-educated and lower-skilled women are fearful of entering the labor force in exclusionist 
states, but that the effects of rights restrictionist states may be circumvented. This may especially 
                                                 
29 7.5 = 100*[exp(-.078)-1] 
30 8.8 = 100*[exp(-.092)-1] 
93
 be the case if women with less than a high school degree are working in personal homes as 
cleaners or child care workers. However, results do not support the hypothesis that higher-skilled 
female immigrants are affected by rights restrictionist laws.  
Policy Effects by Legal Status 
 As Menjivar (2014) has noted, “the multilevel immigration regime has… turned legal 
status into a critical resource for most (if not all) endeavors in which immigrants engage” (7). 
Much, but not all, of state immigration legislation has been targeted toward unauthorized 
immigrants, and these laws have either explicitly prevented certain kinds of structural integration 
because immigrants lack authorized status, or they have allowed for unauthorized immigrants to 
obtain certain rights and benefits. In comparison, authorized immigrants and naturalized citizens 
have not been targeted or hindered in the same manner. On the other hand, authorized 
immigrants and naturalized citizens may be impacted by the symbolic effects of the laws and the 
overall environment of the state toward immigrants. If state policies make them feel unwelcome, 
then their labor force participation will also be impacted. Studies have shown that the passage of 
IRCA at the federal level, which targeted unauthorized immigrants, negatively impacted both 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants’ economic outcomes, but the negative effect was much 
larger for unauthorized immigrants (Donato et al. 2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Gentsch and 
Massey 2011).  
Results by Legal Status 
 Models 11 through 13 in Table 3.6 present coefficients from random-intercept logistic 
regression models estimated for unauthorized men, authorized men, and citizen men, 
respectively. State policy contexts fail to significantly predict male labor force participation 
across the legal status groups, therefore I cannot conclude that exclusionist and rights 
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 restrictionist laws differentially affect the unauthorized and authorized population. Still, 
coefficients are in the expected directions – among unauthorized men, the likelihood of labor 
force participation is lower in exclusionist states where men may be especially afraid of 
deportation. In comparison, authorized immigrants and naturalized citizens likelihood of labor 
force participation is not lower in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states. 
Refer to Table 3.6 
 Models 14 through 16 in Table 3.6 present the same models for immigrant women. 
Unauthorized women in exclusionist states are less likely to participate in the labor force than 
women in rights restrictionist states (t statistic = -2.70, p<0.01). All else held constant, the odds 
of participating in the labor force for women living in exclusionist states decrease by a factor of 
.92 compared to women living in rights restrictionist states.31 This supports the expectation that 
unauthorized immigrants will especially feel the effects of exclusionist laws. In comparison, 
authorized immigrant women’s labor force participation does not appear suppressed in 
exclusionist states (see Model 15). Among citizen women, coefficients indicate that their 
likelihood of participating in the labor force is the lower in exclusionist states (see Model 16); 
but the difference is not statistically significant.  
Policy Effects by Racial Group 
 State immigration legislation is based on immigrant legal status is generally “color-blind” 
in its language. However, enforcement laws, deportation, and “illegal” immigrant status have 
long been associated with Latinos/as. The 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act’s establishment 
of the Border Patrol resulted in the hardening of the US-Mexico border and increased 
                                                 
31 .92 = exp[.036 – (-.051)] 
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 deportations of Mexican immigrants without a proper visa (Ngai 2004).32 The passage of the 
1965 Hart-Cellar Act limited the number of immigrants who could move to the United States 
from the Western Hemisphere, while at the same time terminating the Bracero Program, a 
program that allowed for the authorized entry of Mexican workers for farm labor. Consequently, 
the number of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico and Central America skyrocketed, while 
actual migration numbers remained about the same. Popular discourse and the media espouse the 
Latino threat narrative – Latinos/as are portrayed as dissimilar from other immigrant groups who 
assimilate into the US (Chavez 2013). Latinos/as are characterized as the quintessential illegal 
aliens, which under the public discourse, signals that they are criminals and undeserving of social 
benefits. In practice, DHS targets Latino men for deportation; the DHS has disproportionately 
focused on removing unauthorized immigrants with origins in Mexico, Guatemala, and 
Honduras over unauthorized immigrants with origins in China, Canada, and the UK (Golash-
Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Because most unauthorized immigrants are Latino/a, 
because Latinos/as are criminalized as unauthorized immigrants, and because Latinos have been 
targeted for deportation, I expect that bright immigration enforcement laws and rights 
restrictionist laws may be especially salient for Latino/a immigrants’ labor force participation.  
Results by Racial Group 
Models 17 through 20 in Table 3.7 present the likelihood of labor force participation 
from random-intercept logistic regression models estimated separately for four racial-ethnic 
                                                 
32 Ironically, Mexican immigration was not subject to quota restrictions, but the head tax and entry fee 
required for a visa was prohibitively expensive, resulting in Mexicans crossing the border to work without 
authorization. In contrast, European immigrants, who were subject to quota restrictions, were not 
commonly deported because they obtained legal status through family reunification or by moving to 
Canada and being admitted to the US legally after living in Canada for five years (Ngai 2004).  
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 groups of foreign-born men: non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, Asians, and Latinos.33 
Across the racial-ethnic groups, state policy contexts fail to reach statistical significance; an 
exception is that black immigrant men’s labor force participation is lower in noninterventionist 
policy contexts (see Model 18). Living in a noninterventionist state compared to an inclusionist 
state decreases black immigrant men’s odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 0.68 
(p<0.01). One possibility is that the measure for noninterventionist policy context is picking up 
on the unique economic context of noninterventionist states where black immigrant men live, 
mainly Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio. These states have some of the highest black 
unemployment rates, and black unemployment rates are much higher than the overall 
unemployment rate in the state (Gable and Hall 2013; Wilson 2015). Therefore, black immigrant 
men may lack job opportunities in these states.  
Refer to Table 3.7 
 Among non-Hispanic white immigrant men (see Model 17), coefficients suggest that 
their labor force participation is slightly higher in exclusionist states and lower in 
noninterventionist states. In Model 19, coefficients suggest that exclusionist states boost Asian 
immigrant men’s labor force participation. Finally, among Latinos (see Model 20), coefficients 
suggest that their labor force participation is lower in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states 
than in inclusionist states. The pattern provides limited support for my expectation that the 
effects of exclusionist and rights restrictionist states are targeted at Latino men, but again, effects 
are not statistically significant. 
                                                 
33 Because the ACS only collects data on self-identified racial-ethnic group, I use this measure for these 
analyses. A measure of skin color would be more appropriate because racialization may affect immigrants 
with darker skin or indigenous features more than immigrants with lighter skin tones (Telles and Ortiz 
2008). Variation in skin tone is high among Latinos and Asians; my model for Latinos attempts to control 
for some of this variation by including a dichotomous indicator for whether an immigrant identified as a 
nonwhite race.  
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  Models 21 through 24 in Table 3.7 present the logistic regression coefficients from 
random-intercept models estimated separately for four racial-ethnic groups of foreign-born 
women. Model 21 shows that the labor force participation of non-Hispanic white immigrant 
women is slightly lower in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states than in inclusionist states, 
but the difference fails to reach statistical significance. Black immigrant women’s labor force 
participation is the highest in noninterventionist states; living in a noninterventionist state 
increases women’s odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 1.31 (p<0.01; see Model 22). 
With high black unemployment rates in noninterventionist states, the noninterventionist policy 
context may capture the unemployment effect; black immigrant women may be pulled into the 
labor market to compensate for low levels of black male unemployment. The coefficients in 
Model 23 suggest that Asian women’s labor force participation increases slightly in rights 
restrictionist states, but declines in noninterventionist states. Finally, Model 24 shows that 
Latinas’ labor force participation is the lowest in exclusionist states. Living in an exclusionist 
state compared to an inclusionist state decreases the odds of Latina women entering the labor 
force by a factor of 0.95 (p<0.05). Additionally, there are differences in the labor force 
participation of Latina women living in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. Living in an 
exclusionist state compared to a rights restrictionist state decreases the odds of Latina women 
entering the labor force by a factor of .96 (p<0.05). These findings support my expectation; 
exclusionist policy contexts are especially detrimental to Latinas’ involvement in the labor force 
because policies that treat immigrants as criminals are commonly associated with the Latino/a 
population.  
 Together these subgroup analyses show that the effects of state policy context are felt by 
vulnerable populations. Exclusionist states discourage labor force participation among women 
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 with less than a high school degree, Latina women, and unauthorized women. These women are 
commonly targeted by immigration officials, and states’ efforts to ramp up enforcement may 
increase their fear of public spaces and suppress their involvement in the labor market.  
Supplemental Analyses 
 I also conduct supplemental analyses to evaluate whether alternative specifications of the 
policy context qualify the main results. I measure policy context with the enforcement and rights 
scales I used as the axes to create my state typology. The enforcement scale ranged from -3.75 to 
2.25. A negative score represents states that had passed more bright immigration laws than 
blurred immigration laws (weighted by their potential population scope of impact). A zero on the 
scale represents states that have passed an equal number of blurred and bright enforcement laws 
and states that have not passed any laws. The rights scale ranged from -5.5 to 3.5. A negative 
score represents a state that had passed more bright rights laws than blurred rights laws (or 
restricted immigrants’ rights more than extended rights to them, as weighted by the laws’ 
potential population scope of impact). Again, a zero on the scale represents states that have 
passed an equal number of blurred and bright rights laws and states that have not passed any 
laws. For immigrant men, the immigration law scale had a small negative effect size and was not 
statistically significant. The rights scale was positively associated with men’s labor force 
participation, but the effect was not statistically significant. Like the policy typology, the scale 
measures fail to predict men’s labor force participation. For immigrant women, both scales had 
small effect sizes and were not statistically significant. Considering the two types of laws 
separately may not capture the additive effect of bright immigration and rights laws.  
 I determine whether the findings presented are sensitive to the inclusion of extreme 
exclusionist states. Arizona is known for being an especially harsh exclusionist state, as it was 
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 the first state to pass a law requiring its state enforcement officials to inquire about immigrant 
legal status in a stop or arrest (SB 1070). Results are robust. Even without Arizona in the model, 
women in exclusionist states are less likely to participate in the labor force than women in rights 
restrictionist states (t-statistic=-2.49, p<0.05). For men, the pattern of state policy context 
coefficients remains the same, and effects are not statistically significant.  
Finally, I conduct supplementary analyses to determine whether results are reproducible 
in SIPP data. SIPP data allow me to control for immigrant legal status without having to perform 
CSMI. However, SIPP data only include a fraction of the number of immigrants; immigrants 
outside of the traditional destinations of California, New York, Florida, Illinois, and Texas are 
not as well-represented in the data. Supplemental Table 3.2 compares models using SIPP data 
and ACS data. Models 25 and 28 use SIPP 2004 and 2009 data to predict men’s and women’s 
labor force participation, using listwise deletion for any missing variables. Models 26 and 29 use 
SIPP 2004 and 2009 data to predict labor force participation, but use imputed data for missing 
responses, including imputed data for missing legal status or legal status that was allocated by 
the Census Bureau. Due to smaller sample sizes in SIPP, the SIPP models are simplified by 
collapsing or combining some categorical variables and by estimating a weighted logistic 
regression model with clustered standard errors, rather than a multilevel model. Models 27 and 
30 present the full ACS model but using ACS data from 2004 and 2009 only.  
Refer to Supplemental Table 3.2 
While there are no statistically significant effects for state policy context for immigrant 
men in the SIPP data, the coefficients for state policy context in SIPP models (Models 25 and 26) 
suggest that immigrant men’s labor force participation is lower outside of inclusionist states. The 
ACS model only points to a decline in labor force participation in exclusionist and 
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 noninterventionist states. Among women, labor force participation is lower in exclusionist states 
in the ACS, but not in SIPP. What explains the different results from the two surveys? SIPP 
cannot account for the exact national origin group of immigrant women because 2008 publicly-
available SIPP data only present general world region of birth. Many immigrant women living in 
exclusionist states are Cubans, who have higher levels of labor force participation than 
immigrant women on average. SIPP models may be attributing some of the Cuban effect to 
exclusionist states, resulting in its positive (Model 28) or small (Model 29) coefficient size. On 
the whole, the effect (or lack thereof) of state policy context is similar across SIPP and ACS data 
for immigrant men, but more inconsistent between SIPP and ACS data for women. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Does state policy context matter for immigrant labor force participation? On the whole, 
exclusionist states inhibit the labor force participation of women, especially those who are 
unauthorized or have characteristics commonly associated with unauthorized status, such as 
lower levels of education or Latina race/ethnicity (see Table 3.8 for a summary of results). The 
boundary processes framework, which suggests that bright immigrant-native boundaries 
facilitate the preservation of economic opportunities for natives, receives some support. 
However, my findings also point to caveats and limitations in the boundary processes framework 
– not all types of bright boundaries limit immigrant labor force participation, and bright 
boundaries do not limit the labor force participation of all immigrants.  
Refer to Table 3.8 
 I find a difference in effects between rights restrictionist states and exclusionist states. I 
find that exclusionist states, more so than rights restrictionist states, curb immigrant labor force 
participation. I argue that exclusionist states practice legal violence (Menjivar and Abrego 2012), 
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 more so than rights restrictionist states. Exclusionist states’ laws criminalize immigrants, seek to 
banish them from the state, and result in psychological and social consequences for the 
immigrant population. Fear and anxiety and made possible through these laws have led to 
withdrawal from public spaces, including the labor market. The rights restrictionist laws have a 
more limited scope – their laws do not target immigrants for removal. I argue that rights 
restrictionist policy contexts reflect a desire for immigrants in the state to work. Rights 
restrictionist states have adopted laws to increase immigrant workers’ fear and docility, but do 
not threaten to banish immigrant workers from their jurisdiction. Rights restrictionist laws may 
result in a fearful and docile immigrant workforce, but they do not inhibit immigrant 
participation in the labor force.  
 I also find that exclusionist states have a targeted, gendered effect; exclusionist states 
suppress women’s labor force participation, but not men’s. More specifically, exclusionist states 
discourage labor force participation among women with less than a high school degree, Latina 
women, and unauthorized women. Women’s decisions to enter the labor force are influenced by 
the family or household dynamics. Given that Latino men are commonly targeted for removal 
(Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013), women may refrain from entering the labor market 
in enforcement states because they fear family separation. Mixed status families are common 
(Fix and Zimmermann 2001), and if both mothers and fathers enter the labor market and are 
deported, US-born children could be left in the United States without a guardian. Latina women, 
women with lower levels of education, and unauthorized women may be especially fearful of 
being deported in enforcement states because if they enter the workforce, they would be in public 
spaces that state-level enforcement targets. For example, state police and sheriffs may patrol 
highways or roads that immigrants use to take to work, especially outside of businesses known to 
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 hire immigrant workers. By withdrawing from the labor force when the risk of apprehension is 
high, women can reduce the risk that US-born children would lose both their parents. 
 Finally, these results have important policy implications. One aspect of legal violence is 
the general public’s “acceptance of the suffering of an entire class of people because ‘it is the 
law’… unflawed and beyond question” (Menjívar 2013:234). The public believes that 
immigrants are “living on the margins” and do not deserve jobs because they “broke the law” 
(Menjívar 2013:235). This chapter undermines the idea that certain types of immigrants will not 
join the labor force and work due to their individual characteristics. Instead, it highlights the role 
of the receiving policy context in shaping immigrants’ labor force participation. Exclusionist 
states seek to deter poor, unauthorized immigrants. Although harsh enforcement laws encourage 
outmigration (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013), they do not deter all immigrants and 
negatively affect immigrants remaining in the state. By seeking to remove poor, unauthorized 
immigrants these states actually contribute to impoverishing the immigrants remaining in their 
state by preventing immigrant women from entering the labor market. States without these 
policies do a better job ensuring a productive immigrant population.
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 Table 3.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation, 2000-2015 
 Foreign-Born Men Foreign-Born Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Policy 
Context 
+ State 
Ctrls 
+ Indv 
Ctrls 
Policy 
Context 
+ State 
Ctrls 
+ Indv 
Ctrls 
State Immigration Type       
 (vs Inclusionist)       
Exclusionist 0.002 -0.000 0.006 -0.029* -0.033* -0.029 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.026) (0.01) (0.01) (0.016) 
Rights Restrictionist -0.030 -0.030 -0.022 -0.002a -0.008a 0.001a 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.021) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) 
Noninterventionist -0.015 -0.011 -0.042 0.003 -0.007 -0.019 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.046) (0.03) (0.03) (0.028) 
State Controls       
Local Policy       
% Pop in 287g (/10)  -0.004 -0.005  0.004* -0.001 
  (0.00) (0.004)  (0.00) (0.002) 
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)  0.003 0.001  0.002 0.003   (0.00) (0.004)  (0.00) (0.002) 
Native Attitudes       
Citizen ideology (/10)  -0.031** -0.011  0.009 0.016* 
  (0.01) (0.010)  (0.01) (0.007) 
Coethnic Group       
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10)  0.002 0.001  0.003* 0.007*** 
  (0.00) (0.002)  (0.00) (0.001) 
Coethnic Group % Pop  0.018*** -0.011***  -0.046*** -0.008*** 
  (0.00) (0.002)  (0.00) (0.001) 
% College Degree  0.004*** -0.004***  0.001*** -0.002*** 
  (0.00) (0.001)  (0.00) (0.000) 
Economic Context       
Unemployment Rate  -0.006 -0.004  0.011*** 0.005 
  (0.01) (0.005)  (0.00) (0.003) 
% Emp in Imm Ind  0.015 0.014  0.003 -0.006   (0.01) (0.010)  (0.00) (0.005) 
Individual Controls       
Age   -0.024***   -0.003*** 
   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Age-Squared   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Education (vs <HS degree)       
HS degree   0.311***   0.275*** 
   (0.013)   (0.008) 
Some college   0.493***   0.517*** 
   (0.013)   (0.009) 
College degree   0.819***   0.727*** 
   (0.016)   (0.011) 
Adv. degree   1.138***   1.186*** 
   (0.022)   (0.013) 
Racial/Ethnic Group        
(vs. Hisp, any race)       
White, non-Hispanic   -0.024   -0.107*** 
   (0.032)   (0.017) 
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 Black, non-Hispanic   -0.206***   0.519*** 
   (0.038)   (0.023) 
Asian   -0.084*   -0.012 
   (0.037)   (0.020) 
Other/Multiracial   -0.320***   -0.057* 
   (0.039)   (0.023) 
Eng. ability (vs very well)       
None   -0.039*   -0.372*** 
   (0.018)   (0.010) 
Some   0.023   -0.183*** 
   (0.012)   (0.009) 
Well   0.109***   0.299*** 
   (0.012)   (0.009) 
Only   0.042**   0.131*** 
   (0.016)   (0.011) 
Legal Status (vs. unauthorized)       
Citizen   0.633***   0.584*** 
   (0.046)   (0.039) 
LPR   0.621***   0.253*** 
   (0.054)   (0.043) 
Years in the US   0.002**   0.017*** 
   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Years in the US-squared   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Refugee Origin   -0.393***   0.360*** 
   (0.027)   (0.018) 
Household Controls       
Single   -0.444***   0.606*** 
   (0.009)   (0.006) 
Child < age 5   0.104***   -0.696*** 
   (0.012)   (0.006) 
Other family income (/100)      -0.005*** 
      (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects             
Ntl Origin Fixed Effects         
Intercept 2.686*** 2.698*** 2.489*** 0.826*** 0.857*** 0.076 
State-Level Variation 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.023*** 
N Indv 1074114 1074114 1074114 1135986 1135986 1135986 
N States 50 50 50 50 50 50 
N Imputed Datasets 5 5 5 3 3 3 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05). 
Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time t-1. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. 
Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI. 
Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not 
in school.  
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 Table 3.5 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation among 
Immigrants with Low and High Levels of Education, 2000-2015 
 Foreign-Born Men Foreign-Born Women 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 <HS degree College+ <HS degree College+ 
State Immigration Type     
 (vs Inclusionist)     
Exclusionist -0.023 0.040 -0.078** -0.032 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.028) (0.027) 
Rights Restrictionist -0.022 -0.013 0.014a -0.013 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.023) (0.022) 
Noninterventionist 0.083 -0.073 -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.080) (0.074) (0.055) (0.046) 
State Controls     
Local Policy     
% Pop in 287g (/10) -0.010 -0.021** -0.002 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10) 0.008 -0.014 0.004 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Native Attitudes     
Citizen ideology (/10) -0.005 0.013 0.010 0.043*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) 
Coethnic Group     
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10) -0.007* 0.005 0.007*** 0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coethnic Group % Pop 0.002 -0.008 0.007*** 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
% College Degree -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Economic Context     
Unemployment Rate 0.002 -0.019 0.001 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
% Emp in Imm Ind 0.025 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Individual Controls     
Age -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.009*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age-Squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education      
(vs <college degree)     
Adv. degree  0.282***  0.461*** 
  (0.034)  (0.018) 
Racial/Ethnic Group      
(vs. Hisp, any race)     
White, non-Hispanic -0.141* -0.092 -0.151*** -0.142*** 
 (0.059) (0.067) (0.038) (0.034) 
Black, non-Hispanic -0.412*** -0.209* 0.336*** 0.564*** 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.055) (0.046) 
Asian -0.254*** -0.181* 0.240*** -0.138*** 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.047) (0.040) 
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 Other/Multiracial -0.425*** -0.461*** -0.003 -0.159** 
 (0.068) (0.083) (0.046) (0.049) 
Eng. ability (vs very well)     
None -0.308*** -0.338*** -0.560*** -0.545*** 
 (0.022) (0.075) (0.013) (0.045) 
Some -0.065*** -0.268*** -0.239*** -0.409*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.012) (0.021) 
Well -0.099*** 0.384*** 0.037* 0.478*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) 
Only -0.533*** 0.379*** -0.401*** 0.389*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.021) (0.024) 
Legal Status (vs. unauthorized)     
Citizen 0.411*** 1.116*** 0.366*** 0.890*** 
 (0.043) (0.155) (0.030) (0.026) 
LPR 0.599*** 1.086*** 0.146*** 0.587*** 
 (0.052) (0.187) (0.031) (0.031) 
Years in the US -0.018*** 0.020*** 0.000 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the US-squared -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Refugee Origin -0.567*** -0.363*** 0.189*** 0.410*** 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.040) (0.037) 
Household Controls     
Single -0.452*** -0.358*** 0.556*** 0.848*** 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.009) (0.015) 
Child < age 5 0.101*** 0.088*** -0.602*** -0.756*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.010) (0.011) 
Other family income (/100)   -0.003*** -0.005*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects         
Ntl Origin Fixed Effects         
Intercept 2.483*** 2.559*** 0.257*** 0.312*** 
State-Level Variation 0.045*** 0.008*** 0.029*** 0.012*** 
N individuals 322960 325747 305803 357275 
N States 50 50 50 50 
N imputed datasets 5 5 3 3 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05). 
Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time t-1. Age and years in the US centered on sample 
means. Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI. 
Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth 
country, aged 25-54, not in school. 
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 Table 3.6 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation by Immigrant 
Legal Status, 2000-2015 
 Foreign-Born Men Foreign-Born Women 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
 Unauth Auth Citizen Unauth Auth Citizen 
State Immigration Type       
 (vs Inclusionist)       
Exclusionist -0.041 0.007 0.030 -0.051 0.004 -0.040 
 (0.095) (0.048) (0.034) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) 
Rights Restrictionist -0.004 -0.029 -0.018 0.036a 0.027 -0.024 
 (0.057) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.019) (0.019) 
Noninterventionist 0.035 -0.051 -0.091 -0.040 -0.007 -0.035 
 (0.145) (0.089) (0.060) (0.136) (0.040) (0.041) 
State Controls       
Local Policy       
% Pop in 287g (/10) -0.035*** -0.006 0.009 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10) -0.005 -0.005 0.013* 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Native Attitudes       
Citizen ideology (/10) 0.004 0.013 -0.034** 0.035* 0.029** 0.011 
 (0.032) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Coethnic Group       
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10) -0.002 0.005 -0.000 0.004 0.006*** 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coethnic Group % Pop -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.008*** -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
% College Degree -0.006** -0.003* -0.003*** -0.004* -0.001 -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Economic Context       
Unemployment Rate 0.010 -0.017 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.007) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
% Emp in Imm Ind 0.042 0.001 -0.013 -0.003 -0.008 0.002 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Individual Controls       
Age -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.010*** 0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age-Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education (vs <HS degree)       
HS degree 0.157*** 0.291*** 0.437*** 0.153*** 0.239*** 0.398*** 
 (0.036) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) 
Some college 0.124 0.388*** 0.664*** 0.211*** 0.435*** 0.705*** 
 (0.069) (0.032) (0.017) (0.032) (0.012) (0.011) 
College degree 0.161 0.559*** 1.121*** 0.188*** 0.613*** 1.008*** 
 (0.084) (0.046) (0.021) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) 
Adv. degree 0.441** 0.982*** 1.425*** 0.397*** 1.089*** 1.539*** 
 (0.146) (0.087) (0.026) (0.075) (0.015) (0.016) 
Racial/Ethnic Group        
(vs. Hisp, any race)       
White, non-Hispanic -0.013 -0.069 -0.046 -0.078 -0.177*** -0.069** 
 (0.105) (0.069) (0.041) (0.096) (0.025) (0.024) 
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 Black, non-Hispanic -0.289* -0.312*** -0.057 0.422*** 0.407*** 0.652*** 
 (0.147) (0.086) (0.052) (0.084) (0.037) (0.033) 
Asian -0.131 -0.132 -0.030 -0.105 -0.064* 0.061* 
 (0.096) (0.077) (0.047) (0.078) (0.031) (0.028) 
Other/Multiracial -0.180 -0.479*** -0.234*** -0.079 -0.112*** 0.002 
 (0.111) (0.074) (0.051) (0.191) (0.032) (0.031) 
Eng. ability (vs very well)       
None 0.022 -0.100** -0.854*** -0.410*** -0.386*** -0.801*** 
 (0.058) (0.037) (0.035) (0.020) (0.012) (0.023) 
Some 0.137*** 0.021 -0.234*** -0.177*** -0.168*** -0.285*** 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.018) (0.033) (0.010) (0.011) 
Well -0.084* 0.072** 0.158*** 0.246*** 0.334*** 0.239*** 
 (0.036) (0.024) (0.015) (0.038) (0.010) (0.009) 
Only -0.316*** -0.047 0.115*** 0.000 0.130*** 0.062*** 
 (0.056) (0.035) (0.021) (0.040) (0.014) (0.013) 
Years in the US -0.042*** -0.005*** -0.002 0.002 0.017*** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years in the US-squared -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Refugee Origin -0.298** -0.412*** -0.326*** 0.252* 0.384*** 0.372*** 
 (0.112) (0.059) (0.037) (0.101) (0.029) (0.025) 
Household Controls       
Single -0.148*** -0.301*** -0.718*** 0.691*** 0.736*** 0.385*** 
 (0.039) (0.031) (0.013) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) 
Child < age 5 0.075* 0.110*** 0.093*** -0.693*** -0.708*** -0.712*** 
 (0.036) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) 
Other family income (/100)    -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
    (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects             
Ntl OriginFixed Effects             
Intercept 2.562*** 3.245*** 2.766*** 0.049 0.299*** 0.620*** 
State-Level Variation 0.076*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
N Individuals 155943- 439081- 463000 144535- 455980- 533206- 
 172033 455739  143747 459033  
N States 49 50 50 49 50 50 
N Imputed Datasets 5 5 5 3 3 3 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05). 
Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time t-1. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. Sample size of 
unauthorized and authorized immigrants varies between imputed datasets. Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI. 
Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in 
school. 
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Supplemental Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of 2000-2015 ACS Foreign-Born Men and Women, Aged 25-54 
 Foreign-Born Men Foreign-Born Women 
 Mean/% SD Min Max Mean/% SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable         
Labor Force Status         
In the LF 94.9%    68.3%    
Employed 87.3%    62.8%    
Unemployed 5.1%    5.5%    
Not in LF 7.6%    31.8%    
Independent Variable         
State Policy Context         
Exclusionist 20.0%    19.9%    
Rights Restrictionist 27.3%    27.0%    
Noninterventionist 1.8%    1.8%    
Inclusionist 50.8%    51.3%    
State Controls         
Local Immigration Policy         
% Pop in 287g 12.3 17.8 0.0 84.2 12.3 17.9 0.0 84.2 
% Pop in Sanctuary 7.1 19.3 0.0 94.1 7.3 19.6 0.0 94.1 
Native Attitudes         
Citizen Ideology 55.7 11.7 8.5 96.0 56.0 11.8 8.5 96.0 
Coethnic Group         
% Change in FB pop 57.9 48.5 -40.0 273.7 56.3 46.8 -40.0 273.7 
% State Pop 3.9 5.4 0.0 15.2 3.6 5.2 0.0 15.2 
% w/ Coll Degree 25.9 21.8 3.4 76.3 27.5 21.4 3.4 76.3 
Economic Context         
Male Unemployment Rate 7.1 2.6 2.0 15.8     
Female Unemployment Rate    6.6 2.1 2.0 12.7 
% Emp Male Imm Ind 7.4 1.6 4.7 11.9     
% Emp Female Imm Ind     21.2 2.7 16.7 34.8 
Individual Characteristics         
Age 40.0 8.2 25.0 54.0 40.2 8.1 25.0 54.0 
Education         
Less than HS degree 30.1%    26.9%    
HS degree 22.2%    22.0%    
Some college 17.4%    19.7%    
Bachelor's 16.2%    19.4%    
Adv. degree 14.2%    12.1%    
Racial-Ethnic Group         
White, non-Hispanic 17.6%    17.1%    
Black, non-Hispanic 5.5%    6.0%    
Asian 24.7%    28.6%    
Latino/a 50.8%    46.6%    
Other/Multi 1.6%    1.7%    
English Ability         
None 7.3%    9.8%    
Some 19.3%    20.3%    
Well 24.4%    21.8%    
Very well 34.6%    33.4%    
Only 14.4%    14.6%    
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 Foreign-Born Men Foreign-Born Women 
 Mean/% SD Min Max Mean/% SD Min Max 
Legal Status         
Citizen 43.1%    46.9%    
LPR 41.6%    40.1%    
Unauthorized 15.3%    13.0%    
Years in the US 17.9 11.0 0.0 50.0 17.6 11.0 0.0 50.0 
Married 70.7%    71.3%    
Child <5 in HH 21.6%    21.4%    
Other Family Income (/100)     390.4 516.1 -188.1 1,357.5 
Refugee Origin Country (>60) 4.5%    4.2%    
National Origin         
Canada 1.9%    2.1%    
Mexico 32.5%    27.9%    
El Salvador 3.2%    2.9%    
Other Ctrl Am 4.5%    3.9%    
Cuba 2.2%    1.9%    
Puerto Rico 2.7%    3.0%    
Dominican 1.5%    2.1%    
Other Caribbean 3.3%    3.9%    
Columbia 1.3%    1.7%    
Other S Am 4.6%    5.1%    
Germany 0.9%    1.3%    
Other N&W Europe 3.5%    3.0%    
S&E Europe 6.0%    6.2%    
India 5.7%    5.0%    
China 3.4%    4.0%    
Philippines 3.8%    5.7%    
Vietnam 3.4%    3.6%    
S Korea 2.1%    3.0%    
Other Asia 6.4%    7.6%    
Middle East 3.1%    2.5%    
Africa 3.1%    2.7%    
Oceania 0.9%    0.8%    
N 1074114    1135986    
Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born individuals with known birth country, aged 25-54, 
not in school. Legal status based on 5 CSMI datasets for men and 3 CSMI datasets for women. 
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Supplemental Table 3.2 Comparisons of State Policy Context Effects on Immigrant Labor Force 
Participation between SIPP and ACS Data 
 Foreign-Born Men Foreign-Born Women 
 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
 
SIPP 
Listwise 
SIPP 
Imputed 
ACS 
04&09 
SIPP 
Listwise 
SIPP 
Imputed 
ACS 
04&09 
State Immigration Type       
 (vs Inclusionist)       
Exclusionist -0.228 -0.113 -0.043 0.041 0.013 -0.118* 
 (0.257) (0.206) (0.065) (0.099) (0.095) (0.049) 
Rights Restrictionist -0.175 -0.117 0.018 -0.026 -0.025 0.060 
 (0.166) (0.137) (0.055) (0.084) (0.082) (0.045) 
Noninterventionist -0.181 -0.179 -0.117 -0.131 -0.229 -0.061 
 (0.386) (0.312) (0.098) (0.181) (0.154) (0.077) 
State Controls       
Local Policy       
% Pop in 287g (/10)   -0.017   0.005 
   (0.010)   (0.007) 
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)   -0.081   -0.140    (0.166)   (0.106) 
Native Attitudes       
Citizen ideology (/10) -0.005 0.012 -0.019 -0.032 -0.034 0.035 
 (0.105) (0.083) (0.022) (0.035) (0.033) (0.018) 
Coethnic Group       
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10) 0.020 0.021 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) 
Foreign-Born Population -0.005 -0.004  -0.004 -0.004  
 (0.012) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.006)  
Coethnic Group % Pop   -0.010*   -0.013*** 
   (0.005)   (0.003) 
% College Degree   -0.005**   -0.000 
   (0.002)   (0.001) 
Economic Context       
Unemployment Rate -0.133 -0.121* 0.000 -0.018 -0.006 -0.026 
 (0.070) (0.060) (0.018) (0.032) (0.034) (0.015) 
% Emp in Imm Ind 0.025 0.024 -0.008 0.012 0.014 0.003 
 (0.060) (0.051) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) 
Individual Controls       
Age -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.028*** 0.017*** 0.018*** -0.004*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Age-Squared -0.002 -0.002** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIPP Educ (vs <HS degree)       
HS degree 0.068 0.213  0.134 0.161  
 (0.229) (0.179)  (0.160) (0.147)  
Some college 0.003 0.050  0.406** 0.437***  
 (0.249) (0.204)  (0.124) (0.118)  
College degree or higher 0.749*** 0.941***  0.726*** 0.715***  
 (0.155) (0.142)  (0.160) (0.151)  
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ACS Educ (vs <HS degree)       
HS degree   0.261***   0.254*** 
   (0.034)   (0.020) 
Some college   0.462***   0.504*** 
   (0.039)   (0.023) 
College degree   0.770***   0.689*** 
   (0.046)   (0.026) 
Advanced degree   1.108***   1.176*** 
   (0.056)   (0.032) 
Racial/Ethnic Group        
(vs. Hisp, any race)       
White, non-Hispanic 0.055 -0.024 -0.061 0.146 0.165 -0.075 
 (0.273) (0.209) (0.094) (0.152) (0.157) (0.050) 
Black, non-Hispanic -0.057 -0.041 -0.524*** 0.506* 0.512* 0.649*** 
 (0.390) (0.254) (0.118) (0.253) (0.248) (0.073) 
Asian 0.347 0.304 -0.115 0.515* 0.491* 0.018 
 (0.261) (0.270) (0.111) (0.244) (0.238) (0.061) 
Other/Multiracial -0.267 -0.260 -0.410*** 0.372 0.353 -0.031 
 (0.455) (0.321) (0.119) (0.310) (0.284) (0.069) 
SIPP English ability (vs some)       
None or little -0.125 -0.051  -0.556*** -0.488***  
 (0.157) (0.151)  (0.073) (0.066)  
Well or Only 0.283 0.242  -0.232*** -0.224***  
 (0.232) (0.223)  (0.056) (0.064)         
ACS Eng. ability (vs very well)       
None   -0.174***   -0.381*** 
   (0.049)   (0.028) 
Some   -0.022   -0.217*** 
   (0.036)   (0.022) 
Well   0.119***   0.298*** 
   (0.034)   (0.021) 
Only   0.084   0.181*** 
   (0.047)   (0.028) 
Legal Status (vs. citizen)       
Authorized 0.197 0.151 -0.048 -0.296*** -0.296** -0.334*** 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.035) (0.089) (0.094) (0.021) 
Unauthorized -0.266 -0.313 -0.655*** -0.485*** -0.485*** -0.451*** 
 (0.195) (0.205) (0.071) (0.143) (0.134) (0.092) 
Years in the US 0.016 0.011 0.002 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) 
Years in the US-squared -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Refugee Origin   -0.366***   0.487*** 
   (0.083)   (0.056) 
Household Controls       
Single -0.778*** -0.721*** -0.458*** 0.731*** 0.717*** 0.566*** 
 (0.116) (0.094) (0.027) (0.116) (0.108) (0.018) 
Parent -0.132 -0.049  -0.549*** -0.501***  
 (0.149) (0.155)  (0.068) (0.063)  
       
Child < age 5   0.079*   -0.739*** 
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   (0.035)   (0.017) 
Other family income (/100)    -0.042*** -0.038** -0.005*** 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) 
Year (vs 2009)       
2004 0.198 0.265 -0.705*** 0.094 0.064 -0.267*** 
 (0.185) (0.151) (0.030) (0.057) (0.054) (0.018) 
2008 0.213 0.250  0.022 -0.011  
 (0.190) (0.213)  (0.064) (0.057)  
Region of Origin FE           
Country of Origin FE         
Intercept 3.397*** 3.257*** 3.356*** 1.292*** 1.235*** 0.984*** 
State-Level Variation   0.011***   0.015*** 
N 5018 5666 115973 5294 5811 122732 
N imputed datasets 0 5 5 5 5 5 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time t-1. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. Unauthorized 
status imputed with CSMI. 
Source: SIPP Wave 2 2004 & 2009 data and IPUMS ACS 2004 & 2009 data limited to foreign-born men and women with 
known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school. 
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Chapter Four – The Authorized-Unauthorized Immigrant Wage Gap and State Policy 
Contexts of Reception 
 
 Beginning with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, the federal 
government has sought to reduce unauthorized migration through heightened border enforcement 
and employer sanctions, but IRCA has largely been ineffective at curbing unauthorized 
migration to the US or the hiring of unauthorized workers (Massey and Pren 2012). 
Unauthorized immigrants have continued to migrate to the US in part because of employer 
demand for cheap, flexible labor (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). However, IRCA’s efforts 
to prevent employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants has resulted in the increased 
importance of immigrant legal status for their wages and earnings. Unauthorized workers 
experience wage penalties and are vulnerable to discrimination and employer exploitation. 
 A number of US states have adopted laws mirroring or extending IRCA’s employer 
sanctions. For example, states have enacted E-Verify laws, which require employers to use an 
electronic system to ensure that they are hiring authorized immigrant workers. Some states have 
gone even further than requiring E-Verify; states have added additional fines or will revoke the 
business licenses of employers found employing unauthorized workers. Additionally, states have 
sought to remove unauthorized immigrants from the labor market by adopting laws to increase 
immigration enforcement. Despite the new policy contexts that immigrants face, research on 
immigrant wages has focused on establishing the authorized-unauthorized wage gap or 
examining how federal policy has impacted the gap. This chapter asks, does the authorized-
unauthorized immigrant wage gap vary by state policy context? In other words, do state policy 
contexts exacerbate or ameliorate the unauthorized wage penalty?  
 The following analysis applies a recent methodology, cross-survey multiple imputation, 
to infer legal status in Current Population Survey data. By using CPS data, the analyses can 
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examine the authorized-unauthorized wage gap over time and across different racial-ethnic 
groups. This study answers calls for research to go beyond the establishment of legal status gaps 
and instead evaluate how “legal status distinctions shift and depend on where migrants reside… 
[and the] policymaking specific to that place and time” (Donato and Armenta 2011:535). 
Conflicting federal and state-level policies complicate unauthorized immigrants’ work 
experiences (Marrow 2011). This chapter advances the understanding of the impact of legal 
status by testing whether legal status penalties are context-dependent. It examines whether some 
of the disadvantages of unauthorized legal status may be lessened when unauthorized immigrants 
are in welcoming contexts that blur legal status boundaries. Conversely, it also examines whether 
unauthorized status disadvantages are heightened when immigrants are in contexts that brighten 
legal status boundaries.  
Legal Status Stratification 
 Citizenship boundaries are a form of “legalized discrimination” (Wimmer 2008). 
Immigrants are entitled to certain rights and opportunities dependent on their legal status. Among 
authorized immigrants, legal permanent residents are those who have been admitted for 
permanent residence, while nonimmigrants (such as international students, temporary workers, 
and those in temporary protected status (TPS)) are legally present in the US but do not have the 
right to remain permanently. All legal permanent residents and nonimmigrants with permission 
to work have access to jobs and are guaranteed a minimum wage. Many nonimmigrants are 
guaranteed a prevailing wage to ensure that employers hiring immigrant workers do not lower 
the wages in the industry. However, nonimmigrants on work visas are usually tied to their 
employer and unable to change jobs at will. Despite these work-related rights, both groups are 
subject to deportation if they have committed an aggravated felony.  
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 Unauthorized immigrants include visa over-stayers and those who have clandestinely 
crossed the US border. Unauthorized immigrants do not have the right to reside in the US or hold 
a job in the US. Still, unauthorized workers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MPSA). Under the FLSA, 
unauthorized workers are entitled to a minimum wage and time and a half for overtime hours. 
Under the MSPA, farm employers and contractors must pay wages owed to migrants when they 
payments are due. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also protects both authorized and 
unauthorized immigrants against employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, 
sex, and religion. But overall, unauthorized immigrants have limited work-related rights, and if 
their presence is detected by immigration enforcement, they are subject to removal.  
 These varying rights and forms of societal membership condition immigrant integration. 
The membership-exclusion theoretical perspective highlights the role of formal social 
membership in immigrant integration (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015). Certain kinds of 
integration are often not attainable without formal societal membership. Structural integration, or 
higher achievement in labor market outcomes, education, and home ownership, is often 
contingent on legal status. Unauthorized immigrants may be limited to sociocultural 
incorporation, such as English language ability or religious orientation, where legal restrictions 
play less of a role. The membership-exclusion theory posits a “sharp divide” between immigrants 
with societal membership, whose structural integration should be relatively unhindered, and 
those without societal membership, who are blocked from achievements that require 
membership.  
The first study to capture significant structural integration differences between authorized 
and unauthorized immigrants was Donato and Massey’s (1993) comparison of these immigrants’ 
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wages before and after IRCA’s passage. Donato and Massey used Mexican Migration Project 
(MMP) 1987-1991 data that was collected from residents of Mexican migrant-sending 
communities on both sides of the US-Mexico border. Before IRCA, legal status was not a 
significant predictor of wage levels for Mexican males, but after the passage of IRCA, 
unauthorized immigrants earned lower wages than legal permanent residents and had a greater 
chance of receiving less than minimum wage. Phillips and Massey’s (1999) analysis of MMP 
1987-1997 data revealed that unauthorized male migrants earned 22 percent less than male legal 
permanent residents.  
The authorized-unauthorized wage gap has been found in other data sources. Rivera-
Batiz (1999) examined the hourly earnings of Mexican immigrants using the Legalized 
Population Survey (LPS), a random sample of 6,193 unauthorized immigrants who sought 
amnesty through IRCA in 1987 and 1988. Rivera-Batiz compared their wages to Mexican 
immigrants’ wages in the 1990 Census and assumed that Mexican immigrants in the Census 
were predominately authorized. He found that authorized Mexicans earned about 40 percent 
more per hour than their unauthorized counterparts. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) used LPS’ 
re-interviews with respondents who had been legalized to compare Latino immigrants’ wages 
before and after legalization. The authors used a sample of NLSY Latino immigrants to help 
establish that changes in LPS immigrants’ wages were due to change in legal status rather than 
changes in the economy that affected other workers as well. They found that legalized men’s 
wages were six percent higher after legalization. Other authors used the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation to study unauthorized workers’ wage penalties (Hall, Greenman, and 
Farkas 2010). Hall and colleagues concluded that authorized Mexican male migrants earned 7.4 
percent more than unauthorized Mexican male migrants. Studies have confirmed that the 
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authorized-unauthorized wage gap holds for other Latin American national-origin groups besides 
Mexicans (Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002). 
Scholars have also examined the authorized-unauthorized wage gap over time. Most recently, 
Borjas (2017) identified likely-unauthorized immigrants in the ACS.34 He shows that the wage 
penalty for unauthorized men persists, but the penalty decreased from about 9 percent in 2005 to 
about 3 percent in 2014.  
Scholars argue that federal policy, especially IRCA, “cheapened” the value of 
unauthorized immigrants’ labor (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010). IRCA increased the cost of 
hiring an unauthorized worker through its employer fines. Because of IRCA sanctions, 
employers pay more attention to signals of legal status. Employers assess the probability that a 
worker is unauthorized and pass on the fines associated with IRCA sanctions to the worker in the 
form of lower wages (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; 
Phillips and Massey 1999). Others argue that because unauthorized workers depend on their 
employer for their undetected presence in the United States, employers capitalize on their power 
to lower the wages of unauthorized workers. Employers threaten to report unauthorized 
immigrants seeking higher wages or better working conditions to immigration authorities for 
deportation (Rivera-Batiz 1999). In addition, unauthorized workers may be less likely to 
maximize returns to their human capital by searching for new jobs in the labor market 
(Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Rivera-Batiz 1999). The risk of apprehension by ICE officers 
                                                 
34 Borjas identified likely unauthorized immigrants using a modified version of the PEW methodology. 
Borjas classifies a foreign-born person as authorized if he or she meets any of the following conditions: is 
a citizen, arrived before 1980, receives welfare benefits, is a veteran, works in the government sector, 
receives public housing or rental subsidies, was born in Cuba, holds an occupation that requires a 
professional license, or has a spouse that is a legal immigrant or citizen.  
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incentivizes unauthorized workers to remain in their jobs even if the pay is low (Kossoudji and 
Cobb-Clark 2002; Rivera-Batiz 1999).  
Together, past studies show a consistent authorized-unauthorized wage gap, but most 
research has been limited to low-earning Mexican or Central American immigrants due to data 
limitations; many general surveys do not collect information on legal status. Other studies 
suggest that US natives’ views of Latin American immigrants are strongly associated with 
unauthorized immigration (Timberlake and Williams 2012). US-born, non-Hispanic whites often 
assume that any Latino/a is an unauthorized immigrant (Jiménez 2008), and employers more 
often verify the legal documents of Latino/a immigrants, who they assume to be unauthorized 
(US GAO 1990). With the knowledge of their employees’ legal status, employers may offer 
workers lower wages. Because employers are more likely to verify their legal status, I 
hypothesize that the unauthorized wage penalty is greater for Latino/a immigrant workers than 
other racial/ethnic groups. The effect of legal status may also vary by educational attainment. 
Higher-educated immigrants enter different occupations and industries and a more formal labor 
market than immigrants with lower levels of education. Unauthorized immigrants often enter 
low-paying, dead-end jobs with little opportunity for internal advancement (Powers, Seltzer, and 
Shi 1998). Little opportunity for internal advancement coupled with the high risk unauthorized 
immigrants face searching for new, better-paid jobs, may result in a larger unauthorized status 
penalty for lower-educated workers than high-educated workers. Therefore, the unauthorized 
status penalty may not be uniform; we must examine if non-Latino/a workers and higher-
educated workers are also stratified by legal status.    
 In addition to differential effects by race and education level, legal status may vary based 
on policy context. At the federal level, IRCA brightened the boundary between authorized and 
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unauthorized immigrants by limiting the right to work to authorized immigrants. By brightening 
the authorized-unauthorized boundary, IRCA heightened the importance of legal status in wage 
determinations. However, the decline in the wage penalty over time suggests that the importance 
of legal status may be waning. One possible reason for the decline in the wage gap may be that 
some states have worked to decouple immigrant legal status from the rights (or lack of rights) 
that immigrants receive. Inclusionist states have begun to adopt the notions of what Soysal 
(1994) calls “postnational citizenship” where rights and privileges should not just be reserved for 
citizens of the nation. Instead, rights are based on personhood. States go a step further than 
postnational citizenship and actually confer rights to unauthorized migrants, resulting in a 
localized, state-based citizenship. Recent research shows that states that decoupled unauthorized 
legal status from a lack of rights (for example, by extending in-state tuition to DACA recipients) 
improve the life chances of unauthorized immigrants in those states (Cebulko and Silver 2016). 
Inclusionist states, which have extended rights to unauthorized immigrants, may help 
unauthorized immigrants obtain higher wages; for example, unauthorized immigrants in 
inclusionist states usually have access to higher education, which helps them attain higher wages 
long-term. Inclusionist states may prohibit or discourage the use of E-Verify to validate workers’ 
immigration status and signal to employers that verification of legal status for new hires is not a 
high priority. Unauthorized immigrants may not be as fearful of switching jobs to obtain higher 
wages in inclusionist states which play down local-level immigration enforcement. Inclusionist 
states may provide unauthorized immigrants with driver’s licenses, which provide them with the 
physical mobility to obtain jobs with higher wages.   
Still, other states may heighten the importance of legal status. Unauthorized immigrants’ 
wages are lower in states with E-Verify laws than in states without these laws (Amuedo-
130
  
Dorantes and Bansak 2012; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015), and E-Verify increased the wage 
penalty for unauthorized men (Borjas 2017). Like IRCA, E-Verify laws have brightened the 
boundaries between authorized and unauthorized immigrants by increasing the penalties 
employers face for hiring unauthorized workers. Rights restrictionist states have also brightened 
authorized-unauthorized boundaries by preventing unauthorized workers from obtaining 
professional licenses that may boost their wages. Preventing unauthorized workers from 
obtaining a driver’s license blocks unauthorized immigrants well-paid jobs that require driver’s 
licenses. Exclusionist states have signaled that enforcement is a priority. Employers may draw on 
this fear and offer immigrants lower wages; alternatively, unauthorized immigrants may not be 
able to change jobs so that they can advance and obtain higher wages, a key maneuver used by 
unauthorized workers (Hagan, Lowe, and Quingla 2011).35  I hypothesize that state policy 
context moderates the authorized-unauthorized wage gap. Specifically, I hypothesize that the 
authorized-unauthorized wage gap is the smallest in inclusionist states that blur the boundaries 
between authorized and unauthorized immigrants; the authorized-unauthorized wage gap is the 
largest in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states that brighten the boundaries between 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants.  
Data and Methods 
I examine noncitizen hourly wages using IPUMS Current Population Survey’s Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) from 1998 through 2015 (Flood et al. 2015). CPS data 
serve as the primary source of labor force statistics in the United States and are a nationally-
                                                 
35 Alternatively, Menjivar (2014) observes that enforcement laws lead to the blurring of lines among 
different legal status groups, especially among Latinos. Legislation might lead to discrimination again all 
Latinos, regardless of legal status, leading to smaller wage gaps between authorized and unauthorized 
workers.  
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representative sample collected by the Census Bureau. CPS surveys housing units for four 
consecutive months, leaves them out of the sample for eight months, and then includes them 
again for four more consecutive months. Usual weekly earnings and hours worked are only 
asked of household members in their outgoing month (four and eight). MORG compiles these 
outgoing interviews. CPS-MORG data are frequently used in studies focused on gender and 
racial-ethnic wage differences (Cha and Weeden 2014; Dozier 2010; Pettit and Ewert 2009). 
I begin my analysis in 1998 to provide a baseline comparison for all states, as IIRIRA’s 
and PRWORA’s passage in 1996 mark the beginning of immigration federalism, states began 
implementing their new powers in 1997, and I expect a one-year lag in the effect of state-level 
policy. The MORG analytic sample is limited to noncitizen, non-institutionalized civilian 
workers aged 25 to 54. Self-employed workers, who are not asked wage questions, are excluded. 
Respondents missing on wages are also excluded from analyses.36 Workers whose wages fell 
below $1/hour or above $250/hour in 1999 dollars were dropped from the sample (McCall 
2001).37 In addition, I only include respondents whose country of birth is specified so that I can 
                                                 
36 The number of immigrants with missing wages is small (N=903, or .54% of the sample) and unlikely to 
bias results. The number of immigrants with missing wages is small because the Census uses hotdeck 
imputation to allocate respondents missing earnings values. Hotdeck imputation assigns a missing value 
by matching the record to an individual similar in age, race, sex, major occupation, educational 
attainment, and usual hours worked. The Census allocated 31% of my sample their earnings value, but 
comparisons between immigrants with allocated and unallocated earnings show that unauthorized and 
authorized immigrants had similar rates of nonresponse (about 30% for men and 32% for women). 
However, because unauthorized legal status is not included in allocated earnings, the regression 
coefficient will be attenuated (Hirsch 2004). My analyses then present a conservative effect of 
unauthorized legal status.  
37 The number of workers whose wages fell below $1/hour and above $250/hour is small (N=623 and 35, 
respectively). Workers whose wages fell below $1/hour usually reported working in a service occupation 
and most were not paid hourly. These workers may have difficulty reporting their wage if their schedule 
varied or if they worked piece rate (for example, gardeners and groundskeepers or housekeepers are often 
paid per job). I am unable to examine the legal status of these immigrants because they were dropped 
before CSMI so as not to influence imputation results.  
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account for the influence of the coethnic population on foreign-born noncitizens’ wages. After 
these limitations, the total sample size is 100,200 for men and 64,692 for women. 
Dependent Variable 
The outcome of interest is hourly wage. The CPS asks how much the respondent usually 
earns per week at their current job, before deductions, including tips and overtime pay. The CPS 
also collects the usual number of hours worked per week. I use the IPUMS earnweek variable, 
which divides weekly earnings by hours usually worked, to estimate hourly wage. The CPS also 
asks how much a respondent earned per hour in their current job, if workers reported that they 
were paid an hourly wage. The amount given in earnweek is the higher of these two values. 
Wages are top-coded in the CPS to preserve confidentiality, but the top code is consistent from 
1998 to 2015. I adjusted wages to 1999 dollars using the consumer price index. Hourly wages are 
logged in multivariate analyses but are presented in unlogged form in the descriptive analysis for 
ease of interpretation.  
Independent Variable 
 The independent variable of interest is a triple interaction term between state policy 
context, unauthorized legal status, and year. A triple interaction term shows how the wages of 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants change over time, and whether this change varies by 
state policy context. State policy context, described in more detail in Chapter 2, identifies states 
as either exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, or inclusionist. Exclusionist states 
restrict immigrants’ rights and increase state-level immigration enforcement. Rights restrictionist 
states restrict immigrants’ rights but do not amplify state-level immigration enforcement. 
Inclusionist states extend additional rights to unauthorized immigrants and may even refuse to 
cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. Noninterventionist states have not passed 
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legislation related to immigration enforcement or immigrant rights. Unauthorized legal status is a 
dichotomous variable determined through cross-survey multiple imputation, as described in 
Chapter 2. Year is a set of dichotomous variables so that the analysis captures nonlinear effects 
in time.  
Control Variables 
I control for other state characteristics, including state economic context, coethnic 
community, and native attitudes. The percentage of the labor force that is unemployed is 
associated with lower wages, especially among Latinos (McCall 2001), as workers compete for 
scarce jobs. I control for the percentage of the state civilian labor force that is unemployed 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). I also account for differences in demand for immigrant labor, 
as higher demand can lead to higher immigrant wage levels. I control for higher demand by 
using the percentage of total employment in the state in immigrant industries (percent in 
agriculture, construction, and computer technology for men; percent in accommodations, food 
services, and health for women) (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). Demand for immigrant labor 
is also captured through percent growth of the foreign-born population in the state in the 
previous decade (Malone et al. 2003; Migration Policy Institute 2017). Much of the growth in the 
foreign-born population size in new destinations states was due to employer demand for 
immigrant labor in industries such as meatpacking and food processing (Massey 2008; 
McConnell 2008).  
Coethnic context also influences wage levels. While immigration has little to no effect on 
the wages of low-skilled whites and blacks (National Academies of Sciences 2016), the wages of 
Hispanics and Asians, both US-born and immigrant, are lower in areas with higher shares of 
immigrants (McCall 2001). Immigrants often settle where other coethnic group members live 
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and compete with other coethnics for jobs in immigrant-dominated segments of the labor market. 
Further, policy contexts affect the size of the coethnic population living in the state. Anti-
immigrant policy contexts decrease the share of the coethnic population (Leerkes, Bachmeier, 
and Leach 2013), resulting in lower supply, which then drives up remaining coethnic members’ 
wages. I control for coethnic context by including the percent of the state adult-aged population 
that is an immigrant’s own coethnic group. I calculated five-year rolling averages from ACS data 
for each national origin group. For years prior to 2001, I aggregated Census data and linearly 
interpolated values between 1990 and 2000. Additionally, I control for the percent of the 
coethnic group that has a college degree or more. College-educated immigrant groups may have 
better knowledge of higher-paid open positions on the labor market and refer fellow coethnics to 
these positions (Levanon 2014).          
 Natives often hire immigrant workers because they perceive them to be a cheap, 
submissive source of labor (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Employers with these views may offer 
immigrants lower wages. I proxy these attitudes toward immigrants with Berry et al.’s (1998) 
measure of citizen ideology. Conservative natives may ascribe to the immigrant-stereotype more 
than liberal natives. I also control for local immigration policy using the percent of the state 
population living within a 287(g) or a sanctuary county (Catholic Legal Immigration Network 
2014; Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2016). Table 4.1 shows correlations among the 
state-level control variables.  
Refer to Table 4.1 
  Individual-level covariates include region of origin (11 categories), racial-ethnic group (5 
categories), potential years of work experience (age – educational attainment in years – 6), 
potential work experience squared, and duration of residence in the United States. I control for 
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union membership because union membership boosts wages (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). I 
also control for occupation and industry, standardized to 1990 categorizations to provide 
consistency in changes to occupation and industry over time (8 occupational sectors: managerial 
and professional; technical, sales, and administrative; service; farming, forestry, and fishing; 
production; craft and repairers; and operatives and laborers; and 9 industries: agriculture and 
mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation, communication, and utilities; trade; finance; 
professional services; other services; and public administration). I control for marital and 
parental status because studies report a marriage premium for men (Bellas 1992), and 
experimental studies find a motherhood penalty for women’s wages, but a fatherhood premium 
for men’s wages (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the descriptive 
statistics for the sample as a whole and by legal status. 
Refer to Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
Method of Analysis 
 I use a multilevel random intercept model to predict immigrants’ logged wages. 
Multilevel models account for unobserved similarities among immigrants within a single state; 
for example, immigrants moving to New York may be more ambitious and competitive than 
immigrants who move to New Mexico. Additionally, a regression model fails to take into 
account the error terms at the contextual level and would underestimate the standard errors of the 
coefficients. The random intercept model is written as:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+  𝛽𝛽5𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽9𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes time. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of hourly wages. Unauthorized is a dummy variable indicating that an immigrant 
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does not have the authorization to work in the US. Characteristics are individual-level covariates 
listed above. Policy indicates the state policy context in place at time t-1, and context includes 
other state-level control variables at t-1. Time is measured as year fixed effects which capture 
economic trends common to all states (such as the economic recession). Interaction terms 
between unauthorized status, year, and state policy type allow me to examine how the 
unauthorized wage gap has changed over time in each state policy context. Uj is the random 
intercept for state j and eij is a residual error term (or a person-level random effect). Because 
unauthorized status was imputed, I estimate the multilevel random intercept model across 10 
imputed datasets with Stata’s mi estimate command. Stata’s mi estimate estimates the model for 
each of the datasets and combines the results using Rubin’s rules.  
Results 
Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap 
 I begin by establishing the authorized-unauthorized wage gap found in other studies and 
examining how it changes over time. Panel A in Figure 4.1 shows the log wage gap between 
authorized and unauthorized men, not controlling for any individual or state-level differences. 
The baseline wage gap between unauthorized and authorized men decreases from about a 38 
percent penalty for unauthorized workers in 1999 to about an 18 percent penalty for unauthorized 
workers in 2015.38 There is a steady decline in the wage gap from 1999 to 2015, with an 
exception during the housing bubble (from 2006-2008). As seen in Panel B in Figure 4.1, which 
shows trends in authorized and unauthorized men’s logged wage levels, the decline in the wage 
gap is largely due to unauthorized workers’ wages increasing over time (from $8.57 per hour to 
                                                 
38 38% = 100*[exp(.323)-1]; 18% = 100*[exp(.166)-1]; predicted values from Stata 14’s marginsplot 
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$10.55 per hour in 1999 dollars), while authorized workers’ wages remained flat (at about 
$12.00 per hour) and even decreased slightly during the recession.39 
Refer to Figure 4.1 
 The wage gap is not as large between authorized and unauthorized women as the wage 
gap is for authorized and unauthorized men. Additionally, the gap does not decline as steadily 
from 1998 to 2015 (see Panel C in Figure 4.1). In 1999, the unauthorized wage penalty for 
women was 30 percent, and this penalty decreased to about 17 percent in 2004.40 The gap 
declines again until 2009 but returns to about 19 percent in the recession. The wage penalty 
remains flat for the rest of the recession and post-recession years until a slight decrease in 
2015.41 The decline in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap is due to an increase in 
unauthorized women’s wages (see Panel D in Figure 4.1). In the early 2000s, unauthorized 
women’s wages increased from $7.63 in 1998 to $9.21 in 2004; meanwhile, authorized women’s 
wages leveled off in 2001, at about $10.09 an hour.42  
 Because unauthorized workers are more likely than authorized workers to have less than 
a high school education or to work in low-paying occupations, such as farming or service, 
individual characteristics might account for much of the authorized-unauthorized wage gap. 
Figure 4.2 shows the wage gap after controlling for individual characteristics for men and 
women. Once controlling for these characteristics, the unauthorized wage penalty for men was 
about 11 percent in 1998 (see Panel A in Figure 4.2).43 Instead of a steady decline in the wage 
                                                 
39 $8.57 = exp(2.149); $10.55 = exp(2.356); authorized workers’ wages range from $11.55 (exp(2.447)) to 
$12.78 (exp(2.548)) per hour. 
40 30% = 100*[exp(.261)-1]; 17% = 100*[exp(.160)-1] 
41 19% = 100*[exp(.180)-1 
42 $7.63 = exp(2.032); $9.21 = exp(2.220); $10.09 = exp(2.312) 
43 11% = 100*[exp(.103)-1]  
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gap, the gap declines through the dot-com burst, returns to about a 10 percent penalty during the 
housing bubble, and is eliminated during the recession and post-recession years. In the recession 
and post-recession years, predicted wage values suggest unauthorized men earn about 3 percent 
more than authorized men, although significance tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
wage difference is zero.  
Refer to Figure 4.2 
 Panel B in Figure 4.2 shows the wage gap for women once controlling for individual 
characteristics. The unauthorized wage penalty significantly differs from zero during the dot-com 
burst (2001-2003), with unauthorized women earning about 13-14 percent less than authorized 
women.44 However, throughout the rest of the time period, unauthorized women’s wages fail to 
differ significantly from authorized women’s wages. Models adding controls in a stepwise 
fashion (not shown), show that the unauthorized wage penalty declines by 67 percent when the 
occupation and industry variables are added, another 17 percent when education is added, and is 
no longer statistically significantly different from zero when time in the US is accounted for. 
Hall et al. (2010) also find a small, statistically insignificant effect of unauthorized legal status 
for women. Unauthorized immigrant women are often limited to a narrow range of occupations, 
such as housekeeping, child care, and informal textile work. Because of the informal nature of 
these occupations, authorized legal status may not offer much of a boost in wages.  
Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Education Level 
 Does the authorized-unauthorized wage gap, or lack thereof among women, hold across 
educational levels and racial-ethnic groups? An advantage of using CSMI and imputed CPS data 
is that the sample includes unauthorized workers across educational-levels and racial groups. 
                                                 
44 13% = 100*[exp(.124)-1] in 2001; 14% = 100*[exp(.129)-1] in 2002 
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Figure 4.3 shows the wage gap by high and low levels of education (some college or more versus 
a high school diploma or less) for men and women. The predicted wage values in Figure 4.3 are 
derived from a regression model with a triple interaction term between economic period, 
unauthorized legal status, and a dichotomous variable for higher levels of education (see 
Appendix Table 4.2 for the model). Because of the smaller number of higher-educated 
unauthorized workers, year is collapsed into economic periods: 1998-2000 (tech boom); 2001-
2002 (burst in dot com bubble); 2003-2007 (housing boom); 2008-2012 (recession); 2013-2015 
(post-recession).  
In Panel A of Figure 4.3, the unauthorized wage penalty for men is estimated to be 
slightly higher for higher-educated workers in the years before the recession. During the tech 
boom, the greatest difference between the education levels, there is about a 19 percent 
unauthorized wage penalty for higher-educated workers as opposed to a 9 percent penalty for 
lower-educated workers.45 However, the penalty does not differ significantly between low and 
high education levels because the estimate is imprecise.46 The results suggest that unauthorized 
legal status penalizes even highly skilled workers, and working in a formalized industry with 
more opportunity for internal advancement may not benefit these workers. Further, the trend in 
the wage gap holds for workers with higher and lower levels of education. In the recession years, 
the gap closes completely for men. I conclude that the unauthorized penalty holds across 
education levels for men. Turning to Panel B, we see that there is no difference between higher-
education and lower-educated female workers in the unauthorized wage penalty. For both 
                                                 
45 19% = 100*[exp(.170)-1]; 9%=100*[exp(.090)-1] 
46 A joint significant test of the interaction terms fails to reject the null that the coefficients differ from 
zero. 
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higher- and lower-educated women, the wages of unauthorized workers fail to significantly 
differ from the wages of authorized workers throughout most of the time period.      
Refer to Figure 4.3 
Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Racial Group 
 Figure 4.4 presents the wage gap for Latino/a and Asian workers. These predicted values 
are from a regression model with a triple interaction term between economic period, 
unauthorized legal status, and a dichotomous variable indicating Asian racial identification. The 
sample was limited to Latinos/as and Asians because of the small sample size for white, non-
Hispanic and black, non-Hispanic unauthorized workers (together, about 10 percent of the 
unauthorized sample for men and 16 percent of the unauthorized sample for women). Figure 4.4 
Panel A shows the wage penalty is 21 percent for unauthorized Asian men during the late 
1990s.47 This penalty is higher than the 8 percent penalty for Latinos, but the penalties fail to 
differ significantly.48 Again, the wage gap closes over time for both Latinos and Asians, so that 
in the recession and post-recession years, unauthorized men’s wages are no lower than 
authorized men’s wages. I conclude that the unauthorized wage penalty holds among Asian 
immigrant men. Panel B in Figure 4.4 shows the authorized-unauthorized wage gap for Asian 
and Latina women. Throughout most of the 2000s, neither unauthorized Asian or unauthorized 
Latina women suffer a statistically significant wage penalty. Further, the estimates of the wage 
gap are similar for Asian and Latina women.  
  Refer to Figure 4.4 
                                                 
47 21% = 100*[exp(.187)-1] during 1998-2000 
48 8% = 100*[exp(.080)-1] during 1998-2000 
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Trends in Men’s Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by State Policy Context 
 The decline in the unauthorized wage penalty over time hints that the importance of legal 
status may be waning. For men, the decline in the wage gap and the rise in unauthorized 
immigrants’ wages coincide with the rise of inclusionist states, which have worked to decouple 
unauthorized legal status from a position lacking rights. Table 4.4 presents the results estimating 
logged wages among authorized and unauthorized immigrant men while controlling for 
individual-level characteristics and state context.49 The model also includes the results of the 
interactions between year, unauthorized legal status, and state policy context to examine whether 
the trend in authorized and unauthorized immigrants’ wage levels is similar across exclusionist, 
rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, and inclusionist states.  
Refer to Table 4.4 
The individual-level control variables predict wages as expected. Individuals who have 
higher levels of education and more time in the US have higher wages. White, non-Hispanic and 
Asian immigrants earn higher wages, as do immigrants who were born in regions outside of 
Central America and Mexico. Single men earn less than married men, and parents receive a wage 
premium. Work experience has a slight curvilinear relationship with wage, with returns to wages 
flattening at the highest levels of work experience. Occupations outside of service, with the 
exception of farming, are associated with higher wages. Industries outside of the non-
professional service industry are also associated with higher wage levels. Union membership 
results in higher wages.  
                                                 
49 Table 4.4 only presents the state-level interaction model for men because unauthorized women do not 
experience a wage penalty. Models estimating the trends in authorized and unauthorized women’s wages 
by state policy context (not shown) show a lack of a wage gap across all state policy contexts.  
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State context is also associated with immigrant wage levels. Noncitizen men’s wages are 
boosted by demand from immigrant industries. A one percent increase in the share of the state’s 
workers employed in immigrant industries is associated with a 1.6 percent increase in 
noncitizens wages (p<0.001). Noncitizen men’s wages also receive a small boost from the 
percent of their coethnic group with a college degree (p<0.001). Surprisingly, the percent of the 
population living in a 287(g) county increases noncitizens’ wages (p<0.05). However, the 
increase is negligible, with less than a one percent increase when going from the minimum to 
maximum values of the population covered by 287(g). On the other hand, wages are slightly 
lowered by foreign-born population growth and higher coethnic group shares of the state 
population (p<0.001).  
However, the model does not support the hypothesis that the authorized-unauthorized 
wage gap differs between state policy contexts. The interactions between year, unauthorized 
legal status, and state policy contexts are not significant and a joint significance test indicates 
that I should fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero (f statistic = 
.22; p=1). This model indicates that the authorized-unauthorized wage gap has declined across 
all state policy contexts. Figure 4.5 shows the trend in the predicted logged wage gap between 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants by state policy type. Authorized-unauthorized wage 
gaps were similar across policy types. 
Refer to Figure 4.5 
Supplemental Analyses 
 Supplementary analyses were conducted to examine whether alternative specifications of 
the state policy context impact the trends in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap. I re-estimated 
the models using narrowly defined indicators of blurred and bright boundaries related to work. I 
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included an indicator whether a state 1) had an E-Verify law and a law allowing state law 
enforcement to verify immigrant legal status; 2) only had an E-Verify law; 3) outlawed the 
required use of E-Verify or state law enforcement inquiring about legal status; or 4) had no laws 
related to E-Verify or state law enforcement checking legal status. Models showed that 
immigrant men in states with both E-Verify and state law enforcement involvement earned about 
3 percent less than immigrants in states without these types of laws. However, the trend in the 
authorized-unauthorized wage gap failed to vary by these measures of state policy context. I also 
estimated a model including an indicator for the enactment of an E-Verify law. Immigrant men 
in E-Verify states earned less than immigrant men in states without these laws. The trend in the 
authorized-unauthorized wage gap also failed to vary by E-Verify context. Together, these 
analyses suggest that state policy context has failed to differentially impact the authorized-
unauthorized wage gap over time.  
 I also tested whether the trend in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap was sensitive to 
the inclusion of immigrants who earned up to $250 an hour. I estimated the models by omitting 
immigrants who earned more than $100 per hour from analyses. These high earners were more 
likely to be professionals, work in construction, finance, or professional services, have college 
degrees, and be born in Asia. The share of unauthorized immigrants was similar among higher-
earning and lower-earning male immigrants; 25 percent of high-earning men were unauthorized, 
similar to 24 percent among lower-earning men. But a higher share of unauthorized immigrants 
made up the high-earner group among women (22 percent vs 18 percent). Trends in the 
authorized-unauthorized wage gap are similar when high-earning immigrants are excluded. The 
decrease in the male authorized-unauthorized wage gap is not driven by a few high earners, and 
the lack of a gap among women is not driven by high-earning unauthorized women. Further, 
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trends in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap were similar in SIPP. The authorized-
unauthorized wage gap had disappeared in 2009 among immigrant men, and the effect of 
unauthorized legal status was only significant for women in the 2001 SIPP survey.  
Summary and Discussion 
 This chapter contributes to the literature on immigrant legal status by examining whether 
the unauthorized status penalty varies by educational attainment, racial-ethnic group, and state 
policy context. It takes advantage of CSMI to capture variation within the unauthorized 
immigrant group, including smaller segments of the population – such as higher-educated and 
Asian unauthorized immigrants – and to ensure adequate unauthorized immigrant representation 
across many US states. By providing a thorough analysis of the unauthorized immigrant 
population, we can better understand whether the penalties of unauthorized immigrant status can 
be mitigated. This chapter answers three questions: Do unauthorized immigrants with higher 
education levels also experience a wage penalty? Do non-Latino unauthorized immigrants also 
experience a wage penalty? Do state policy contexts exacerbate or ameliorate the unauthorized 
wage penalty?  
 I find that unauthorized male immigrants suffer a wage penalty no matter whether they 
are Asian or Latino, highly-educated or with a high school degree or less. In fact, while 
coefficients fail to differ significantly, the legal status penalty was estimated to be slightly larger 
for Asian and highly-educated immigrants. This goes against the expectations that unauthorized 
Latino immigrants and unauthorized immigrants in low-skilled, informal sectors would suffer a 
greater wage penalty than unauthorized Asian immigrants and unauthorized immigrants in high-
skilled sectors. These results suggest that unauthorized legal status is a disadvantage in the 
marketplace that cannot be mitigated with higher levels of education. Also, employer stereotypes 
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of Latinos as unauthorized immigrants will not prevent employers from verifying the legal status 
of all “foreign-appearing” immigrants, and Asian unauthorized immigrants suffer from the same 
job immobility that disadvantages Latino unauthorized immigrants. These results suggest that in 
wage negotiations, unauthorized status will always be penalized. These findings show the 
applicability of the membership-exclusion model. Lack of societal membership disadvantages 
immigrant economic integration, no matter immigrants’ race or education level.  
While inclusionist state policy contexts work to decouple unauthorized legal status from 
some of its disadvantages, findings suggest that these states fail to mitigate the negative effects 
of unauthorized legal status. But exclusionist and rights restrictionist states do not exacerbate the 
wage gap, either. Contrary to expectations, legal status distinctions are not dependent on state 
policy context. As Marrow (2011) suggests, immigrants are constantly navigating the national 
context, state contexts, and more proximate local contexts, such as the local labor market, local 
policies, or the organizational policies of their workplace. Given the decline in the authorized-
unauthorized wage gap, national contexts may matter more for immigrants wage determination 
than state-level contexts.  
The unauthorized penalty holds among different racial-ethnic groups, different education 
levels, and across US states, but this chapter shows that legal status stratification is differentiated 
in other respects. First, among women, unauthorized legal status is not penalized. Past research 
has shown that as a result of IRCA, women experienced more wage deterioration and more 
informal working conditions than men (Donato et al. 2008). Both unauthorized and authorized 
women who work in these low-skilled industries and occupations experience poor working 
conditions, and there is little room for an additional effect for legal status. Any additional 
authorized wage premium can be explained by education level and time spent in the US. Most 
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authorized women have lived longer in the US than unauthorized women. With time in the US, 
authorized women may have gained additional knowledge on where to find the best-paying jobs 
and have cultivated their skills, including their English ability, in order to obtain them. Time in 
the US could also allow immigrant women to shift their gender ideology to redefine motherhood 
as compatible with paid labor (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992). If adopted, these women may have 
more stable work trajectories than women whose gender ideology limits their involvement in 
work. 
Second, among men, the unauthorized wage penalty declines over time. Although state 
policy initiatives do not explain the decline in the wage penalty, we know that legal distinctions 
shift. This finding leaves open several questions for future research. What explains the decline in 
the authorized-unauthorized wage gap? One possibility is that the recession resulted in an exodus 
of unauthorized workers from the United States, yet employers still preferred to hire 
unauthorized immigrant workers because of stereotypes about their deferential manner and work 
ethic. Due to lower supply, employers may have offered unauthorized immigrants better wages. 
Higher wages for unauthorized workers may not translate into higher incomes, however, if the 
bump in wages occurred simultaneously with an involuntary shift to part-time employment. 
Other scholars have shown that immigrant men were more likely to shift into part-time work 
than US-born whites, blacks, and Latinos (Sisk and Donato 2016). The convergence in the 
authorized-unauthorized wage gap may also be due to employers failing to reward authorized 
immigrants’ skills and education during the recession, resulting in a flattening of authorized 
immigrants’ wages. 
Theoretically, the declining authorized-unauthorized wage penalty raises the possibility 
that the membership-exclusion model is losing ground to a universal model of citizenship. 
147
  
Instead of societal membership conditioning structural integration, nation-based legal status may 
no longer be important for securing certain rights and opportunities. Postnational citizenship 
poses that the “universalistic rights of personhood transcend [national boundaries]” (Soysal 
1994:8) and that the human rights accorded to all people help unauthorized immigrants integrate 
into society. However, I argue that postnational citizenship cannot explain the declining 
authorized-unauthorized wage penalty. If postnational citizenship was the main factor driving the 
closing of the authorized-unauthorized wage gap, we would expect to see a general rise in the 
wages of unauthorized workers as they capitalized on their human rights to better their economic 
situations. Instead, my model shows that a decline in authorized men’s wages, in addition to an 
increase in unauthorized men’s wages, resulted in a closing of the wage gap. The decline of 
authorized men’s wages challenges postnational citizenship by suggesting that immigrants’ 
economic circumstances have not been directly improved by increasing the value of their human 
rights. Instead, membership and its rights are now devalued so that the authorized experience is 
more similar to the unauthorized one. Moving forward, it will be crucial to identify the 
circumstances where 1) unauthorized legal status no longer blocks incorporation, and 2) the 
rights associated with authorized legal status no longer secure structural integration. We 
especially need to understand both dynamics so that we can ensure continued growth in 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants’ hourly wages.  
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Figure 4.3 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Education Level, 1998-2015 
Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal 
status.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized men and women aged 25-54. 
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Figure 4.4 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Racial-Ethnic Group, 1998-2015 
 
Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal 
status.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized Latino/a and Asian men and women aged 25-54.  
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Figure 4.5 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by State Policy Context, 1998 to 2015 
 
Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal 
status. Models include a triple interaction term between state policy context, legal status, and year. Models control 
for state and individual-level characteristics. 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized men aged 25-54. 
  
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Lo
gg
ed
 W
ag
e 
G
ap
, F
ix
ed
 P
or
tio
n
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Exclusionist Rights Restrictionist
Noninterventionist Inclusionist
153
  Ta
bl
e 4
.1
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 a
m
on
g 
St
at
e-
Le
ve
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 fo
r W
ag
e 
&
 S
al
ar
ie
d 
N
on
ci
tiz
en
 M
en
 a
nd
 W
om
en
, 1
99
8-
20
15
 
Pa
ne
l A
: C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 A
m
on
g 
W
ag
e/
Sa
la
rie
d 
N
on
ci
tiz
en
 M
en
 
 
Ex
cl
 
Re
st 
N
on
in
t 
In
cl
 
Ci
tz
Id
eo
l 
28
7g
 
Sa
nc
t 
FB
%
ch
 
G
rp
%
po
p 
%
Co
ll 
U
ne
m
p 
Im
m
In
d 
Ex
cl
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rt
s R
es
t 
-0
.3
5 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
on
in
t 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
8 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
cl
 
-0
.3
6 
-0
.6
5 
-0
.1
9 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ci
tz
Id
eo
l 
-0
.2
4 
-0
.1
3 
-0
.0
9 
0.
35
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
7g
 
0.
05
 
-0
.1
4 
-0
.1
1 
0.
15
 
-0
.0
4 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sa
nc
t 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
7 
-0
.0
6 
0.
25
 
0.
06
 
0.
07
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
FB
%
ch
 
0.
20
 
0.
16
 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.3
0 
-0
.3
6 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.2
2 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
G
rp
%
po
p 
-0
.1
4 
0.
00
 
-0
.1
1 
0.
16
 
-0
.0
8 
0.
32
 
0.
09
 
-0
.0
4 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
%
Co
ll 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
2 
0.
06
 
0.
00
 
0.
16
 
-0
.0
7 
0.
00
 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.4
8 
1.
00
 
 
 
U
ne
m
p 
0.
05
 
-0
.2
4 
-0
.0
8 
0.
24
 
0.
09
 
0.
34
 
0.
18
 
-0
.1
5 
0.
13
 
0.
01
 
1.
00
 
 
Im
m
In
d 
0.
04
 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.1
0 
0.
10
 
-0
.2
3 
0.
14
 
0.
00
 
0.
24
 
0.
38
 
-0
.1
9 
-0
.2
2 
1.
00
 
 Pa
ne
l B
: C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 a
m
on
g 
W
ag
e/
Sa
la
rie
d 
N
on
ci
tiz
en
 W
om
en
 
 
Ex
cl
 
Re
st 
N
on
in
t 
In
cl
 
Ci
tz
Id
eo
l 
28
7g
 
Sa
nc
t 
FB
%
ch
 
G
rp
%
po
p 
%
Co
ll 
U
ne
m
p 
Im
m
In
d 
Ex
cl
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rt
s R
es
t 
-0
.3
5 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
on
in
t 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
8 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
cl
 
-0
.3
6 
-0
.6
5 
-0
.1
8 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ci
tz
Id
eo
l 
-0
.2
5 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.1
0 
0.
34
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
7g
 
0.
05
 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.1
1 
0.
13
 
-0
.0
6 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sa
nc
t 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
6 
-0
.0
6 
0.
24
 
0.
04
 
0.
07
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
FB
%
ch
 
0.
21
 
0.
15
 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.2
9 
-0
.3
8 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.2
1 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
G
rp
%
po
p 
-0
.1
3 
0.
00
 
-0
.1
0 
0.
14
 
-0
.0
8 
0.
31
 
0.
10
 
-0
.0
4 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
%
Co
ll 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
3 
0.
05
 
0.
00
 
0.
14
 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.4
9 
1.
00
 
 
 
U
ne
m
p 
0.
06
 
-0
.2
0 
-0
.1
2 
0.
20
 
-0
.0
5 
0.
40
 
0.
22
 
-0
.1
2 
0.
22
 
-0
.0
6 
1.
00
 
 
Im
m
In
d 
0.
08
 
0.
09
 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.1
1 
0.
18
 
0.
14
 
0.
18
 
0.
04
 
-0
.1
1 
0.
09
 
0.
19
 
1.
00
 
So
ur
ce
: C
PS
-M
O
RG
 1
99
8-
20
15
, a
ut
ho
riz
ed
 a
nd
 u
na
ut
ho
riz
ed
 w
ag
e 
an
d 
sa
la
rie
d 
im
m
ig
ra
nt
s a
ge
d 
25
-5
4.
 
154
  
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Wage & Salaried Men, Aged 25-54 in CPS-MORG 1998-2015 
 All Noncitizen Men Unauthorized Men Authorized Men 
 Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD 
Dependent Variable       
Wage 14.00 10.56 10.93 8.04 14.95 11.05 
Independent Variables       
State Policy Context       
Exclusionist 16.2%  19.6%  15.2%  
Rights Restrictionist 38.6%  34.3%  39.9%  
Noninterventionist 4.9%  3.3%  5.4%  
Inclusionist 40.3%  42.9%  39.5%  
Legal Status       
Unauthorized 23.7%      
State Controls       
Local Immigration Policy       
% Pop in 287g 7.5 15.3 8.3 16.0 7.3 15.1 
% Pop in Sanctuary 3.8 14.5 3.7 14.1 3.9 14.6 
Native Attitudes       
Citizen Ideology 54.5 12.8 53.7 12.8 54.8 12.8 
Coethnic Group       
% State Pop 4.2 5.3 5.0 5.5 3.9 5.2 
% w/ College Degree 21.4 21.5 13.6 16.8 23.8 22.2 
Economic Context       
Male Unemployment Rate 6.3 2.4 6.5 2.4 6.3 2.4 
% Emp in Male Imm Industry 7.4 1.7 7.4 1.7 7.4 1.6 
% Change in FB Pop 64.9 51.6 73.9 61.0 62.1 47.9 
Individual Characteristics       
Work Experience 19.1 9.1 18.3 8.4 19.3 9.2 
Occupation       
Professional 17.9%  6.1%  21.5%  
Tech/Sales/Admin 12.9%  9.1%  14.1%  
Service 15.5%  19.0%  14.4%  
Farming 8.0%  12.1%  6.7%  
Production/Manufacturing 20.3%  24.3%  19.0%  
Operations/Labor 25.5%  29.4%  24.2%  
Industry       
Agriculture/Mining 8.2%  11.9%  7.1%  
Construction 18.5%  25.6%  16.3%  
Manufacturing 17.5%  15.5%  18.1%  
Transp/Comm/Utilities 6.4%  4.7%  6.9%  
Trade 20.7%  22.7%  20.0%  
Finance 3.3%  1.8%  3.8%  
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 All Noncitizen Men Unauthorized Men Authorized Men 
 Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD 
Professional Services 10.2%  4.9%  11.9%  
Other Services 14.3%  12.5%  14.8%  
Public Administration 0.9%  0.4%  1.1%  
Covered by Union 7.7%  5.8%  8.3%  
Education       
Less than HS degree 39.1%  53.3%  34.7%  
HS degree 24.4%  26.6%  23.8%  
Some college 11.1%  8.1%  12.1%  
Bachelor's 13.2%  6.7%  15.2%  
Adv. degree 12.1%  5.3%  14.2%  
Racial-Ethnic Group       
White, non-Hispanic 15.2%  7.8%  17.5%  
Black, non-Hispanic 4.7%  2.4%  5.4%  
Asian 18.6%  8.8%  21.6%  
Latino/a 61.3%  80.8%  55.3%  
Other/Multi 0.3%  0.2%  0.3%  
Years in the US 19.07 9.06 8.4 5.9 12.4 9.2 
Refugee Origin Country 3.4%  1.8%  3.9%  
Region of Birth       
North America 1.9%  0.5%  2.3%  
North/West Europe 3.9%  1.2%  4.7%  
South/East Europe 4.4%  2.3%  5.0%  
East Asia 5.9%  2.5%  6.9%  
South Central Asia 7.7%  3.7%  8.9%  
South/East/West Asia 7.8%  3.8%  9.1%  
Africa 2.8%  1.5%  3.1%  
Caribbean 5.5%  2.4%  6.5%  
Central America 27.7%  39.6%  24.0%  
South America 6.0%  7.1%  5.7%  
Mexico 26.6%  35.4%  23.8%  
Married 68.6%  63.1%  70.3%  
Parent 56.9%  49.3%  59.3%  
N 100200  23720.7  76479.3  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Wage & Salaried Women, Aged 25-54 in CPS-MORG 1998-2015 
 All Women Unauthorized Women Authorized Women 
 Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD 
Dependent Variable       
Wage 11.60 9.31 9.79 8.37 11.99 9.46 
Independent Variables       
State Policy Context       
Exclusionist 16.2%  15.8%  16.3%  
Rights Restrictionist 38.6%  33.6%  39.7%  
Noninterventionist 4.7%  3.5%  5.0%  
Inclusionist 40.5%  47.1%  39.1%  
Legal Status       
Unauthorized 17.8%      
State Controls       
Local Immigration Policy       
% Pop in 287g 7.5 15.5 8.7 15.7 7.3 15.5 
% Pop in Sanctuary 3.7 14.4 4.3 15.5 3.6 14.1 
Native Attitudes       
Citizen Ideology 55.5 13.2 55.3 12.7 55.5 13.3 
Coethnic Group       
% State Pop 3.5 5.0 4.4 5.5 3.3 4.8 
% w/ College Degree 24.3 20.3 18.1 18.5 25.6 20.5 
Economic Context       
Female Unemployment Rate 6.0 1.9 6.1 2.0 5.9 1.9 
% Emp in Female Imm Ind 19.9 3.3 19.5 3.0 20.0 3.4 
% Change in FB Pop 61.7 49.0 68.1 57.2 60.3 46.9 
Individual Characteristics       
Work Experience 19.7 9.4 18.9 8.9 19.8 9.5 
Occupation       
Professional 21.0%  10.1%  23.3%  
Tech/Sales/Admin 23.0%  19.5%  23.8%  
Service 35.8%  44.2%  34.0%  
Farming 2.0%  3.3%  1.7%  
Production/Manufacturing 3.2%  3.8%  3.0%  
Operations/Labor 15.0%  19.2%  14.1%  
Industry       
Agriculture/Mining 1.8%  2.9%  1.6%  
Construction 0.9%  1.1%  0.8%  
Manufacturing 15.1%  16.7%  14.8%  
Transp/Comm/Utilities 2.9%  2.4%  3.0%  
Trade 22.3%  26.4%  21.4%  
Finance 4.6%  2.8%  5.0%  
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 All Women Unauthorized Women Authorized Women 
 Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD 
Other Services 23.8%  28.7%  22.8%  
Public Administration 1.3%  0.8%  1.5%  
Covered by Union 8.4%  5.6%  9.1%  
Education       
Less than HS degree 30.7%  42.5%  28.1%  
HS degree 25.4%  26.8%  25.1%  
Some college 15.7%  10.1%  16.9%  
Bachelor's 17.3%  12.8%  18.3%  
Adv. degree 10.9%  7.8%  11.5%  
Racial-Ethnic Group       
White, non-Hispanic 18.7%  10.2%  20.5%  
Black, non-Hispanic 7.3%  6.1%  7.6%  
Asian 22.5%  13.9%  24.3%  
Latino/a 51.1%  69.6%  47.1%  
Other/Multi 0.4%  0.2%  0.4%  
Years in the US 11.92 8.82 8.1 6.0 12.8 9.1 
Refugee Origin Country (>60) 4.0%  2.5%  4.3%  
Region of Birth       
North America 2.8%  0.7%  3.3%  
North/West Europe 5.1%  1.4%  5.9%  
South/East Europe 5.9%  3.0%  6.6%  
East Asia 8.0%  5.0%  8.7%  
South Central Asia 5.0%  3.5%  5.3%  
South/East/West Asia 12.1%  7.2%  13.2%  
Africa 3.1%  3.3%  3.0%  
Caribbean 9.0%  6.3%  9.6%  
Central America 23.6%  36.3%  20.8%  
South America 7.6%  10.1%  7.0%  
Mexico 17.8%  23.5%  16.5%  
Married 63.7%  56.0%  65.4%  
Parent 66.5%  61.8%  67.5%  
N 64692  11540.7  53151.3  
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Table 4.4 Multilevel Random Intercept Regression Coefficients for Logged Wages of Noncitizen Men 
Regressed on Year, State Policy Context, and Unauthorized Legal Status Interaction; with State and 
Individual Controls 
 B SE 
State-Level Controls   
Local Immigration Policy   
% Pop in 287g 0.004* (0.002) 
% Pop in Sanctuary 0.001 (0.002) 
Coethnic Group   
% State Pop -0.005*** (0.001) 
% w/ College Degree 0.003*** (0.000) 
Economic Context   
Male Unemployment -0.005** (0.002) 
% Emp in Male Imm Ind 0.015*** (0.004) 
% Change in FB Pop -0.002*** (0.001) 
Native Attitudes   
Citizen Ideology 0.002 (0.004) 
Individual Characteristics   
Education (vs less than HS)   
HS degree 0.135*** (0.004) 
Some college 0.185*** (0.006) 
Bachelor's 0.406*** (0.007) 
Adv. degree 0.557*** (0.008) 
Race (vs Latino)   
White, non-Hispanic 0.069*** (0.009) 
Black, non-Hispanic -0.006 (0.010) 
Asian 0.070*** (0.011) 
Other/Multi 0.041 (0.027) 
Years in the US 0.006*** (0.000) 
Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)   
North America 0.169*** (0.015) 
North/West Europe 0.139*** (0.014) 
South/East Europe 0.021 (0.013) 
East Asia -0.039* (0.016) 
South Central Asia 0.015 (0.018) 
South/East/West Asia -0.065*** (0.014) 
Africa -0.097*** (0.015) 
Caribbean -0.010 (0.011) 
South America -0.011 (0.008) 
Mexico 0.029*** (0.007) 
Refugee Origin -0.030** (0.009) 
Single -0.031*** (0.004) 
Childless -0.040*** (0.004) 
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Work Experience 0.003*** (0.000) 
Work Exp Squared -0.000*** (0.000) 
Occupation (vs Service)   
Professional 0.448*** (0.007) 
Tech/Sales/Admin 0.251*** (0.006) 
Farming -0.083*** (0.011) 
Production/Manufacturing 0.149*** (0.006) 
Operations/Labor 0.052*** (0.005) 
Industry (vs other services)   
Agriculture/Mining 0.015 (0.010) 
Construction 0.083*** (0.006) 
Manufacturing 0.022*** (0.005) 
Transp/Comm/Utilities 0.036*** (0.007) 
Trade -0.120*** (0.005) 
Finance 0.061*** (0.009) 
Professional Services -0.153*** (0.006) 
Public Administration 0.007 (0.015) 
Union member 0.118*** (0.006) 
Intercept 2.109*** (0.041) 
State SD 0.003*** (0.001) 
N 100200  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: Triple interaction between year, unauthorized legal status, and 
state policy context included, but not shown. Unauthorized status 
estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 9 imputed datasets 
and results combined using Rubin’s rules and Stata’s mi estimate 
command. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered 
on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-
2015 data, for men aged 25-54. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Supplemental Table 4.1: Models used for Figures 4.1 and 4.2 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage 
Gap, 1998-2015 
 Men Women 
 Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls 
 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
Year (vs 1998)     
1999 0.041** 0.025* 0.026 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
2000 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.054*** 0.037** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
2001 0.115*** 0.066*** 0.079*** 0.056*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) 
2002 0.109*** 0.069*** 0.093*** 0.073*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
2003 0.098*** 0.072*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) 
2004 0.099*** 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.057*** 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) 
2005 0.088*** 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.072*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 
2006 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.073*** 0.059*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) 
2007 0.102*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
2008 0.113*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) 
2009 0.089*** 0.048*** 0.097*** 0.066*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
2010 0.077*** 0.038* 0.075*** 0.046*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) 
2011 0.067*** 0.023 0.089*** 0.057*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
2012 0.075*** 0.021 0.074*** 0.042** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) 
2013 0.076*** 0.016 0.067*** 0.030* 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
2014 0.073*** 0.017 0.067*** 0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
2015 0.101*** 0.050*** 0.095*** 0.071*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
Legal Status (vs authorized)     
Unauthorized -0.298*** -0.102* -0.205** -0.032 
 (0.054) (0.042) (0.069) (0.057) 
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Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued 
 Men Women 
 Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls 
 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
Year x Legal Status     
1999#unauth -0.022 -0.002 -0.056 -0.032 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.061) (0.048) 
2000#unauth -0.020 0.010 -0.043 -0.018 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.057) (0.051) 
2001#unauth -0.003 0.027 -0.049 -0.092 
 (0.068) (0.049) (0.110) (0.078) 
2002#unauth 0.002 0.036 -0.068 -0.097 
 (0.061) (0.046) (0.106) (0.071) 
2003#unauth 0.000 0.034 -0.054 -0.091 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.107) (0.069) 
2004#unauth 0.018 0.005 0.045 0.015 
 (0.071) (0.061) (0.101) (0.077) 
2005#unauth 0.035 0.014 0.042 0.005 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.096) (0.067) 
2006#unauth 0.016 -0.002 0.033 0.002 
 (0.073) (0.057) (0.096) (0.078) 
2007#unauth 0.024 0.011 0.047 0.008 
 (0.073) (0.063) (0.092) (0.083) 
2008#unauth 0.023 0.011 0.062 0.008 
 (0.078) (0.066) (0.110) (0.081) 
2009#unauth 0.083 0.133* 0.024 0.081 
 (0.056) (0.053) (0.068) (0.055) 
2010#unauth 0.070 0.128* 0.031 0.079 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.071) (0.058) 
2011#unauth 0.084 0.136* 0.028 0.068 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.066) (0.052) 
2012#unauth 0.075 0.127* 0.031 0.064 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.078) (0.058) 
2013#unauth 0.083 0.131** 0.034 0.073 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.080) (0.065) 
2014#unauth 0.090 0.131* 0.037 0.073 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.076) (0.058) 
2015#unauth 0.106 0.136* 0.094 0.107* 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.070) (0.053) 
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Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued 
 Men  Women  
 Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls 
 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
Individual Characteristics     
Education (vs less than HS)     
HS degree  0.137***  0.102*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Some college  0.192***  0.174*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Bachelor's  0.421***  0.370*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Adv. degree  0.574***  0.510*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Race (vs Latino/a)     
White, non-Hispanic  0.079***  0.050*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Black, non-Hispanic  -0.011  0.067*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Asian  0.070***  0.067*** 
  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Other/Multi  0.049  0.066* 
  (0.027)  (0.029) 
     
Years in the US  0.006***  0.005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)     
North America  0.246***  0.181*** 
  (0.015)  (0.016) 
North/West Europe  0.217***  0.118*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014) 
South/East Europe  0.088***  0.047*** 
  (0.012)  (0.014) 
East Asia  0.071***  0.068*** 
  (0.014)  (0.016) 
South Central Asia  0.179***  0.133*** 
  (0.014)  (0.016) 
South/East/West Asia  0.028*  0.061*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Africa  0.002  0.027 
  (0.014)  (0.015) 
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Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued 
 Men Women 
 Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls 
 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
Caribbean  0.025*  -0.001 
  (0.011)  (0.011) 
South America  0.045***  0.048*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Mexico  0.013*  0.008 
  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Refugee Origin Country  -0.061***  -0.054*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Single  -0.030***  -0.008* 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
No children  -0.038***  0.009* 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Work Experience  0.003***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Work Exp-Squared  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Occupation (vs Service)     
Professional  0.451***  0.425*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Tech/Sales/Admin  0.256***  0.172*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Farming  -0.086***  -0.040* 
  (0.011)  (0.018) 
Production/Manufacturing  0.149***  0.107*** 
  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Operations/Labor  0.051***  -0.026*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Industry (vs other services)     
Agriculture/Mining  0.014  -0.014 
  (0.010)  (0.019) 
Construction  0.082***  0.148*** 
  (0.006)  (0.019) 
Manufacturing  0.020***  0.064*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Transp/Comm/Utilities  0.036***  0.045*** 
  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Trade  -0.123***  -0.098*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
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Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued 
 Men Women 
 Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls Baseline w/ Indv Ctrls 
 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.1) 
(Model for 
Figure 4.2) 
Finance  0.059***  0.109*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Professional Services  -0.154***  -0.021*** 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Public Administration  0.006  0.068*** 
  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Union Member  0.118***  0.096*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Intercept 2.447*** 2.046*** 2.237*** 1.838*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) 
State SD 0.018*** 0.003*** 0.013*** 0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
N 100200 100200 64692 64692 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 10 imputed datasets and 
results combined using Rubin’s rules and Stata’s mi estimate command. All state-level variables are 
lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 
data, for men and women aged 25-54. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Supplemental Table 4.2: Models used for Figure 4.3 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by 
Education Level, 1998-2015 
 Men Women 
 B SE B SE 
Economic Period (vs 1998-2000)     
2001-2002 0.041*** (0.012) 0.052*** (0.014) 
2003-2007 0.056*** (0.011) 0.062*** (0.012) 
2008-2011 0.018 (0.013) 0.042*** (0.011) 
2012-2015 -0.008 (0.014) 0.036** (0.011) 
Legal Status (vs Authorized)     
Unauthorized -0.086* (0.038) -0.050 (0.048) 
Period x Legal Status     
2001xUnauth 0.013 (0.042) -0.055 (0.061) 
2003xUnauth 0.000 (0.045) 0.018 (0.056) 
2008xUnauth 0.091* (0.044) 0.085 (0.048) 
2012xUnauth 0.116** (0.045) 0.097* (0.048) 
Educational Attainment     
Higher Education  
(some college +) 0.195*** (0.010) 0.200*** (0.012) 
Period x Ed     
2001xhied 0.025 (0.016) 0.001 (0.018) 
2003xhied 0.031** (0.011) -0.007 (0.015) 
2008xhied 0.048*** (0.012) 0.015 (0.015) 
2012xhied 0.063*** (0.014) 0.011 (0.014) 
Legal Status x Ed     
Unauthxhied -0.082* (0.040) 0.004 (0.066) 
Period x Status x Ed     
2001xunauthxhied 0.044 (0.069) -0.047 (0.092) 
2003xunauthxhied 0.019 (0.051) -0.012 (0.075) 
2008xunauthxhied 0.059 (0.050) -0.012 (0.078) 
2012xunauthxhied 0.089* (0.045) 0.008 (0.063) 
Race (vs Latino)     
White, non-Hispanic 0.087*** (0.009) 0.054*** (0.010) 
Black, non-Hispanic -0.028** (0.010) 0.050*** (0.010) 
Asian 0.071*** (0.011) 0.064*** (0.013) 
Other/Multi 0.044 (0.028) 0.064* (0.029) 
Years in the US 0.005*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)     
North/West Europe 0.277*** (0.013) 0.151*** (0.014) 
South/East Europe 0.142*** (0.012) 0.097*** (0.014) 
East Asia 0.165*** (0.014) 0.144*** (0.015) 
South Central Asia 0.285*** (0.014) 0.228*** (0.016) 
South/East/West Asia 0.062*** (0.013) 0.097*** (0.014) 
Africa 0.048*** (0.014) 0.060*** (0.015) 
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Supplemental Table 4.2 Continued 
 Men Women 
 B SE B SE 
Caribbean 0.053*** (0.011) 0.018 (0.010) 
South America 0.084*** (0.008) 0.077*** (0.009) 
Mexico 0.004 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007) 
Refugee Origin -0.064*** (0.009) -0.058*** (0.010) 
Single -0.041*** (0.009) -0.008* (0.004) 
Not a parent -0.041*** (0.004) 0.009 (0.004) 
Work Experience 0.001** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Work Exp-Squared -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Occupation (vs Service)     
Professional 0.548*** (0.007) 0.507*** (0.007) 
Tech/Sales/Admin 0.290*** (0.006) 0.189*** (0.005) 
Farming -0.099*** (0.011) -0.046* (0.018) 
Production/Manufacturing 0.149*** (0.006) 0.107*** (0.011) 
Operations/Labor 0.053*** (0.005) -0.030*** (0.007) 
Industry (vs other services)     
Agriculture/Mining 0.017 (0.011) -0.013 (0.019) 
Construction 0.074*** (0.006) 0.139*** (0.019) 
Manufacturing 0.022*** (0.006) 0.066*** (0.007) 
Transp/Comm/Utilities 0.035*** (0.007) 0.046*** (0.011) 
Trade -0.135*** (0.005) -0.108*** (0.005) 
Finance 0.071*** (0.009) 0.105*** (0.009) 
Professional Services -0.116*** (0.006) -0.011 (0.005) 
Public Administration 0.034* (0.016) 0.086*** (0.016) 
Union Member 0.116*** (0.006) 0.102*** (0.007) 
Intercept 2.126*** (0.013) 1.887*** (0.014) 
State SD 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
N 100200  64692  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 10 imputed datasets and 
results combined using Rubin’s rules and Stata’s mi estimate command. All state-level variables are 
lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 
data, for men and women aged 25-54. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Supplemental Table 4.3: Models used for Figure 4.4 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by 
Racial-Ethnic Group, 1998-2015 
 Men Women 
 B SE B SE 
Economic Period (vs 1998-2000)     
2001-2002 0.039*** (0.012) 0.045** (0.015) 
2003-2007 0.054*** (0.010) 0.061*** (0.013) 
2008-2011 0.020 (0.013) 0.045*** (0.012) 
2012-2015 -0.011 (0.015) 0.023 (0.013) 
Legal Status (vs Authorized)     
Unauthorized -0.078** (0.027) -0.032 (0.046) 
Period x Legal Status     
2001xUnauth 0.018 (0.035) -0.067 (0.059) 
2003xUnauth 0.001 (0.037) -0.003 (0.057) 
2008xUnauth 0.077 (0.040) 0.061 (0.046) 
2012xUnauth 0.108** (0.041) 0.079 (0.050) 
Race (vs Latino/a)     
Asian 0.105*** (0.025) 0.078** (0.027) 
Period x Race     
2001xAsian 0.008 (0.018) 0.005 (0.021) 
2003xAsian 0.005 (0.013) -0.013 (0.017) 
2008xAsian 0.022 (0.015) -0.020 (0.016) 
2012xAsian 0.046** (0.017) 0.013 (0.017) 
Legal Status x Race     
unauth#Asian -0.110* (0.054) -0.030 (0.056) 
Period x Legal Status x Race     
2001xunauthxAsian 0.059 (0.091) -0.022 (0.077) 
2003xunauthxAsian 0.034 (0.072) 0.004 (0.087) 
2008xunauthxAsian 0.103 (0.065) 0.023 (0.067) 
2012xunauthxAsian 0.114 (0.076) 0.081 (0.072) 
Education (vs less than HS)     
HS degree 0.130*** (0.004) 0.100*** (0.006) 
Some college 0.188*** (0.007) 0.174*** (0.008) 
Bachelor's 0.420*** (0.008) 0.376*** (0.008) 
Adv. degree 0.581*** (0.009) 0.522*** (0.011) 
Years in the US 0.006*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000) 
Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)     
North America 0.189*** (0.051) 0.082 (0.056) 
North/West Europe 0.082* (0.040) 0.062 (0.050) 
South/East Europe 0.229*** (0.034) 0.096** (0.035) 
East Asia 0.045 (0.024) 0.077** (0.025) 
South Central Asia 0.155*** (0.024) 0.147*** (0.026) 
South/East/West Asia -0.017 (0.023) 0.066** (0.024) 
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Supplemental Table 4.3 Continued 
 Men Women 
 B SE B SE 
Africa 0.087 (0.059) 0.022 (0.078) 
Caribbean 0.005 (0.012) -0.011 (0.012) 
South America 0.047*** (0.008) 0.050*** (0.009) 
Mexico 0.005 (0.005) -0.000 (0.007) 
Nonwhite -0.021* (0.008) -0.013 (0.010) 
Refugee Origin -0.044*** (0.011) -0.044*** (0.012) 
Single -0.028*** (0.004) -0.009* (0.004) 
No children -0.037*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 
Work Experience 0.002*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Work Exp-Squared -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Occupation (vs Service)     
Professional 0.428*** (0.008) 0.397*** (0.008) 
Tech/Sales/Admin 0.243*** (0.007) 0.161*** (0.006) 
Farming -0.078*** (0.011) -0.034 (0.019) 
Production/Manufacturing 0.149*** (0.006) 0.095*** (0.012) 
Operations/Labor 0.058*** (0.006) -0.027*** (0.007) 
Industry (vs other services)     
Agriculture/Mining 0.015 (0.011) -0.022 (0.020) 
Construction 0.089*** (0.006) 0.166*** (0.021) 
Manufacturing 0.016** (0.006) 0.051*** (0.008) 
Transp/Comm/Utilities 0.056*** (0.008) 0.034** (0.013) 
Trade -0.110*** (0.006) -0.095*** (0.006) 
Finance 0.070*** (0.010) 0.107*** (0.011) 
Professional Services -0.144*** (0.008) -0.021*** (0.006) 
Public Administration 0.030 (0.020) 0.078*** (0.019) 
Union Member 0.132*** (0.006) 0.112*** (0.008) 
Intercept 2.074*** (0.013) 1.867*** (0.014) 
State SD 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
N 80039  47605  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 10 imputed datasets and 
results combined using Rubin’s rules and Stata’s mi estimate command. All state-level variables are 
lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 
data, for men and women aged 25-54, who identified as Asian or Hispanic (any race). Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Chapter Five – State Policy Contexts and the Second Generation’s Economic Well-being 
The two previous chapters sought to understand the association between state-level 
immigration policy contexts and the economic outcomes of first-generation immigrants. In this 
chapter, I shift focus to second-generation immigrants, or US-born children of immigrant 
parents. Upward mobility and the successful economic outcomes of the second generation are the 
realization of their parents’ American Dream. Is the dream still attainable? Has the hard work of 
second-generation immigrants resulted in as much economic success for them as for their native 
peers? These are not new questions, and many social science researchers have shown that 
second-generation economic outcomes are usually higher than those of the first generation, but 
lag behind those of third-generation or higher, non-Hispanic white natives (Bean and Stevens 
2003; Kim and Sakamoto 2014; Kim and Zhao 2014; Perlmann 2005; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 
2007). However, it is still debated why second-generation economic outcomes fall below those 
of white natives.50 Cultural repertoires, family structure, school quality, and racial discrimination 
have been proposed as promising explanations, but another possibility is that institutional 
barriers based on ethnic and cultural differences block the economic success and prosperity of 
second-generation immigrants. 
The movement toward immigration federalism and the importance of state context for 
immigrant incorporation necessitate an examination of how state policy has affected not just 
immigrants’ economic outcomes, but those of their children. Even though state immigration laws 
are targeted at the first generation, they spill over and affect those born in the US; for example, 
                                                 
50 In this chapter, I use the terms “whites”, “native-born whites” and “non-Hispanic whites” to refer to 
third-generation or higher non-Hispanic whites. These are individuals who identify racially as white, do 
not identify ethnically as Hispanic, and who have parents who were born in the United States. Similarly, I 
use the terms “blacks”, “native-born blacks”, and “non-Hispanic blacks” to refer to third-generation or 
higher non-Hispanic blacks. The term “natives” indicates third-generation or higher individuals.  
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state enforcement and restrictive rights policies have affected immigrants across generations, 
national origins, and nativity (Aranda, Menjívar, and Donato 2014). Exclusionary ordinances 
have resulted in higher reports of perceived discrimination among Latinos, including those born 
in the US (Ebert and Ovink 2014), and increased arrests among the Latino population (Donato 
and Rodríguez 2014). The increased heterogeneity of the policy landscape is coupled with the 
fact that many immigrants moved outside of traditional destination states in the 1990s to raise 
their children in states in the South and Midwest, typically states that later passed anti-immigrant 
laws in the 2000s and 2010s.   
Most research on the second-generation has focused on their socioeconomic attainment in 
gateway cities such as Los Angeles, New York, San Antonio, and Miami. These studies provide 
an in-depth perspective on second-generation outcomes in high-density immigrant cities, but 
they cannot generalize beyond the local context. Moreover, because of the uniform policy 
context in each city, they have not examined the association between policy and the 
socioeconomic attainment of second-generation immigrants. To build on previous research, this 
study examines the economic outcomes of second-generation immigrants in the nation as a 
whole, and it directly measures variation in policy across state contexts of reception. This chapter 
addresses two questions: First, how do second-generation immigrants’ labor force participation 
and hourly wages compare across state policy contexts? Second, how do second-generation 
immigrants’ labor force participation and wages compare to those of third-generation or higher 
US natives across policy contexts?  
Second-Generation Economic Assimilation 
An important component of research on second-generation economic outcomes is 
scholars’ chosen reference group – often either first-generation immigrants or third-generation 
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and higher natives. This chosen reference group influences the conceptualization of second-
generation assimilation as either a process or an outcome (Marrow 2013). Assimilation as a 
process studies how second-generation immigrants compare to their first-generation parents or 
parents’ generation. Assimilation is defined as a process where ethnic origins become less 
consequential for the outcomes of second-generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants 
may experience decline, where their outcomes are worse than those of their immigrant parents; 
second-generation immigrants may experience stagnation so that their outcomes are similar to 
those of their first-generation parents; or second-generation immigrants may be upwardly mobile 
and experience progress as compared to their immigrant parents (Tran and Valdez 2017). 
Scholars examining work outcomes with the assimilation process perspective show that, in 
general, second-generation immigrants experience progress; they attain higher wages, higher 
family incomes, and are more likely to hold white collar or professional occupations than their 
immigrant parents (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Perlmann 2005; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Tran and Valdez 
2017). 
Assimilation as an outcome, or convergence to a mean, occurs when there is no longer a 
gap between immigrants and a “mainstream” reference group attributable to second-generation 
immigrants’ ethnicity (Alba and Nee 2003). Assimilation as an outcome views second-
generation immigrants as experiencing advantage and disadvantage compared to third-
generation or higher US natives, usually either non-Hispanic whites and/or non-Hispanic blacks. 
Second-generation immigrants can outperform the white, non-Hispanic native-born population; 
achieve parity with the white majority and outperform racial minorities; outperform racial 
minorities but not achieve parity with the white majority; achieve parity with racial minorities; or 
be disadvantaged compared to both groups. Comparisons with these native reference groups 
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show that parity with whites has been achieved in some respects: second-generation Mexicans 
were no less likely than whites to be employed, and more likely than African Americans to be 
employed (Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). For Dominican, West Indian, South American, 
Chinese, and Russian second-generation immigrants living in New York, the wage levels of their 
first job achieved parity with the wage levels of white natives and surpassed the wages of blacks 
(Kasinitz et al. 2008). However, in other respects, the second-generation has not achieved parity 
with whites but surpassed racial minorities: second-generation Mexicans earn less than whites, 
but more than African Americans (Bean and Stevens 2003; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). 
Second-generation Central Americans and Afro-Caribbeans are less likely than non-Hispanic 
whites, but more likely than African Americans, to be in professional positions (Farley and Alba 
2002). Asian American men who do not have high levels of education (high school degree or 
less) have lower earnings than comparable whites (Kim and Sakamoto 2014). Finally, Kasinitz et 
al. (2008) argue that second-generation groups should be compared to their native-born peers of 
the same race because it is unrealistic to expect that the second generation would surpass white 
natives, given a racially-stratified America. Comparisons of second-generation, Latino/a ethnic 
groups to third-generation and higher Puerto Ricans usually show that second-generation 
Latino/a groups achieve parity with their racial minorities in terms of professional occupations 
(Tran and Valdez 2017) and even surpass the wages of racial minorities (Kasinitz et al. 2008).  
To explain why second generation immigrants do or do not achieve parity with the 
mainstream, assimilation theorists have pointed to laws which have sought to combat or uphold 
ethnic discrimination. New assimilation theorists argue that ethnicity is a boundary, or 
difference, between a cultural majority and minority group, which is institutionalized in different 
domains, including the law (Alba and Nee 2003). Classic assimilation is a type of boundary 
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crossing, where second-generation immigrants disregard their cultural and ethnic ties to enter 
into the majority group. When the boundary is bright, or when differences between majority and 
minority groups are clear and large, economic assimilation largely occurs through boundary 
crossing, if it occurs at all. However, equality of outcomes is more likely to occur when 
boundaries are blurred, or when the social categories and differences between the two sides 
decline in importance. New assimilation theorists are cautiously optimistic that second-
generation immigrants will attain parity with natives because many boundaries between natives 
and immigrants have been blurred. I argue that in some sense, bright and blurred boundaries in 
new assimilation theory are similar to the “context of reception” found in segmented assimilation 
theory. Segmented assimilation theory suggests that national origin groups are usually 
disadvantaged if they experience hostile government policies (Portes and Zhou 1993). 
Government policies can codify discrimination and therefore brighten boundaries between 
immigrants and US natives, or they can extend rights to immigrants and blur boundaries between 
immigrants and natives. Segmented assimilation theorists, however, are less optimistic about 
second-generation assimilation, and argue that the hostile policies and reception lead to 
downward mobility and assimilation to an underclass. 
Unfortunately, bright and blurred boundaries and contexts of reception are usually not 
measured directly in the study of second-generation immigrants’ economic outcomes. Because 
many studies of second-generation immigrants are in one setting, such as New York City, Los 
Angeles, San Diego, or Miami, boundaries cannot vary across space. Instead, scholars have 
argued that different national origin groups face different boundaries or contexts of reception. 
They show that Mexicans, who experience hostile contexts of reception, have lower occupational 
attainment than Cubans or Koreans, with more favorable contexts of receptions (Haller, Portes, 
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and Lynch 2011). An exception is Luthra and colleagues (2017), who operationalized the 
different aspects of contexts of reception to show that the mean years of schooling, skin color, 
and legal status of the second generation’s coethnic immigrant group impacted second-
generation attainment.  
The geographic dispersion of first and second generation immigrants has allowed 
scholars to contrast contexts of reception. New destinations are theorized to be more welcoming 
contexts of reception; a lack of ethnic networks results in lower levels of competition with 
coethnics for jobs and economic and job growth in new destinations offer more opportunity for 
full-time employment. However, new destinations, especially in the South, have long-standing 
racial prejudices that may make it difficult for dark-skinned immigrants to succeed. Research has 
found that Latinos/as in new destinations had higher rates of labor force participation and lower 
unemployment than Latinos/as in traditional destinations (Crowley, Lichter, and Turner 2015). 
For Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and Filipinos, residence in new destinations is associated with 
higher wages and occupational status (Flippen and Kim 2015). Additionally, the gap between 
Latinos/as and natives is smaller in new destinations, usually because natives have lower levels 
of economic success (Crowley, Lichter, and Turner 2015). However, classifying locations as new 
and traditional destinations poses a similar problem as using national origin group as a measure 
for the context of reception or brightness of boundaries. New and traditional destination 
comparisons cannot show whether bright immigrant-native ethnic boundaries, the economic 
context, or the coethnic group play a larger role in the economic well-being of second-generation 
immigrants.  
This chapter compares second-generation immigrant national origin groups to one 
another and to US natives across state policy contexts while accounting for individual human 
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capital differences and other state characteristics. I hypothesize that bright boundaries codified in 
state policies result in poorer economic outcomes for second-generation national-origin groups 
compared to their counterparts in states with blurred boundaries. When compared to US natives, 
new assimilation theory would suggest that blurred boundaries result in economic equality 
among second-generation ethnic groups and third-generation white natives, or at least in a 
smaller gap between second-generation ethnic groups and third-generation white natives than in 
states with bright boundaries. They might also expect that blurred boundaries would result in 
greater economic equality between second-generation ethnic groups and their racially-similar 
peers, while bright boundaries would highlight these groups’ ethnic differences. Segmented 
assimilation theory would suggest that anti-immigrant policies result in similar economic 
outcomes for second-generation immigrants as third-generation, native blacks. 
Racialization & the Effects of Federal Policy 
 While all second-generation immigrants experience a blurred boundary in terms of 
citizenship (the United States grants citizenship to anyone born in the US, regardless of their race 
or ethnic boundary), ethnic groups associated with darker skin tones, often encounter racial 
discrimination that prevents them from assimilation. Both new and segmented assimilation 
scholars have noted that assimilation can be slowed or halted by racialization, or designating 
people of a certain race with a certain position in the social hierarchy (Alba 2005; Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Although state-level enforcement and social rights laws 
are written in “color-blind” language, there is reason to expect that these laws are racialized. At 
the federal level, employers were more likely to examine the documents of workers who 
appeared foreign after the passage of IRCA, and those who examined documents were less likely 
to hire Hispanic applicants (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). Wage returns to training were 
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lower for Mexicans than whites in the post-IRCA period (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 1998). IRCA 
may have a direct effect on second-generation immigrants, especially Hispanics, because 
employers felt that they should be able to differentiate between legitimate and forged 
documentation. Instead of being able to differentiate the two, employers use skin tone or last 
name to infer job applicants’ legal status (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). More broadly, 
many white, non-Hispanic Americans assume that second-generation Mexicans are first-
generation unauthorized immigrants (Jiménez 2008). These studies show that the effects of 
policy are racialized. I hypothesize that bright boundaries in exclusionist and rights restrictionist 
states will be especially detrimental for the economic outcomes of ethnic groups racialized as 
Latino/a. I hypothesize that Mexicans, Central/South Americans, and Spanish Caribbeans will 
have a larger exclusionist-inclusionist wage gap than Asian, European, and Afro-Caribbean 
ethnic groups.  
Data and Methods 
This chapter compares the labor force participation and hourly wages of second-
generation ethnic groups to one another across policy contexts, and to US third-generation or 
higher groups across policy contexts. I test whether second-generation ethnic groups have better 
outcomes in contexts where the boundaries between natives and immigrants have been blurred. I 
use data from IPUMS’ Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-
MORG) (Flood et al. 2015). CPS data serve as the primary source of labor force statistics in the 
United States, so they are especially appropriate to answer employment questions and wage 
questions. Information on usual weekly earnings and hours worked are asked of household 
members during the fourth and eighth month of the survey (approximately one year apart due to 
the rotating sampling structure of the CPS – CPS surveys households for four consecutive 
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months, leaves them out of the sample for eight months, then includes them again for four more 
consecutive months). Unlike the American Community Survey, CPS-MORG includes a question 
on parental birthplace, which allows researchers to distinguish second-generation immigrants. 
Unlike the CPS Annual and Social Economic Supplement (ASEC), it asks about usual wages and 
hours worked last week, rather than in the past year, so contemporaneous demographic 
characteristics can be matched to wage characteristics.  
Dependent Variables 
The economic outcomes of interest include labor force participation and hourly wages. 
Labor force analyses compare individuals who participate in the labor force to individuals who 
are not in the labor force. A respondent is considered in the labor force if he or she: worked at all 
for pay in the last week; performed at least 15 hours of unpaid labor for a family business in the 
last week; had a job but was temporarily not at work due to illness, bad weather, industrial 
dispute, or vacation; or had been looking for work in the past four weeks. Individuals were not in 
the labor force if they were not employed or had not looked for work during the last four weeks.  
To measure hourly wages, CPS-MORG asks wage and salary workers how much they 
usually earn per week at their current job, before deductions, including tips and overtime pay. 
CPS-MORG also asks how many hours a respondent usually works per week. The IPUMS 
earnweek variable divides the weekly earnings by hours usually worked to estimate their hourly 
wage. For hourly workers, the CPS asks how much the worker earns per hour, and if this amount 
is higher than the amount used in the weekly earnings calculation, earnweek uses the higher 
value. Wages are top-coded at $2884.61, but this top code is consistent over the time period. If 
earnweek was missing due to a worker not reporting their usual hours per week, I calculated their 
hourly wage using actual hours worked in the past week. Finally, wages are adjusted to 1999 
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dollars using the consumer price index. Wages are logged for analyses, and workers earning 
more than $250/hour or less than $1/hour were omitted from analyses.51  
Independent Variables 
My independent variable of interest is an interaction term between state policy context 
and ethnic origin. As previously discussed, state policy context is measured as a set of 
dichotomous variables identifying states as exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, 
or inclusionist. Exclusionist states have brightened boundaries between immigrants and natives 
by restricting immigrants’ rights and increasing state-level immigration enforcement. Rights 
restrictionist states brighten boundaries by restricting immigrants’ rights, but these states do not 
amplify state-level immigration enforcement. Inclusionist states blur immigrant-native 
boundaries by extending additional rights to immigrants. Noninterventionist states have not 
passed legislation related to immigration enforcement or immigrant rights. 
Following Farley and Alba (2002), I use CPS questions regarding individuals’ own 
birthplace and the birthplace of their parents to identify second-generation immigrants and their 
ethnic group. I use CPS questions regarding individuals’ own birthplace, race, and Spanish origin 
questions to identify third-generation US-born majority and minority groups. I identify second-
generation immigrants as those who are born in the United States and have at least one parent 
born abroad. This group includes individuals born in the US with two foreign-born parents; 
individuals born in the US with a foreign-born mother, but a US-born father; and individuals 
                                                 
51 Dropping very low and high earners from analyses is a common practice in studies using CPS-MORG 
or Census data (Card and DiNardo 2002; Cha and Weeden 2014; McCall 2001; Weeden et al. 2007). 
Because of the top-code, CPS-MORG does not effectively capture the wages of high earners. 
Respondents who reported earning less than $1 per hour were suspect, as many of them were in 
professional positions (about 20%). I test whether my findings are sensitive to top and bottom wage 
coding in supplementary analyses.  
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born in the US with a foreign-born father, but a US-born mother. Individuals who were born in 
the US but only had birthplace information available for one parent were classified as a second 
generation immigrant if the birthplace for the parent was outside of the US. I assume that many 
respondents who do not know one parent’s birthplace were raised in single parent families.52 If 
the known parent is foreign-born, I assume the US-born respondent had similar experiences to 
second generation immigrants who have two foreign-born parents (N=389). If the known parent 
is US-born, I assume the US-born respondent was a third-generation or higher native (N=1,275).  
After identifying second-generation immigrants, I then classify them by their ethnic 
group. I group second-generation immigrants into six categories: European/Canadian, Asian, 
Afro-Caribbean (primarily Jamaica and Haiti), Spanish Caribbean (primarily Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico), Central/South America, and Mexico. I identified ethnic 
group membership through the birth country of second-generation immigrants’ mothers.53 If a 
second-generation immigrant’s mother was US-born or unknown, I identified his or her ethnic 
group through the father’s birth country.54  
I identify third-generation or higher US natives as those who are born in the United States 
and whose parents were also born in the United States. I then identified racial/ethnic majorities 
                                                 
52 As single-parent households are more commonly female-headed, this assumption would receive support 
if more respondents knew their mother’s birthplaces, but did not know their father’s birthplaces than the 
opposite pattern (knowing their father’s birthplaces, but not their mother’s). The data show some support; 
223 respondents knew their mother’s birthplaces but did not know their father’s, while 166 respondents 
know their father’s birthplaces but did not know their mother’s.  
53 Using birth country as an indicator for ethnic group is an imprecise measure. Birth country of the parent 
cannot capture within-country differences in language, culture, and race. This measure best reflects the 
most dominant or populous ethnic characteristics of the country. 
54 Among the second generation immigrants with two foreign-born parents, most second generation 
immigrants’ mother and father were born in the same country; only 14 percent had two non-US-born 
parents who were born in different countries. I prioritize mother’s birth country because mothers are often 
the primary caretakers of children and socialize their children into their ethnic group. This also follows 
Farley and Alba’s classification system. 
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and minorities using self-identified race and Hispanic origin. Native whites are third-generation 
or higher individuals who identified as white only and did not indicate that were of Hispanic 
ethnicity. Native blacks are third-generation or higher individuals who identified as black or 
African American only and did not indicate that they were of Hispanic ethnicity. Finally, third-
generation or higher Mexicans were identified as individuals who selected “Mexican” in 
response to the Hispanic ethnicity question, no matter their racial identification. While Kasinitiz 
et al. (2002) use third-generation or higher Puerto Ricans as a native reference group, I use third-
generation or higher Mexicans because of their greater geographic distribution across the United 
States. Farley and Alba (2002) use Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, in addition to third-generation 
and higher Asians and other Hispanics.  
Control Variables 
I account for other aspects of the state context of reception theorized to influence second 
generation assimilation. Similar to state-level immigration policies, local-level immigration 
policies may affect the second generation. Although a thorough accounting of local level policies 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I control for local immigration policy using the percent 
of the state population living within a 287(g) or sanctuary county.  
Lower shares of professionals in the immigrant generation are hypothesized to limit 
second-generation immigrants’ referral networks. They may be less likely to locate a job at all, 
or only be able to find lower-paying jobs. I control for the percent of the coethnic group that had 
a college degree or more. While coethnics may help one another find jobs (Waldinger and 
Lichter 2003), previous research has shown that the wages of native-born Hispanics and Asians 
are lower in areas with higher shares of immigrants (McCall 2001). Because of occupational 
funneling, coethnics often work in the same types of jobs and may compete with one another for 
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positions (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). Large coethnic groups and high levels of 
competition may result in second-generation immigrants withdrawing from the labor market or 
taking a job with lower wages. Population share of the immigrant national origin group also 
influences how second-generation immigrants experience anti-immigrant legislation, with 
second-generation immigrants reporting more instances of discrimination when living in a 
county with anti-immigrant legislation and a large share of coethnics (Ebert and Ovink 2014). 
Therefore, large coethnic communities may amplify the effects of state immigration legislation. 
Consequently, I control for the state population share of the immigrant national origin group. 
Each national origin group’s state population share and proportion of persons with a college 
education was calculated using five-year rolling averages from ACS data (for years 2001-2015) 
and Census data (for years 1998-2000; values linearly interpolated between 1990 and 2000 
Censuses).55   
Other variables account for state economic context. Industrial restructuring has led to a 
lack of relatively high-wage manufacturing jobs. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that without 
these opportunities, second-generation immigrants are relegated to low-wage industries. I 
measure the prevalence of manufacturing jobs as the share of the state population employed in 
the manufacturing sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). The decline of manufacturing jobs 
coincided with the growth of services. While the service sector may ensure jobs for those 
participating in the labor force, research has shown that the growth of high tech industries is 
                                                 
55 National origin group data were matched to second-generation immigrants based on the birth country of 
their mothers. Specific birth country rather than ethnic group was used. I prioritize mother’s birth country 
because mothers are often the primary caretakers of children and socialize their children into their 
national origin group. The social ties and familiarity with this group may lead to second generation 
immigrants pulling on these ties when looking for a job. However, the origin group of the same-sex 
parent would also be appropriate due to gendered occupational segregation. If I prioritized the birth 
country of the same sex parent, only 6 percent of the sample’s birthplace would change.  
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associated with lower wage levels for Asian women (McCall 2001), suggesting that women are 
pulled into low-skilled service jobs to serve those in high-skilled jobs. I measure the prevalence 
of high-tech industries as the share of the state population employed in high-tech industries 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).56 The growth of the foreign-born population suggests an 
increasing demand for second generation employment. Second-generation immigrants are often 
bilingual and can cater to and communicate with immigrant consumers in a wide variety of 
settings, from retail to hospitals, or can serve as managers of immigrant workers (Waldinger and 
Lichter 2003). I control for this demand by measuring the percent growth in the foreign-born 
population in the previous decade (Malone et al. 2003; Migration Policy Institute 2017). Finally, 
overall employment opportunities within the state are controlled for using the state 
unemployment rate and state gross product (GSP) per capita (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). 
Higher state unemployment rates result in lower wages for Latinos (McCall 2001), and richer 
states usually have a higher cost of living and necessitate higher wages.  
Natives hold different perceptions of the second generation. The bilingualism of the 
second generation fills a niche in the labor market, but qualitative research shows that employers 
often prefer immigrant workers to second generation workers because immigrants are perceived 
                                                 
56 High-tech industries are those identified by Hecker (2005). High tech industries are defined as those 
who have a high proportion of research and development employment (scientists, engineers, and 
technicians). An industry is considered high tech if the proportion of technology-oriented occupations of 
that industry’s total employment was at least twice the 4.9-percent average for all industries. I use the 
Level I threshold where these occupations were at least 5 times the average. They include: pharmaceutical 
and medicine manufacturing; computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing; communications 
equipment manufacturing; semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing; navigational, 
measuring, electromedical and control instruments manufacturing; aerospace product and parts 
manufacturing; software publishers; internet service providers and web search portals; data processing, 
hosting, and related services; architectural, engineering and related services; computer systems design and 
related services; and scientific research and development services 
183
  
as harder workers, more docile, and willing to work for lower wages (Waldinger and Lichter 
2003; Waters 2009). Natives with these views may be less likely to hire second-generation 
workers, or if they hire them, more likely to offer them a lower wage. I proxy natives attitudes 
toward immigrants with Berry et al.’s (1998) ideology measure (provided by Jordan and 
Grossman 2016). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the correlations between state-level variables for men 
and women.  
Refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
For the labor force participation analyses, I control for age and educational attainment 
(less than a high school degree; high school degree; some college; college degree; and advanced 
degree) at the individual level. At the household-level, I account for marital status and if a child 
younger than 5 years of age lives in the household. CPS-MORG does not provide information on 
the family or household income, which is a predictor of women’s labor force participation, but I 
proxy family income through spouse’s level of education and usual hours worked per week. A 
dichotomous indicator of a spouse having a college degree or higher level of education is meant 
to represent a high-income household where women do not need to enter the labor market out of 
economic need.57   
I add additional state-level and individual-level predictors for the wage analysis. At the 
individual-level, I add potential years of work experience (age – educational attainment in years 
– 6) and its square term. I omit age in these analyses to prevent collinearity. Instead of the 
presence of children under age 5 in the household, I control for parental status since fatherhood 
is associated with a wage premium and motherhood is associated with a wage penalty (Correll, 
                                                 
57 All single, divorced, separated, or widowed women received a 0 value. All women who reported being 
married but their spouse was absent from the household also received a 0 value. 
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Benard, and Paik 2007). I also omit spouse’s education level and work hours, as women are 
already in the labor force. I control for occupational sector (8 categories) and industry (9 
categories). At the state-level, I add a control for the overall economic richness of the state by 
including gross state product (GSP) per capita. This measure is rescaled (divided by 100) and 
centered on the mean for each year of the data.    
Analytical Sample and Methods 
The sample is limited to noninstitutionalized civilians of prime working age (25 to 54) 
living in the 50 United States. I exclude second-generation immigrants if their parents’ birthplace 
is an unspecified region (N=2,982 or 1.7 percent of the sample). Without a national origin group, 
I cannot account for the influence of the coethnic population in the state.58 Additionally, I 
exclude second-generation immigrants if their mother or father’s birthplace fell outside of the 
ethnic groups listed above. This excludes immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. 
I exclude these groups because of their small size – there are not enough second-generation 
immigrants in these groups to compare them across state policy contexts. Further, I exclude 
third-generation natives who identified as Asian, Native American, or a non-Mexican Hispanic 
ethnicity. Again, small sample sizes prevent their comparison across state policy contexts. 
Finally, I drop a small number of women who had missing education information for their 
spouse (N=1,108). The final sample size for labor force participation analyses is 1,144,184 for 
men and 1,223,378 for women. The sample for wage analyses is further limited to wage and 
                                                 
58 Respondents whose parents were born in an unspecified region (for example, Caribbean, not specified) 
could be due to the respondent not providing an exact country, or because the CPS had small numbers of 
individuals from a country and collapsed those numbers into one region. Second generation immigrants 
with parents from a region, rather than a specific country were less likely to have less than a high school 
degree and were more likely to identify as black or Asian. There were no statistically significant 
differences in their labor force participation. However, second generation immigrants with parents from a 
region reported 3 percent lower wages.  
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salaried workers. The CPS does not ask self-employed workers the wage questions, so they were 
dropped from the wage sample. Respondents missing on wages were also excluded from 
analyses.59 The final sample size for wage analyses is 843,669 for men and 839,620 for women.  
Because second-generation immigrants are nested within states, I estimate multilevel 
random intercept models to predict their economic outcomes. While intraclass correlations 
indicate that about 95 percent of the variation in outcomes is due to within-state variation, I use 
multilevel models because the state-level variance remains significant and because a cross-level 
interaction is my main predictor of interest. Multilevel random intercept models allow me to 
account for all unmeasured time-constant characteristics at the state-level that could otherwise 
bias results. The random intercept model is written as:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes time. The dependent variable is either 
labor force participation or the natural log of hourly wages. A logistic multilevel random 
intercept model is modeled to estimate the probability of being in the labor force, and a 
multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model is used to estimate second generation 
immigrants’ logged hourly wages. EthnicGrp indicates an individual’s second- or third-
generation ethnic group membership. Policy indicates the state policy context in place at time t-
1. The cross-level interaction between ethnic group membership and policy context indicates the 
extent to which state policy context inhibits or promotes a group’s economic achievement. 
Characteristics are individual-level covariates listed above, and context includes other state-level 
                                                 
59 Less than one percent of the sample (10,794 respondents) was missing wage data because the Census 
Bureau allocates missing responses through hot deck imputation. 
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control variables at t-1. Time is measured as year fixed effects. Uj is the random intercept for 
state j and eij is a residual error term (or a person-level random effect). 
Results 
Labor Force Participation 
Descriptive Results 
 I begin with descriptive results on men’s labor force participation (see Table 5.3). Across 
all groups and policy contexts, labor force participation is the highest for third-generation white 
men in noninterventionist states (93 percent) and is the lowest for third-generation black men in 
inclusionist and exclusionist states (80 percent). Labor force participation rates vary little across 
state policy contexts for second-generation Europeans/Canadians, Asians, Central/South 
Americans, and Mexicans. For those ethnic groups whose labor force participation varies (Afro- 
and Spanish Caribbeans), labor force participation is the lowest in inclusionist states. The 
participation rates of almost all second-generation ethnic groups are lower than those of whites in 
inclusionist and noninterventionist states. In contrast, almost all groups participate at the same 
rates as whites in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states (the exceptions are Afro- and 
Spanish Caribbeans). These descriptive statistics offer little support for the idea that bright 
boundaries in state laws inhibit the incorporation of second-generation immigrants. Second-
generation men’s labor force participation largely does not vary by state policy context, and 
when it does, it is higher in exclusionist states. Further, second-generation immigrant groups are 
more likely to achieve parity with whites in exclusionist contexts, mainly due to whites’ slightly 
lower labor force participation rates. 
Refer to Table 5.3 
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 The pattern is different for women’s labor force participation (see Table 5.4). Across all 
groups and policy contexts, labor force participation is the highest for second-generation Asian 
women in rights restrictionist states and second-generation Afro-Caribbean women in 
noninterventionist states (82 percent). Labor force participation is the lowest for Spanish 
Caribbean women in inclusionist states (72 percent). Labor force participation rates vary little 
across state policy contexts for second-generation Central/South Americans and Mexicans. 
Meanwhile, second-generation European/Canadians and Asians have lower labor force 
participation rates in exclusionist states compared to their rates in other policy contexts. In 
comparison to the labor force participation of white third-generation women, most second-
generation groups have achieved parity with whites across state policy contexts. When there are 
gaps, second-generation women’s labor force participation is lower than white natives’ in 
inclusionist or noninterventionist states rather than exclusionist or rights restrictionist states. 
However, second-generation Mexicans are disadvantaged across all state policy contexts. 
Therefore, descriptive statistics offer some support for the hypothesis that bright boundaries 
inhibit the incorporation of second-generation immigrants; Asian and European/Canadian 
immigrants’ labor force participation is lower in exclusionist states. However, when second-
generation women do not attain parity with third-generation whites, it is in inclusionist and 
noninterventionist states rather than exclusionist and rights restrictionist states.  
Refer to Table 5.4 
Second-Generation Ethnic Groups’ Labor Force Participation 
Figure 5.1 presents the predicted probabilities for the labor force participation of men by 
ethnic group and across state policy contexts. Predicted probabilities are estimated from 
multilevel logistic regression models (shown in Supplemental Table 5.1). Are second-generation 
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immigrants less likely to participate in the labor force in exclusionist and rights restrictionist 
states? In short, the answer is no. The probability of labor force participation for each ethnic 
group varies little across policy context. The probabilities of labor force participation for 
European/Canadians, Asians, Afro-Caribbean, and Central/South Americans are similar across 
state types. Among Spanish Caribbeans and Mexicans, labor force participation does vary across 
state context, but surprisingly, Spanish Caribbeans and Mexicans have higher probabilities of 
labor force participation in exclusionist states (as compared to rights restrictionist and 
inclusionist states). On average, living in an exclusionist state compared to living in an 
inclusionist state increases a Spanish Caribbean man’s probability of labor force participation 
from .88 to .90 (p<0.01). Similarly, living in an exclusionist state compared to an inclusionist 
state increases a Mexican man’s probability of labor force participation from .92 to .94 (p<0.01). 
Therefore, when men’s labor force participation does vary by state policy context, is higher in 
exclusionist states. Further, contrary to the racialized policy hypothesis, the labor force 
participation of Mexican and Central/South American men is not penalized to a greater extent 
than non-Hispanic ethnic groups in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states.  
Refer to Figure 5.1 
  Figure 5.2 presents the predicted probabilities for women’s labor force participation, 
estimated separately from men (models shown in Supplemental Table 5.1). Results are similar to 
men in that most groups’ probabilities of labor force participation do not vary across state policy 
contexts. Where there is variation across state policy contexts, women’s probability of labor 
force participation is lower in inclusionist states and higher in rights restrictionist states or 
exclusionist states. For example, among second-generation Asian women, living in a rights 
restrictionist state increases their probability of labor force participation by .02 compared to 
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living in an inclusionist state (p<0.01). Among second-generation Spanish Caribbean women, 
living in either an exclusionist state or rights restrictionist state increases their probability of 
labor force participation by .03 (p<0.001). Only among second-generation Europeans and 
Canadians are effects as expected. On average, living in an exclusionist state compared to living 
in an inclusionist state decreases a European/Canadian woman’s probability of labor force 
participation from .83 to .81 (p<0.05). As for men, when women’s labor force participation 
varies by state policy context, it is higher in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. There is 
little support for the racialized policy hypothesis because Mexicans’ and Central/South 
Americans’ labor force participation does not vary by state policy context. Instead, 
European/Canadian women actually have a slightly larger penalty in exclusionist and rights 
restrictionist states.  
Refer to Figure 5.2 
Second-Generation Assimilation 
Are second-generation immigrants more likely to achieve parity with third-generation 
and higher whites in inclusionist states? Table 5.6 shows comparisons of predicted probabilities 
between second-generation male ethnic groups and native groups in each state policy context. 
Contrary to expectations, second-generation European/Canadian, Asian, Central/South 
American, and Mexican men achieve parity with white men across all state policy contexts, even 
those with bright boundaries. Also contrary to expectations, second-generation Afro- and 
Spanish Caribbean men have lower probabilities of labor force participation than white natives in 
inclusionist and rights restrictionist states, but have similar probabilities of labor force 
participation as whites in exclusionist states. Further, all second-generation, Hispanic ethnic 
groups have at least achieved parity with third-generation Mexicans, the exception again being a 
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group in an inclusionist state: Spanish Caribbean men. Almost all second-generation ethnic 
groups in exclusionist, rights restrictionist, and inclusionist states have higher probabilities of 
labor force participation than native black men. Overall, these findings suggest that second-
generation immigrants are no more likely to achieve parity with native whites in inclusionist 
states than in states with bright immigrant-native boundaries. The labor force participation of 
second-generation ethnic groups still surpasses the labor force participation of blacks in states 
with bright immigrant-native boundaries. 
Refer to Table 5.6 or Figure 5.3 
Table 5.7 shows the difference between predicted probabilities of ethnic groups and 
native groups for women’s labor force participation. Often when scholars make comparisons 
between second-generation ethnic groups and native whites, they assume that native whites have 
the highest levels of attainment (for example, higher levels of education, more occupational 
prestige, or higher wages). Female labor force participation differs because, after accounting for 
human capital differences, third-generation white women have the lowest probabilities of 
entering the labor force and third-generation Mexican and black women have higher probabilities 
of labor force participation. It is not surprising, then, to see that all second-generation ethnic 
groups in all state policy contexts have probabilities of labor force participation equal to or 
higher than those of native white women. However, some second-generation ethnic groups have 
higher probabilities of labor force participation than both native whites and native blacks. 
European/Canadians, Asians, and Central/South Americans have higher labor force participation 
than both groups. However, these groups surpass both blacks and whites in inclusionist and 
rights restrictionist states, thereby challenging the hypothesis that ethnic groups would have 
better economic assimilation in states with blurred boundaries. Similarly, second-generation 
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Mexicans have higher labor force participation than whites and blacks in both inclusionist and 
exclusionist states. Finally, if we compare second-generation Hispanic groups to third-generation 
Mexicans, we see that most groups achieve parity across all state policy contexts. These results 
suggest that second-generation assimilation is no more likely to be accomplished in inclusionist 
states than states with bright immigrant-native boundaries.  
Refer to Table 5.7 or Figure 5.4 
Summary 
 In sum, contrary to expectations, the labor force participation of men and women does 
not vary by state policy context. Among ethnic groups whose labor force participation does vary 
across state policy contexts, it is higher in rights restrictionist or exclusionist states where 
boundaries are bright rather than inclusionist states where the boundaries have been blurred. Also 
contrary to expectations, Hispanic ethnic groups who are likely to be racialized as Latino/a, do 
not experience more of a labor force participation penalty than non-Hispanic ethnic groups in 
rights restrictionist or exclusionist states. In terms of assimilation, it is not more likely for 
second-generation ethnic groups to achieve parity with native whites in inclusionist states. Most 
second-generation men achieve parity with white men across all state policy contexts, and 
second-generation women have similar or higher probabilities of labor force participation than 
native whites across all state policy contexts. Further, the labor force participation of most 
second-generation men surpasses that of native blacks, even in states with bright boundaries. 
Second-generation women’s labor force participation is equal to the higher labor force 
participation probabilities of blacks across all state policy contexts, but some groups even 
surpass blacks’ labor force participation in rights restrictionist states.    
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Wages 
Descriptive Results 
 This chapter also examines the wage levels of second-generation ethnic groups as wages 
are a key indicator of socioeconomic well-being. Table 5.6 shows the hourly wages of men for 
each ethnic group in each policy context. Across all groups and policy contexts, second-
generation European/Canadian men in inclusionist states have the highest wages, at $18.92 per 
hour, whereas native blacks in exclusionist states have the lowest wages, at $11.70 per hour. 
Wages for second-generation ethnic groups vary considerably across state policy contexts, and 
many ethnic groups have higher wages in inclusionist states. European/Canadians, Asians, Afro- 
Caribbeans, and Mexicans all have wages higher in inclusionist states than their counterparts in 
exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. However, when we compare second-generation ethnic 
groups’ wage levels to whites’ wage levels, all groups except for European/Canadians and 
Asians are disadvantaged. The white-Mexican wage gap is similar in exclusionist and 
inclusionist states, but the white-Spanish Caribbean wage gap and the white-Central/South 
American wage gap are larger in inclusionist states than in exclusionist states. These patterns 
show that while second-generation ethnic groups often have higher wages in inclusionist states, 
they are no closer to achieving parity with whites in these states. 
Refer to Table 5.6 
 The pattern is more mixed for second-generation women (see Table 5.7). Second-
generation women’s wages vary across state contexts, and for all ethnic groups, their wages are 
highest in inclusionist states. However, among women, more ethnic groups achieve parity with 
native whites’ wage levels; only Spanish Caribbean and Mexican women have lower wage 
levels. Further, there is no clear pattern in the difference between the wages of second-generation 
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ethnic groups and those of native whites across state policy contexts. The white-Mexican wage 
gap is higher in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states than inclusionist states, but the 
white-Spanish Caribbean wage gap is higher in inclusionist states and exclusionist states. Among 
ethnic groups that have achieved parity with white women’s wages, Asians appear the most 
advantaged in inclusionist states, but European/Canadians, Afro-Caribbeans, and Central/South 
Americans are the most advantaged in rights restrictionist states. These descriptive statistics offer 
little support for the idea that bright boundaries inhibit the incorporation of second-generation 
immigrants – second-generation Mexican women may be the exception.     
Refer to Table 5.7 
Second-Generation Ethnic Groups’ Wages 
 Figure 5.5 presents second-generation men’s predicted logged wages for each policy 
context by ethnic group. Predicted logged wages are based on multilevel regression models 
controlling for individual and household characteristics, other aspects of state environment, and 
year fixed effects (see Supplemental Table 5.2). Once controlling for individual and state 
characteristics, second-generation men no longer earn higher hourly wages in inclusionist states. 
Instead, hourly wages do not vary across state policy contexts for European/Canadian men, 
Spanish Caribbean men, and Mexican men. For the remaining ethnic groups, second-generation 
men’s hourly wages are often lower in inclusionist states than their wages in exclusionist states. 
Holding all else constant, Asian men’s wages are 4 percent higher in exclusionist states than in 
inclusionist states (p<0.01).60 Central/South American men’s wages are 5 percent higher in 
exclusionist states than in inclusionist states (p<0.01).61 These results go against the expectation 
                                                 
60 4% = [exp(2.75-2.71)-1] 
61 5% = [exp(2.73-2.68)-1] 
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that second-generation men’s economic attainment would be the highest in inclusionist states. 
They also go against the racialized policy expectation that Mexicans, Central/South Americans, 
and Spanish Caribbeans have a larger exclusionist-inclusionist wage gap than Asian, European, 
and Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups.  
Refer to Figure 5.5 
 Second-generation women’s hourly wages largely fail to vary across state policy contexts 
(see Figure 5.6). Hourly wages only vary across state policy contexts for Central/South 
American women, and the predicted wage values go against the expectation that second-
generation women’s economic attainment is the highest in inclusionist states. For Central/South 
American women, we see the opposite effect. Central American women’s wages are 5 percent 
higher in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states (p<0.05).62 Central American women’s 
wage also 5 percent higher in rights restrictionist states than in inclusionist states (p<0.01).63 
There is also little support for the racialized policy hypothesis because Central Americans have 
higher wages in states with brighter boundaries.  
Refer to Figure 5.6 
Second-Generation Assimilation  
 Are second-generation men’s wages closer to native whites’ wages in inclusionist states 
than they are in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states? The answer is no. The hourly wages of 
almost all second-generation ethnic groups are lower than the hourly wages of whites in all state 
policy contexts (see Table 5.10 or Figure 5.7). The exception is Asian second-generation men; 
however, their wages achieve parity with whites’ wages in exclusionist, rather than inclusionist, 
                                                 
62 5% = [exp(2.51-2.46)-1] 
63 5% = [exp(2.52-2.46)-1], some error due to rounding 
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states. Even comparing the magnitude of the wage gap between second-generation groups and 
whites in each policy context suggests that second-generation men’s wages are not closer to 
whites’ wages in inclusionist states. For example, second-generation Mexicans earn 11 percent 
less than whites in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states, and they earn 10 percent less 
than whites in inclusionist states.64 For those ethnic groups whose wage gaps vary across state 
policy contexts, the gap is often higher in inclusionist states than in exclusionist states. For 
example, Asians’ wages are similar to whites’ wages in exclusionist states, but they earn 7 
percent less than whites in inclusionist states.65 Central/South Americans earn 5 percent less than 
whites in exclusionist states but earn 10 percent less than whites in inclusionist states.66  
Refer to Table 5.10 or Figure 5.7 
If instead of native whites, we use third-generation Mexicans as the comparison group for 
second-generation groups with Hispanic ethnicity, results still do not support the hypothesis that 
blurred boundaries are more likely to result in equivalent economic outcomes than bright 
boundaries. Mexicans attain parity with third-generation Mexicans in exclusionist, rights 
restrictionist, and noninterventionist contexts. But in inclusionist states, second-generation 
Mexicans’ wages are 3 percent lower than third-generation Mexicans’ wages (p<0.001). Spanish 
Caribbeans attain wage parity with third-generation Mexicans in all state policy contexts, and 
Central/South Americans have higher wages than third-generation Mexicans in all state policy 
contexts with the exception of inclusionist states, where Central/South Americans’ wages only 
reach parity with third-generation Mexicans.  
                                                 
64 11% = [exp(2.66-2.78)-1] for exclusionist states; 11% = [exp(2.66-2.78)-1] for rights restrictionist 
states; 10% = [exp(2.67-2.78)-1] for inclusionist states 
65 7% = [exp(2.71-2.78)-1]  
66 5% = [exp(2.73-2.78)-1] for exclusionist states; 10% = [exp(2.68-2.78)-1] for inclusionist states 
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Segmented assimilation theory suggests that anti-immigrant contexts result in second 
generation outcomes that are similar to those of native blacks, but this expectation is not 
supported. All second-generation ethnic groups’ wages are above the wages of native blacks, 
even in rights restrictionist and exclusionist states. Only Afro-Caribbeans in rights restrictionist 
states, Afro-Caribbeans in noninterventionist states, and Mexicans in noninterventionist states 
have similar wage levels as native blacks.  
 Turning to women in Table 5.11, we again see that second-generation women’s wages 
are not closer to native whites’ wages in inclusionist states than they are in exclusionist or rights 
restrictionist states. Similar to men, the hourly wages of almost all second-generation ethnic 
groups are lower than the hourly wages of white women in all state policy contexts. Two groups 
attain wage parity with white women: Central/South Americans and Asians. Asians attain wage 
parity in both exclusionist and inclusionist states; Central/South Americans attain wage parity in 
exclusionist, rather than inclusionist, states. Additionally, the magnitude of the wage gap 
between second generation ethnic groups and white women does not vary by state policy 
context. The wage penalty each ethnic group experiences is very similar across state types. 
Where the magnitude of the gap does vary, it is larger in inclusionist states. For example, 
Central/South Americans’ wages are similar to white women’s wages in exclusionist states, and 
they only experience a 3 percent wage penalty in rights restrictionist states.67 However, 
Central/South Americans’ wages are 8 percent lower than native white women’s wages in 
inclusionist states (p<0.001).68  
Refer to Table 5.11 or Figure 5.8 
                                                 
67 3% = [exp(2.52-2.55)-1] 
68 8% = [exp(2.46-2.54)-1] 
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Using third-generation Mexicans as a reference group for Hispanic second-generation 
ethnic groups still does not lend support to the hypothesis that the second-generation is more 
likely to attain wage parity in inclusionist states than exclusionist or rights restrictionist states. 
Spanish Caribbeans and Central/South Americans had higher wages than third-generation 
Mexicans in rights restrictionist states, achieved wage parity in exclusionist states, and either had 
similar or lower wage levels than third-generation Mexicans in inclusionist states. Second-
generation Mexicans achieved wage parity with third-generation Mexicans in rights restrictionist 
states but had lower wages than third-generation Mexicans in both exclusionist and inclusionist 
states. These patterns indicate that second-generation Hispanic groups had slightly poorer 
assimilation outcomes in both exclusionist and inclusionist states when third-generation 
Mexicans serve as the comparison group.  
 Women’s wage results also do not support the expectations of the segmented assimilation 
hypothesis. Most second-generation groups have higher wages than native blacks in exclusionist 
and rights restrictionist states. However, Central Americans’ wages are similar to native blacks’ 
in inclusionist states, and Mexicans’ wages are similar to native blacks’ across all state policy 
contexts. If the segmented assimilation hypothesis was upheld, Mexicans’ wages would be 
similar to black wages only in rights restrictionist or exclusionist states.  
Summary 
 Overall, second-generation men and women’s wages are not higher in inclusionist states 
than they are in rights restrictionist states and exclusionist states. When second-generation men 
and women’s wages do vary across state policy contexts, they are usually lower in inclusionist 
states. The racialized policy hypothesis received little support because Central/South Americans, 
Mexicans, and Spanish Caribbeans do not suffer a greater wage disadvantage in exclusionist 
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states than non-Hispanic second-generation ethnic groups. Furthermore, most second-generation 
ethnic groups earn less than native whites across all state policy contexts. When ethnic groups do 
attain wage parity with native whites, it usually occurs in exclusionist states. Most second-
generation Hispanic groups attain wage parity with third-generation Mexicans across all state 
policy contexts, and when they did not, they had lower wages in inclusionist states. Finally, 
across all state policy contexts, most second generation groups earned higher wages than native 
blacks. If second generation groups only attained wage parity with third-generation blacks, it was 
not more likely to occur in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states.  
Supplemental Analyses 
One paradox is that when ethnic groups’ economic outcomes actually vary over state 
policy contexts, groups have higher wage levels in exclusionist states over inclusionist states. 
Central/South American men and women and Asian men have higher wage levels in exclusionist 
states over inclusionist states. Why would wages be higher in exclusionist states for 
Central/South Americans and Asian men? Most second-generation ethnic groups in exclusionist 
states live in either Florida, Virginia, or Ohio. The wages of Central/South Americans and 
Asians are higher in Virginia than the wages of other exclusionist states. Upon further 
investigation of second-generation immigrants in Virginia, I found that higher proportions of 
Central/South Americans and Asians live in the Washington, DC metro area, which could be 
driving up these groups’ wages, as Washington, DC is an inclusionist policy context as opposed 
to Virginia’s exclusionist context. Nevertheless, wage analyses omitting Virginia from the model 
still showed that Central/South Americans and Asian men in exclusionist states earned higher 
wages than those living in inclusionist states. These analyses suggest that models are not 
sensitive to the higher earnings of workers from one state.  
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I also examined whether results were sensitive to the inclusion of very high- or low-
earning men and women. High earners (operationalized as those who earned more than 
$100/hour) were more highly-educated, professional workers, but they were also less likely to be 
paid hourly or to work full-time. Common occupations included managers/administrators, 
subject instructors at the high school or college level, and airplane pilots. Wage analyses 
omitting high earners show that results are robust. Second-generation men’s wages do not vary 
across state policy contexts for European/Canadian men, Spanish Caribbean men, and Mexican 
men. However, the wages of Asian men and Central American men are higher in exclusionist 
than in inclusionist states. For women, hourly wages only vary across state policy contexts for 
Central/South Americans, with women earning higher wages in exclusionist states than in 
inclusionist states.  
Turning to low earners (operationalized as those who earned less than $3/hour), 
descriptive comparisons indicate that individuals with less than a high school degree made up a 
larger share of low earners. Low earners were more likely to work in service, and commonly 
held jobs as waiters/waitresses, cooks, nursing aides, child care workers, and farm workers. Low 
earners also worked fewer hours and were less likely to be married or a parent. Non-Hispanic, 
third-generation or higher whites made up a smaller share of low earners, but non-Hispanic, 
third-generation or higher blacks made up a higher share. Results changed slightly for second-
generation Spanish Caribbeans. The wages of Spanish Caribbean men were 3 percent higher in 
exclusionist states than in rights restrictionist states (p<0.05), and the wages of Spanish 
Caribbean women were 3 percent higher in inclusionist states than exclusionist states (p<0.01). 
Still, overall, wage analyses omitting low earners showed similar results as the full models for 
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both men and women. Policy context has little effect on the wages of second generation ethnic 
groups and this finding is robust to the omission of low earners.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The rise of anti-immigrant legislation in the states has raised concerns over the 
assimilation prospects of the second generation. Anti-immigrant state legislation has been shown 
to disadvantage not just immigrants, but their US-born children in terms of their mental health 
(Santos and Menjívar 2013) and educational achievement (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 
2011). As a result, understanding the economic outcomes of the second generation in states 
across the country has become more pressing. Previous studies of the second generation provide 
a limited picture by only examining second-generation assimilation in established immigrant 
destinations or by examining outcomes at the country-level without accounting for state policy 
differences. Even those studies that compare second-generation outcomes across traditional and 
new immigrant destinations fail to directly measure the impact of policy. This chapter advances 
the study of assimilation by directly assessing policy effects, rather than indirectly capturing 
them through ethnic group membership or new destination. In light of native-immigrant 
boundaries brightening across the United States, it is important to directly measure the impact of 
state-level policy on second generation immigrants.  
Overall, my assessment of policy effects on second-generation immigrants’ labor force 
participation and wage levels is largely positive. The bright boundaries found in exclusionist and 
rights restrictionist states do not disadvantage second-generation ethnic groups; instead, they 
have little effect on second-generation labor force participation and wage levels when comparing 
ethnic groups across state policy contexts. They are also no more likely to target Central/South 
American or Mexican ethnic groups, despite immigration laws’ association with the Latino/a 
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population. Brighter state policy contexts may not inhibit second-generation labor force 
participation or lower second-generation wages for a few possible reasons. This study 
hypothesized that state policy would have a direct effect on the second generation. Instead of 
state policy acting directly on employers and second-generation immigrants themselves, they 
might act through the first generation. Segmented assimilation theory suggests that hostile 
government policy acts indirectly through immigrant parents. For example, unauthorized status 
prevents immigrant parents from attaining socioeconomic status and passing on their resources to 
the second generation. Consequently, we might not see an effect of state policy for another 
generation, after immigrant parents have experienced additional disadvantages in rights 
restrictionist and exclusionist states. Another possibility is that state laws are largely symbolic 
for the second generation, unlike the immigrant generation who can experience deportation and 
must negotiate this threat with employers. 
Two ethnic groups’ economic outcomes actually vary over state policy contexts. 
Central/South Americans and Asian men have higher wage levels in exclusionist states over 
inclusionist states. As shown in Chapter 3, first-generation Latina women are withdrawing from 
the labor force in exclusionist states. With these workers no longer available, certain employers 
may be forced to offer higher wages to draw second-generation immigrants to fill openings. This 
distortion may result in higher wages for jobs in exclusionist states than for similar positions in 
other states. Central/South American second-generation immigrants would be likely to fill these 
positions because of racial segregation in work. If employers in exclusionist states pay a 
premium to ensure that they are not hiring unauthorized workers, they may also turn to second-
generation Asian workers, who are stereotyped as model minorities and not seen as unauthorized 
immigrants.  
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The results also show that exclusionist states’ and rights restrictionist states’ passage of 
anti-immigrant laws does not result in Hispanic ethnic groups having a large exclusionist-
inclusionist labor force participation or wage gap than non-Hispanic groups. Due to the lack of 
an association between state policy context and second-generation groups’ economic outcomes, 
data provide little support for the idea that state immigration policies have a racialized effect. 
Mexicans, Spanish Caribbeans, and Central/South Americans do not join the labor force at lower 
rates or earn lower wages in states with bright immigrant-native boundaries, like exclusionist or 
rights restrictionist states. However, results show that the wages of second-generation Mexicans 
and Spanish Caribbeans are lower than those of second-generation Europeans and Asians, no 
matter the state policy context. Additionally, the wages of second-generation African Caribbeans 
are some of the lowest of all second-generation ethnic groups, across all state policy contexts. 
Therefore, racialization may not be more common or heightened in exclusionist and rights 
restrictionist states; the stereotypes of any darker-skinned ethnic group are present in national 
discourse throughout the US and may affect wage negotiations no matter the state policy context.  
This chapter also considered whether the blurred boundaries in state policies are more 
likely to result in assimilation, or the reduction of ethnic distinctions so that a group attains equal 
economic outcomes as third-generation or higher natives. Because second-generation ethnic 
groups’ labor force participation and wage levels do not vary over state policy contexts, blurred 
and bright boundaries codified in policy have little influence over economic assimilation; we see 
similar assimilation outcomes for each group in each policy context. In terms of labor force 
participation, second-generation immigrants have achieved parity with white majorities in all 
state policy contexts; among women, many second-generation ethnic groups have even 
outperformed native whites. Further, the labor force participation of most second-generation men 
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surpasses that of native blacks and second-generation women’s labor force participation is equal 
to the higher labor force participation probabilities of blacks across all state policy contexts. 
When we examine wages, most second-generation ethnic groups fail to attain parity with whites 
but earn higher wages than native blacks. Only second-generation Mexican women did not earn 
wages significantly higher than blacks, across all state policy contexts. At the same time, women 
attained parity with third-generation and higher Mexicans. Inclusionist states are the exception 
not because second-generation Mexicans’ wages are lower there, but because third-generation 
Mexicans have higher wages in inclusionist states.  
To return to the overarching question of many second-generation studies – has the hard 
work of second-generation immigrants resulted in as much economic success for them as for 
their native peers? – we see that in most cases, second-generation immigrants’ efforts are 
rewarded with higher wages than native blacks, but do not yet meet parity with native whites. 
Even second-generation Mexican women who do not outearn blacks are at least earning similar 
wages to third-generation Mexicans. This chapter has ruled out one possible explanation for the 
wage gap between second-generation immigrants and native whites; exclusionist and rights 
restrictionist laws have a limited association with the wage levels of immigrants and natives. My 
findings suggest that assimilation theorists need to be more specific about which boundaries need 
to be blurred in order for second-generation ethnic groups to attain parity with native whites. It 
also suggests that assimilation theorists may need to be more specific about how exactly blurred 
boundaries have an effect. Future research could consider how blurred and bright boundaries 
shift the hiring practices of employers or the job searches of second-generation immigrants. 
Moving forward, scholars can also look to other contextual and structural factors that may play a 
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role in explaining the gap between native whites and second-generation ethnic groups. My 
results point to the importance of coethnic community and economic context.  
In a sense, the lack of an association between second-generation assimilation and state 
policy context is a positive finding – the bright boundaries in exclusionist states and rights 
restrictionist states do not widen the wage gap between native whites and second-generation 
ethnic groups. On the other hand, it also indicates that states that have blurred boundaries 
between immigrants and natives have not done much to close the gap between native whites and 
second-generation immigrants. As of now, states that recognize the contributions of their 
immigrant populations and attempt to blur boundaries to facilitate their incorporation still have a 
ways to go to ensure equal treatment for later immigrant generations. 
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Figure 5.1 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Men, by Ethnic Group 
and across State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which 
controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to exclusionist states.  
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Figure 5.2 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Women, by Ethnic 
Group and across State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which 
controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to exclusionist states.  
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Figure 5.3 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Men, Compared to 
Native Majorities and Minorities across State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which 
controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to native whites within the same state policy context.  
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Figure 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Women, Compared to 
Native Majorities and Minorities across State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which 
controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to native whites within the same state policy context.  
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Figure 5.5 Predicted Wages for Second Generation Men by Ethnic Group and State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and 
household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to exclusionist states.  
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Figure 5.6 Predicted Wages for Second Generation Women by Ethnic Group and State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and 
household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried women aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to exclusionist states.  
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Figure 5.7 Predicted Logged Wages for Second Generation Men, Compared to Native Majorities and 
Minorities across State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and 
household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to native whites within the same state policy context.  
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Figure 5.8 Predicted Logged Wages for Second Generation Women, Compared to Native Majorities and 
Minorities across State Policy Contexts 
 
Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and 
household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.  
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54. 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 compared to native whites within the same state policy context.  
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Table 5.3 Male Labor Force Participation by Ethnic Group across State Policy Contexts 
 
Exclusionist Rights Restrictionist Noninterventionist Inclusionist 
Second Generation     
European/Canadians 90.9% 92.7% 92.2% 91.2% 
Asians 91.0% 89.9% 90.8% 89.2% 
Afro Caribbean 86.7% 86.8% 87.8% 83.8% 
Spanish Caribbean 88.9% 87.1% 90.6% 83.1% 
Central/South American 92.2% 91.2% 90.3% 90.7% 
Mexican 92.1% 91.5% 91.5% 89.3% 
Third and higher Generation     
Native white 90.5% 91.3% 92.8% 91.4% 
Native black 80.3% 81.7% 81.5% 80.0% 
Mexican 86.5% 88.8% 89.5% 87.5% 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54 
 
 
Table 5.4 Female Labor Force Participation by Ethnic Group across State Policy Contexts  
 
Exclusionist Rights Restrictionist Noninterventionist Inclusionist 
Second Generation     
European/Canadians 77.6% 80.0% 81.1% 80.0% 
Asians 77.6% 81.9% 77.5% 79.6% 
Afro Caribbean 80.5% 80.7% 82.1% 80.1% 
Spanish Caribbean 78.4% 76.3% 73.2% 71.7% 
Central/South American 80.6% 81.4% 79.5% 79.7% 
Mexican 74.3% 74.2% 76.8% 75.8% 
Third and higher Generation     
Native white 77.4% 78.3% 79.8% 79.3% 
Native black 76.8% 76.9% 77.5% 76.5% 
Mexican 75.2% 74.3% 75.6% 74.5% 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54 
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Table 5.6 Logged Wage Levels for Men, by Ethnic Group and Across State Policy Contexts 
  
Exclusionist Rights Restrictionist Noninterventionist Inclusionist 
Second Generation    
European/Canadians 2.88 2.89 2.89 2.94 
Asians 2.82 2.79 2.76 2.89 
Afro Caribbean 2.59 2.61 2.59 2.72 
Spanish Caribbean 2.68 2.67 2.66 2.70 
Central/South American 2.73 2.71 2.81 2.74 
Mexican 2.53 2.54 2.52 2.62 
Third and higher Generation   
Native white 2.77 2.77 2.81 2.84 
Native black 2.46 2.49 2.56 2.61 
Mexican 2.59 2.54 2.53 2.66 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54 
 
 
Table 5.7 Logged Wage Levels for Women, by Ethnic Group and Across State Policy Contexts 
  
Exclusionist Rights Restrictionist Noninterventionist Inclusionist 
Second Generation    
European/Canadians 2.65 2.65 2.63 2.72 
Asians 2.68 2.65 2.69 2.79 
Afro Caribbean 2.56 2.61 2.61 2.67 
Spanish Caribbean 2.51 2.51 2.49 2.56 
Central/South American 2.59 2.59 2.60 2.62 
Mexican 2.36 2.35 2.33 2.47 
Third and higher Generation   
Native white 2.55 2.53 2.55 2.62 
Native black 2.35 2.36 2.44 2.52 
Mexican 2.41 2.33 2.29 2.48 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried women aged 25-54 
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Table 5.8 Difference in Predicted Probabilities of Male Labor Force Participation between Second- and 
Third-Generation or Higher Ethnic Groups across State Policy Contexts 
 Compared to Third and Higher Generation: 
 Whites Blacks Mexicans 
Exclusionist    
2G European/Canadian ns +.05 +.02 
2G Asian ns +.04 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean ns +.04 ns 
2G Central/South American ns +.05 +.02 
2G Mexican +.03 +.07 +.04 
Rights Restrictionist    
2G European/Canadian +.02 +.06 +.02 
2G Asian ns +.04 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.03 ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.02 +.02 -.01 
2G Central/South American ns +.05 ns 
2G Mexican +.01 +.06 +.02 
Noninterventionist    
2G European/Canadian ns +.07 +.02 
2G Asian ns +.05 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean ns +.06 ns 
2G Central/South American ns ns ns 
2G Mexican ns +.07 ns 
Inclusionist    
2G European/Canadian +.01 +.07 +.01 
2G Asian -.01 +.05 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.04 +.02 -.04 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.03 +.03 -.02 
2G Central/South American ns +.07 +.01 
2G Mexican +.01 +.07 +.02 
Notes: All differences in probabilities significant at p<0.05 level, otherwise listed as 
ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel logistic regression 
model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state 
characteristics, and fixed year effects. 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54 
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Table 5.9 Difference in Predicted Probabilities of Female Labor Force Participation between Second- and 
Third-Generation or Higher Ethnic Groups across State Policy Contexts 
 Compared to Third and Higher Generation: 
 Whites Blacks Mexicans 
Exclusionist    
2G European/Canadian +.04 ns ns 
2G Asian +.04 ns ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean +.05 ns ns 
2G Central/South American +.06 ns ns 
2G Mexican +.06 +.02 ns 
Rights Restrictionist    
2G European/Canadian +.05 +.02 +.02 
2G Asian +.07 +.03 +.04 
2G Afro-Caribbean +.03 ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean +.05 ns +.01 
2G Central/South American +.07 +.03 +.03 
2G Mexican +.04 ns ns 
Noninterventionist    
2G European/Canadian +.07 +.03 +.02 
2G Asian +.04 ns ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Central/South American ns ns ns 
2G Mexican +.06 +.03 ns 
Inclusionist    
2G European/Canadian +.05 +.04 +.02 
2G Asian +.04 +.03 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Central/South American +.04 +.03 +.02 
2G Mexican +.04 +.03 +.02 
Notes: All differences in probabilities significant at p<0.05 level, otherwise listed as 
ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel logistic regression 
model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state 
characteristics, and fixed year effects. 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54 
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Table 5.10 Comparison of Second-Generation Logged Hourly Wages to Third-Generation Groups across 
State Policy Contexts, Men Aged 25-54 
 Compared to Third and Higher Generation: 
 Whites Blacks Mexicans 
Exclusionist    
2G European/Canadian -.03 +.17 +.06 
2G Asian ns +.17 +.06 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.09 +.11 ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.07 +.13 ns 
2G Central/South American -.05 +.15 +.04 
2G Mexican -.12 +.09 ns 
Rights Restrictionist    
2G European/Canadian -.05 +.15 +.07 
2G Asian -.07 +.12 +.05 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.18 ns -.06 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.10 +.09 ns 
2G Central/South American -.08 +.12 +.05 
2G Mexican -.12 +.07 ns 
Noninterventionist    
2G European/Canadian -.05 +.13 +.09 
2G Asian -.10 +.08 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.19 ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.11 +.06 ns 
2G Central/South American ns +.15 +.11 
2G Mexican -.14 ns ns 
Inclusionist    
2G European/Canadian -.04 +.16 +.04 
2G Asian -.07 +.13 ns 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.12 +.07 -.04 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.10 +.10 ns 
2G Central/South American -.10 +.09 ns 
2G Mexican -.11 +.09 -.03 
Notes: All differences in predicted logged wages significant at p<0.05 level, 
otherwise listed as ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel 
logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, 
state characteristics, and fixed year effects. 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54 
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Table 5.11 Comparison of Second-Generation Logged Hourly Wages to Third-Generation Groups across 
State Policy Contexts, Women Aged 25-54 
 Compared to Third and Higher Generation: 
 Whites Blacks Mexicans 
Exclusionist    
2G European/Canadian -.04 +.07 ns 
2G Asian ns +.08 +.04 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.08 ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.07 +.03 ns 
2G Central/South American ns +.06 ns 
2G Mexican -.10 ns -.04 
Rights Restrictionist    
2G European/Canadian -.03 +.07 +.06 
2G Asian -.02 +.07 +.06 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.05 +.05 ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.06 +.04 +.02 
2G Central/South American -.03 +.07 +.06 
2G Mexican -.09 ns ns 
Noninterventionist    
2G European/Canadian -.03 +.05 +.06 
2G Asian ns +.07 +.09 
2G Afro-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Spanish-Caribbean ns ns ns 
2G Central/South American ns ns ns 
2G Mexican -.08 ns ns 
Inclusionist    
2G European/Canadian -.03 +.06 ns 
2G Asian ns +.08 +.04 
2G Afro-Caribbean -.08 ns -.04 
2G Spanish-Caribbean -.04 +.05 ns 
2G Central/South American -.08 ns -.03 
2G Mexican -.09 ns -.03 
Note: Notes: All differences in predicted logged wages significant at p<0.05 level, 
otherwise listed as ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel 
logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, 
state characteristics, and fixed year effects. 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54 
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Supplemental Table 5.1 Multilevel Random Intercept Logistic Regression Coefficients for Labor Force 
Participation of Second and Third and Higher Generation Ethnic Groups 
 Men Women 
 B SE B SE 
Generational and Ethnic Group (vs 3G Whites)     
2G Eur/Can 0.084 (0.043) 0.345*** (0.031) 
2G Asian -0.116* (0.057) 0.290*** (0.044) 
2G AfCarib -0.461*** (0.106) 0.128 (0.091) 
2G SpCarib -0.339*** (0.063) 0.067 (0.046) 
2G Ctrl/Sam 0.138 (0.086) 0.281*** (0.060) 
2G Mexican 0.160** (0.058) 0.304*** (0.042) 
3G Black -0.657*** (0.034) 0.082** (0.026) 
3G Mexican -0.061 (0.045) 0.138*** (0.032) 
State Policy Context (vs Inclusionist)     
Exclusionist -0.052** (0.019) -0.051*** (0.013) 
Rights Restrictionist -0.057*** (0.015) -0.036*** (0.010) 
Noninterventionist 0.013 (0.022) -0.023 (0.015) 
Gen/Ethnic Group x Policy Context     
2G Eur/Can x Excl 0.018 (0.063) -0.068 (0.043) 
2G Eur/Can x Rts Rest 0.125** (0.046) 0.015 (0.031) 
2G Eur/Can x Nonint -0.000 (0.072) 0.119* (0.049) 
2G Asian x Excl 0.078 (0.107) -0.021 (0.076) 
2G Asian x Rts Rest 0.106 (0.074) 0.194*** (0.057) 
2G Asian x Nonint -0.029 (0.165) -0.035 (0.119) 
2G AfCarib x Excl 0.200 (0.199) 0.074 (0.159) 
2G AfCarib x Rts Rest 0.082 (0.188) 0.088 (0.145) 
2G AfCarib x Nonint -0.149 (0.463) 0.096 (0.373) 
2G SpCarib x Excl 0.306** (0.096) 0.280*** (0.071) 
2G SpCarib x Rts Rest 0.092 (0.077) 0.249*** (0.056) 
2G SpCarib x Nonint 0.339 (0.210) 0.056 (0.134) 
2G Ctrl/SAm x Excl 0.067 (0.158) 0.120 (0.110) 
2G Ctrl/SAm x Rts Rest -0.119 (0.120) 0.185* (0.088) 
2G Ctrl/SAm x Nonint -0.488* (0.233) -0.100 (0.167) 
2G Mexican x Excl 0.332** (0.102) 0.087 (0.062) 
2G Mexican x Rts Rest 0.040 (0.064) -0.037 (0.042) 
2G Mexican x Nonint -0.065 (0.156) 0.107 (0.102) 
3G Black x Excl 0.223*** (0.027) 0.194*** (0.021) 
3G Black x Rts Rest 0.163*** (0.025) 0.165*** (0.019) 
3G Black x Nonint 0.012 (0.036) 0.104*** (0.028) 
3G Mexican x Excl -0.039 (0.066) 0.157** (0.048) 
3G Mexican x Rts Rest -0.025 (0.047) 0.073* (0.033) 
3G Mexican x Nonint -0.081 (0.088) 0.167** (0.061) 
State Controls     
Local Immigration Policy     
% Pop in 287g -0.010* (0.004) -0.004 (0.003) 
% Pop in Sanctuary -0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 
Native Attitudes     
Citizen Ideology -0.012 (0.007) 0.009 (0.005) 
     
Coethnic Group     
% Change in FB Pop 0.003* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
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% State Pop 0.002*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000) 
% w/ College Degree -0.004** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 
Economic Context     
Unemployment -0.020*** (0.004) -0.004 (0.003) 
% Emp in Manufacturing 0.001 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) 
% Emp in High Tech -0.020* (0.010) 0.003 (0.007) 
Individual Characteristics     
Age -0.032*** (0.000) -0.015*** (0.000) 
Age-squared -0.002*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Education (vs HS degree)     
Less than HS degree -0.962*** (0.010) -1.006*** (0.008) 
Some college 0.298*** (0.008) 0.373*** (0.006) 
Bachelor's 0.890*** (0.011) 0.703*** (0.007) 
Advanced degree 1.081*** (0.017) 1.312*** (0.011) 
Household Characteristics     
Single -0.925*** (0.007) 0.173*** (0.006) 
Child younger than age 5 in HH 0.386*** (0.013) -0.818*** (0.006) 
Spouse w/ Bachelor's or higher   -0.627*** (0.009) 
Spouse Hours Worked   -0.000*** (0.000) 
Intercept 2.534***  1.082***  
State Variation 0.047***  0.047***  
N 1144184  1223378  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: Fixed effects for year included, but not shown. All state-level variables are lagged one year and 
centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for men and women 
aged 25-54.  
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Supplemental Table 5.2 Multilevel Random Intercept Regression Coefficients for Logged Hourly Wages of 
Second and Third and Higher Generation Ethnic Groups 
 Men Women 
 B SE B SE 
Generational and Ethnic Group (vs 3G Whites)     
2G Eur/Can -0.035*** (0.007) -0.033*** (0.007) 
2G Asian -0.067*** (0.009) -0.011 (0.009) 
2G AfCarib -0.124*** (0.020) -0.088*** (0.019) 
2G SpCarib -0.096*** (0.011) -0.041*** (0.011) 
2G Ctrl/Sam -0.101*** (0.013) -0.079*** (0.013) 
2G Mexican -0.108*** (0.009) -0.088*** (0.009) 
3G Black -0.194*** (0.006) -0.094*** (0.006) 
3G Mexican -0.079*** (0.007) -0.049*** (0.007) 
State Policy Context (vs Inclusionist)     
Exclusionist 0.002 (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 
Rights Restrictionist 0.005* (0.002) 0.005* (0.002) 
Noninterventionist 0.015*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 
Gen/Ethnic Group x Policy Context     
2G Eur/Can x Excl 0.001 (0.009) -0.005 (0.009) 
2G Eur/Can x Rts Rest -0.011 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) 
2G Eur/Can x Nonint -0.011 (0.010) 0.000 (0.010) 
2G Asian x Excl 0.040* (0.016) -0.011 (0.016) 
2G Asian x Rts Rest -0.002 (0.011) -0.014 (0.012) 
2G Asian x Nonint -0.029 (0.024) 0.006 (0.025) 
2G AfCarib x Excl 0.033 (0.037) 0.004 (0.032) 
2G AfCarib x Rts Rest -0.056 (0.034) 0.040 (0.030) 
2G AfCarib x Nonint -0.065 (0.079) -0.005 (0.071) 
2G SpCarib x Excl 0.023 (0.016) -0.033* (0.016) 
2G SpCarib x Rts Rest -0.007 (0.014) -0.020 (0.013) 
2G SpCarib x Nonint -0.013 (0.030) -0.007 (0.031) 
2G Ctrl/SAm x Excl 0.054* (0.022) 0.042 (0.022) 
2G Ctrl/SAm x Rts Rest 0.025 (0.017) 0.047** (0.018) 
2G Ctrl/SAm x Nonint 0.076* (0.035) 0.036 (0.035) 
2G Mexican x Excl -0.008 (0.014) -0.012 (0.014) 
2G Mexican x Rts Rest -0.012 (0.009) -0.005 (0.009) 
2G Mexican x Nonint -0.032 (0.022) 0.006 (0.022) 
3G Black x Excl -0.008 (0.005) -0.010* (0.005) 
3G Black x Rts Rest 0.003 (0.005) -0.006 (0.004) 
3G Black x Nonint 0.022** (0.007) 0.013* (0.006) 
3G Mexican x Excl -0.012 (0.011) -0.013 (0.011) 
3G Mexican x Rts Rest -0.044*** (0.008) -0.041*** (0.008) 
3G Mexican x Nonint -0.054*** (0.013) -0.048*** (0.013) 
State Controls     
Local Immigration Policy     
% Pop in 287g 0.003*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
% Pop in Sanctuary -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Native Attitudes     
Citizen Ideology -0.001 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
     
Coethnic Group     
% Change in FB Pop 0.000* (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 
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% State Pop -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
% w/ College Degree 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
Economic Context     
Unemployment -0.005*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
% Emp in Manufacturing 0.008*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 
% Emp in High Tech 0.005** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
GSP per capita 0.006*** (0.000) 0.005*** (0.000) 
Individual Characteristics     
Work experience 0.008*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.000) 
Work experience squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Education (vs HS degree)     
Less than HS degree -0.204*** (0.002) -0.175*** (0.003) 
Some college 0.090*** (0.001) 0.103*** (0.001) 
Bachelor's 0.328*** (0.002) 0.334*** (0.002) 
Advanced degree 0.445*** (0.002) 0.481*** (0.002) 
Single -0.088*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Parent 0.046*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.001) 
Occupation (vs Tech/Sales/Admin)     
Professional 0.144*** (0.002) 0.207*** (0.001) 
Service -0.208*** (0.002) -0.177*** (0.002) 
Farming -0.378*** (0.004) -0.240*** (0.008) 
Production/Manufacturing 0.009*** (0.002) 0.046*** (0.004) 
Operations/Labor -0.142*** (0.002) -0.134*** (0.003) 
Industry (vs Professional Services)     
Agriculture/Mining 0.174*** (0.004) 0.028*** (0.005) 
Construction 0.163*** (0.002) 0.078*** (0.004) 
Manufacturing 0.148*** (0.002) 0.124*** (0.002) 
Trans/Comm/Utility 0.168*** (0.002) 0.160*** (0.002) 
Trade -0.005** (0.002) -0.087*** (0.002) 
Finance 0.165*** (0.002) 0.110*** (0.002) 
Other Service 0.063*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
Public Administration 0.204*** (0.002) 0.134*** (0.002) 
Intercept 2.579***  2.348***  
State Variation 0.004***  0.004***  
N 843669  839620  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Note: Fixed effects for year included, but not shown. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered 
on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for wage and salaried men and 
women aged 25-54. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusion  
 In 2011, Alabama passed HB 56, a law modeled after Arizona’s SB 1070, which 
heightened state-level involvement in immigration enforcement and restricted immigrant rights. 
The law required police to verify the legal status of any person that they have “reasonable 
suspicion” is not legally present in the US. Additionally, the law required large and small 
businesses to use E-Verify. NBC News reported that after the passage of the law, Alabama 
employers thought that immigrants “[felt] like there [was] a negative atmosphere for them here. 
They [didn’t] feel welcome.” In a mobile home community of immigrant families, driveways 
were “full of cars and trucks at midday Tuesday, a time when most residents used to be at work.” 
Immigrants reported that they were “afraid to venture out during daylight” and that “people are 
just not going to work. They don’t want to be arrested” (Rawls 2011). This news story illustrates 
how state laws can heighten immigrant-native differences and prevent immigrants from 
participating in the labor force. Alabama’s HB 56 is one of many laws passed during the rise of 
immigration federalism in the 2000s and 2010s. As of 2015, every state had passed some kind of 
law related to immigrant rights or enforcement.  
 Despite the rise of immigration federalism, studies of first- and second-generation 
immigrants’ economic outcomes have not accounted for variation in state immigration policy. 
This empirical gap is striking because it is at odds with theoretical perspectives on immigrant 
incorporation. Immigration policy and programs for immigrant incorporation are key 
components of the context of reception, a central concept in assimilation theories. New 
assimilation theory, through its conceptualization of boundary processes, suggests that 
immigrants will be more likely to succeed and assimilate when boundaries are blurred between 
immigrants and natives. Blurred boundaries, in comparison to bright boundaries, fail to 
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distinguish between immigrants and natives regarding culture or opportunities. Cross-national 
comparative research and state-level research on non-economic outcomes show that blurred 
boundaries, in the form of pro-immigrant policies, result in higher citizenship rates, feelings of 
belonging, and educational attainment for immigrants (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011; 
Koopmans et al. 2005; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). This dissertation has contributed to the 
field of immigration by examining associations between state-level policies and the economic 
well-being of first- and second- generation immigrants. Two empirical chapters of the 
dissertation examined the association between state policies and the labor force outcomes of 
authorized and unauthorized immigrants. A third empirical chapter investigated the association 
between state policies and economic outcomes for the second generation as compared to natives.  
Summary of Findings  
Diverse Policy Contexts of Reception 
 Chapter 2 clearly demonstrates that immigrants experience multifaceted constellations of 
state policies and programs. After coding a comprehensive database of state laws related to 
immigrants and immigration, I find that immigrants face four types of state policy 
configurations. Exclusionist states view immigrants as law-breakers or criminals. They deny 
social rights to immigrants and amplify immigration enforcement with the involvement of state 
law enforcement officials. Rights restrictionist states view immigrants as a drain on public 
services or unfair competitors in the labor force and pass laws which deny them social rights and 
services. Rights restrictionist states do not, however, augment federal immigration enforcement. 
On the other hand, inclusionist states recognize the economic potential and contributions of 
immigrants and challenge the idea that national citizenship is required before individuals should 
have access to certain rights. These states extend many social rights to authorized and 
227
  
unauthorized immigrants. Some inclusionist states have even adopted laws to resist federal 
immigration enforcement in an effort to promote an enforcement regime that targets criminals, 
not families. Finally, noninterventionist states were largely uninvolved in immigration issues. 
Since 1997, the prevalence of noninterventionist states has declined, further highlighting that 
immigrants now experience policy environments that differ from the national policy context. As 
of 2015, states were closely split between exclusionist, inclusionist, and rights restrictionist 
configurations.  
Immigrant Labor Force Participation 
In Chapter 3, I find that exclusionist states are associated with lower female labor force 
participation, especially among Latina immigrants, women with less than a high school 
education, and unauthorized women. Meanwhile, the labor force participation of immigrant men 
is similar across state policy types. This finding corrects popular media depictions, such as the 
one at the beginning of this chapter, that all immigrants are dropping out of the labor force due to 
state involvement in enforcement. Instead, this finding highlights the gendered effect of 
immigration enforcement. Because men are more likely to be deported, women often experience 
anxiety and fear becoming single mothers and facing economic hardship (Dreby 2015). Many 
unauthorized parents attempt to create emergency plans for their US-born children if they are 
taken into custody (Enriquez 2015). Another risk management strategy may be that women 
choose not to enter the workforce to prevent complete family separation. Women remain home 
and do not participate in the workforce in exclusionist states where the risk of apprehension is 
high. Their withdrawal from the workforce lowers the risk that US-born children would lose both 
of their parents. Meanwhile, men’s labor force participation may not be susceptible to state 
policies and threats of deportation because of the breadwinner expectation.  
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Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap 
 Although past research has shown the existence of an authorized-unauthorized wage gap, 
in Chapter 4, I find that the late 2000s marked a convergence between authorized and 
unauthorized immigrants’ wage levels. Among immigrant men, a simultaneous increase in the 
wages of unauthorized men and a decline in the wages of authorized men closed the authorized-
unauthorized wage gap during the economic recession. This pattern held among high- and low-
educated immigrants and among Latinos and Asians. Analyses also showed that state policy 
context does not explain the convergence in wages; the convergence in authorized-unauthorized 
wages was present across all state policy types. This finding suggests that state policy context is 
not enough to counter national economic forces and common employer practices. The 
convergence in the authorized and unauthorized wage gap may be due to employers failing to 
reward authorized immigrants’ skills and education during the economic recession, resulting in a 
flattening of immigrant wages. Some evidence has suggested that legal immigrants no longer 
receive better returns to their education and time in the US than unauthorized immigrants 
(Gentsch and Massey 2011). Notably, the wages of non-Hispanic, third generation and higher 
white natives also decreased over this time period (see Figure 6.1), resulting in a diminishing 
native-immigrant wage gap, as the authorized-unauthorized gap declined. This trend supports the 
possibility that employers no longer reward education and skills in the same manner. The 
convergence in the authorized and unauthorized wage gap may also be explained by the falling 
supply of unauthorized immigrant workers during the economic recession, resulting in their 
higher hourly wages.  
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Second Generation Economic Incorporation 
 Chapter 5 turns to the US-born children of immigrants, and I compare the labor force 
participation and wages levels of second-generation Europeans/Canadians, Asians, Afro-
Caribbeans, Spanish-Caribbeans, Central/South Americans, and Mexicans, as identified by their 
parental birthplace. My comparison of second-generation ethnic groups across state policy 
contexts shows that state policy context has no association with the labor force participation and 
wage levels of most groups. Further, because second-generation ethnic groups’ labor force 
participation and wage levels do not vary over state policy contexts, these groups have similar 
assimilation outcomes in each policy context. Across all policy contexts, most second-generation 
ethnic groups fail to attain wage parity with native-born, third-generation or higher, non-
Hispanic whites but earn higher wages than native-born, third-generation or higher, non-
Hispanic blacks. These findings contradict my expectation that state policy would have a direct 
effect on second-generation immigrants’ labor force participation and wages. Instead, state 
policy may act through the first generation.  
 Segmented assimilation theory suggests that hostile government policy acts through 
immigrant parents; for example, unauthorized status prevents immigrant parents from attaining 
higher socioeconomic status whereas refugee status offers no such limitations. Research has also 
shown how the unauthorized status of immigrant parents affects their children’s educational 
attainment and income (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015). Similarly, exclusionist state 
contexts, which limit the labor force participation of female immigrants, may limit the future 
opportunities and wages of second-generation immigrants who grew up in these contexts without 
230
  
having a direct effect on current second-generation immigrants.69 For example, daughters may be 
less likely to enter the workforce because their immigrant mothers did not participate; higher 
likelihoods of single-family incomes in exclusionist states may limit children’s pursuit of higher 
education and therefore their ability to attain higher paid jobs.  
Implications for Theories of Immigrant Assimilation and Native-Immigrant Boundaries 
 This dissertation has important implications for the study of immigrant assimilation. 
Labor force participation results support the premise that “immigrants’ fortunes depend on where 
in the country they go” (Marrow 2005:793). Researchers should recognize that variation in the 
structural and contextual factors can explain differences in immigrants’ life chances. Analyses 
that focus solely on individual immigrants’ characteristics are insufficient. Moreover, research at 
the aggregate, national level is insufficient because variation in state structural and contextual 
factors go unrecognized. My work has challenged the presumption of a uniform policy context 
and demonstrated that the US is comprised of different configurations of policies and programs. 
Further, I argue that a comparison of places, such as new destinations and traditional 
destinations, is not enough when these comparisons do not account for differences in 
immigration policy. As this dissertation has shown, exclusionist states have limited female 
immigrant incorporation, but both new and traditional destinations fall within the exclusionist 
category. Precise measurement of the structural and contextual factors of each place is needed. 
My research suggests that we should build on established research findings and examine under 
what policy contexts they hold, and in what policy contexts they are modified.  
                                                 
69 Current second-generation immigrants did not grow up in these state policy contexts because states 
have only recently enacted their laws (in the late 1990s and early 2000s).  
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My findings inform assimilation theory and the boundary processes framework. Not all 
bright boundaries, which are conceptualized to limit immigrant integration, are the same. For 
example, I find that not all types of bright boundaries limit immigrant labor force participation. 
Theories of assimilation require further refinement in the face of this new evidence. States have 
passed laws creating bright boundaries with regard to the physical presence of immigrants and 
their rights within their jurisdiction. My research shows that exclusionist states, which 
criminalize immigrants and seek to banish them from the state, result in the withdrawal of the 
immigrant population from public space (specifically, the labor market). Meanwhile, rights 
restrictionist states have a limited scope. Their lack of immigration enforcement suggests a desire 
for immigrants’ physical presence in the state, often to work. These policies do not inhibit 
immigration labor force participation, but restricting immigrants’ rights may result in a more 
docile workforce. The difference in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states suggests that 
boundaries which are violent, resulting in fear and anxiety, are detrimental to immigrant 
integration. More study should be given to the characteristics of boundaries and why specific 
laws and policies matter when others do not.  
My dissertation also highlights the gendered nature of native-immigrant boundaries and 
their implications for immigrant assimilation. Past research has shown the gendered effects of 
federal immigration policy – US immigration policy shapes the order which family members 
arrive in the country and the ability of tied movers, often women, to work. Similarly, my 
research indicates that state-level immigration policies are gendered. State-level policies have 
disproportionately inhibited women’s labor force participation, which can prevent them and their 
families from attaining higher household incomes. Further, because I argue that women are 
reacting to state policies based on their family dynamics, assimilation theory could benefit by 
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considering how bright and blurred boundaries affect individual actions within the context of the 
family. Currently, blurred boundaries are theorized to make it easier for all individuals from one 
ethnic group easier to cross and succeed in obtaining the opportunities of the majority group. 
Instead, boundaries may affect individuals differently depending on their gender and their family 
context.  
However, immigrant-native boundaries codified by state policy context are not always 
associated with immigrants’ economic outcomes. One possible explanation for these surprising 
findings is that state policy effects may not be felt because of vertical differentiation in the 
context of reception (Marrow 2011). Immigrants experience national, state, and local contexts 
simultaneously, as well as different organizational and interpersonal environments. Although not 
directly measured in my dissertation, I propose that competing vertical cross-pressures resulted 
in null state policy effects. For example, Marrow found that employers at a large food processing 
plant in North Carolina continued to hire unauthorized workers despite restrictive federal policies 
against their hiring and strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the county where the plant was based. 
Like this company, employers and corporations may counter exclusionist and rights restrictionist 
policies by signaling to first- and second-generation immigrants that they are willing and prefer 
to hire them, thereby drawing them into the labor force. In the case of immigrant wages, national 
economic trends may have countered the effects of exclusionist and rights restrictionist state 
policy contexts. An economic recession ensured low immigrant labor supply, which increased 
unauthorized immigrants’ wages. This national context contradicted the exclusionist and rights 
restrictionist policies that result in employers “taxing” the wages of unauthorized immigrants to 
cover potential fines for their hiring (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). The recession may 
also have contradicted inclusionist policies that would have encouraged higher returns to 
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immigrants’ skills and education. The null effects of state policy contexts hint at the complex 
process of immigrant integration, and assimilation theories must recognize competing vertical 
inclusionist and exclusionist pressures that complicate the immigrant experience. 
Empirically, my dissertation advances the study of immigrant incorporation by applying 
cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI) to account for unauthorized legal status in national-
level, representative data. Without accounting for the disadvantages associated with immigrant 
legal status, research suffers from omitted variable bias. Given current data limitations and the 
sensitive nature of unauthorized status for immigrants and employers alike, CSMI is the best 
possible approach to the estimation of outcomes for unauthorized immigrants.70 Additionally, 
my typology of state policy contexts is the first to measure changes in state-level immigration 
policy over time, to capture both pro- and anti- immigrant sentiment, and to recognize important 
differences within “anti-immigrant” states in terms of their enforcement and rights policies. This 
measure allows me to advance the study of second-generation immigrants. Much research has 
indirectly measured the effects of policy on second-generation economic outcomes through 
proxy measures, such as national origin group or new destination. By directly measuring policy, 
I isolate its effects from coethnic community. My research suggests that policy plays a less 
important role than the coethnic community for second-generation immigrant labor force 
participation and wage levels, but this may change if there is an intergenerational transmission of 
state-level policy effects. 
                                                 
70 Originally, I had proposed using the restricted version of the SIPP data to access the more refined 
measure of immigrant legal status. SIPP restricted data differentiate between legal permanent residents 
(and the type of visa they have, either family or employer-based), nonimmigrants, and unauthorized 
immigrants. However, my application to access these data was rejected because the Census Bureau does 
not release detailed information on legal status in order to protect the confidentiality of its respondents.  
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Immigration Federalism and Policy Recommendations 
My dissertation results can help policymakers evaluate the effectiveness of a federalist 
approach to immigrant integration. Legal scholars and the press have debated whether a 
federalist system of immigration enforcement is legally valid, but the Supreme Court upheld 
Arizona’s “show me your papers” provision in Arizona v. United States. Therefore, an evaluation 
of immigration federalism must consider its resulting effects.71 Exclusionist states, or those states 
who have adopted strict immigration enforcement laws, have not deterred all immigrants from 
settling and remaining in the state. However, by seeking to remove unauthorized immigrants, 
these states actually impoverish immigrants by discouraging their participation in the labor force. 
Because research has shown that immigration enforcement does not completely stem 
unauthorized migration to the US (Cornelius and Salehyan 2007; Massey and Pren 2012), states 
that adopt humane immigration enforcement will do a better job at ensuring a productive 
immigrant population than those who enforce the letter of the law without regard for human 
consequences. 
In contrast to immigration law, the federal government has played a limited role in 
immigrant integration. The role of integration falls mainly to state and local governments, and 
we must consider whether a federalist strategy is enough to ensure immigrant integration. My 
research suggests that it is not. While inclusionist states have extended additional rights to 
immigrants and seek to incorporate them, first- and second-generation immigrants’ wages are no 
higher in inclusionist states than in states limiting immigrant rights. Across all states, wages are 
low for Latino/a immigrants with less than a high school degree, averaging $12.49 per hour for 
                                                 
71 This dissertation only examines state immigration laws that have not been challenged in court or have 
been ruled that they do not violate the supremacy clause of the constitution.  
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authorized immigrant men and $10.40 for authorized immigrant women in 2015.72 This finding 
suggests that state and local strategies for integration, or integration through a federalist 
approach, is not enough for immigrant well-being.  
Some scholars argue that shifting the weight of integration to the federal government 
would result in a leveling effect because states could not creatively address the needs of their 
immigrant population (Rodriguez 2017). However, because the innovative policies of 
inclusionist states are not associated with improved immigrant outcomes (at least in terms of 
their labor force participation and wage levels), I argue that the federalist approach has not 
provided any additional benefits for immigrants. Instead, more involvement from the federal 
government could be key to immigrant integration. The US could look to Canadian models of 
integration. Canada’s federal department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) strongly 
promotes and funds immigrant workforce training and naturalization, while still allowing for 
local community organizations to be the direct providers of these services (Bloemraad 2006). In 
contrast, the US federal government’s support and funding of the Adult Education and Financial 
Literacy Act (AEFLA), which funds adult education including English language programs for 
immigrants, declined by 20 percent between 2003 and 2013 (National Immigration Forum 2016). 
The federal government has yet to create and support a program for simultaneous English 
learning and workforce training or to create trainings with the native-born population to highlight 
how immigrants bring value to the workforce and how employers can better recognize and 
reward their education and skills. The federal government should also work to ensure that all 
people, including unauthorized immigrants, have strong worker protections. The federal 
                                                 
72 Author’s calculations from interaction model in Chapter 4. $8.78 in 1999 dollars converted to 2015 
value for immigrant men. $7.31 in 1999 dollars converted to 2015 value for immigrant women.  
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government could provide know your rights training to workers and better assist workers in any 
legal action taken to assert their rights. This approach could help to address workers’ hesitation 
to enter the workforce. Overall, shifting from a federalist approach to one with federal 
involvement in immigrant integration could boost immigrant and second generation immigrants’ 
economic outcomes across the US.  
Finally, politicians have framed anti-immigrant laws as laws that will help the native-
born population secure jobs and higher wages. This dissertation shows that exclusionist and 
rights restrictionist policy contexts do not offer any advantages to most US-born ethnic groups. If 
policies acted as conservative politicians suggested, we would see higher labor force 
participation and wages in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states across the board, for all 
second-generation ethnic groups, third-generation and higher whites, and third-generation and 
higher blacks. However, this is not the case. We must look to other policies to stimulate US-born 
labor force participation and wages, such as higher minimum wage levels and policies that 
promote work-life balance.    
Limitations of the Dissertation 
 One potential limitation of this dissertation is selectivity due to the internal migration of 
immigrants. Scholars have shown outmigration from anti-immigrant states (Leerkes, Bachmeier, 
and Leach 2013). It is possible that immigrants who would withdraw from the labor force or 
have lower wage levels in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states moved to more-welcoming 
inclusionist states. If this occurred, then the immigrant population remaining in exclusionist and 
rights restrictionist states would be positively selected on employment and wages, and my 
dissertation would underestimate a negative association between these state policy contexts and 
immigrants’ economic outcomes. Because I do not have longitudinal data and because CPS-
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MORG data do not include an indicator of whether an individual recently crossed state lines, I 
cannot account for this selectivity. However, there is some evidence that immigrants who moved 
over the course of a year did not differ greatly in terms of employment. Sisk and Donato (2016) 
examined the employment of immigrant and native-born men between the years 2005 and 2010 
using matched longitudinal CPS data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement. They 
used a Heckman two-step procedure to estimate whether the probability of being employed at t1 
affected an individual’s transition (either out of the labor force, unemployed, or continued 
employment) at t2 and found insignificant effects, suggesting that moving did not affect the 
employment transition. 
 This dissertation provides the first comprehensive, national examination of state policy 
contexts as they relate to immigrant labor force outcomes. But its focus on the state level misses 
the nuances of within-state variation across cities and counties. Cities, not states, were the first to 
resist federal immigration enforcement in the sanctuary movement during the 1980s. Many cities 
have provided municipal IDs to immigrants or have accepted consular identification cards so that 
they can access city services, and some cities have even allowed noncitizens to vote in their local 
elections. On the other hand, cities have penalized local landlords for renting to unauthorized 
residents, passed English-only laws, and have entered 287(g) agreements with Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement. These local-level policies are sure to impact immigrants’ everyday 
environment and their economic behaviors. However, this dissertation’s focus on state-level 
policy provides a breadth that many immigration studies have been missing and serves to 
complement smaller city-based studies of immigrant incorporation.  
Another limitation is that my measure of state policy context only captures the existence 
of legislation and does not account for implementation. States may vary in the amount of 
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resources dedicated to their programs, the priority given to enforcement by state officials, or the 
capacity of state workers to implement the letter of the law. Within states, some individual cities, 
counties, or towns may be enthusiastic in their embrace of state policies while others actively or 
passively resist enforcement. However, one advantage of my state policy context measure is that 
it captures the prevailing normative climate within states. Research has shown that behaviors 
often change after the passage of a law, regardless of whether the law is strictly enforced. For 
example, employers changed their hiring behavior despite weak enforcement of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity law because of normative pressure from their environment (Edelman 
1992). My research indicates that immigrants, too, respond to the normative climate of the state. 
Still, future research should explore whether immigrant behavior is further modified with the 
strict implementation or enforcement of these state laws.   
Future Research 
 The conclusions of this dissertation suggest several directions for future research. First, 
future research should consider why and under what circumstances state-level immigration 
policy has no effect on immigrants’ economic outcomes, especially immigrant wage levels. 
Calavita’s (1990) work on why IRCA sanctions did not succeed in stopping the employment of 
unauthorized immigrants provides a good example as to how future research could proceed. 
Calavita’s interviews with both employers and employees demonstrated how IRCA resulted in 
employers relying on fraudulent documents to comply with the requirement of verifying their 
employees’ legal status. Employers and employees in exclusionist or rights restrictionist state 
policy contexts may alter or adapt their behavior to skirt state laws’ intended effects. 
Alternatively, immigration policy could not have an effect if it is not enthusiastically 
implemented or funded. Instead of examining the impacts of laws on the books, future research 
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could measure immigration program funding from state budgets or personnel allocations to 
determine whether the execution of program impacts immigrant economic behavior.   
Although my research has shown limited effects of state policy context on the wages and 
labor force participation of first- and second-generation immigrants, I argue that policy context 
should not be considered irrelevant for all immigrant outcomes. My research suggests that 
differentiating exclusionist and rights restrictionist states may be especially important when 
relating to immigrants’ access to public space. Therefore, other behaviors that these policy 
contexts could impact include benefit-seeking behaviors, as well as civic engagement and 
parental involvement in children’s schools. Quantitative comparisons could indicate whether 
policy contexts subdue certain behaviors, and qualitative comparisons could showcase how 
immigrants, employers, and providers of government services navigate policy contexts 
differently. Because I argue that exclusionist states promote legal violence, future research could 
focus on immigrant mental and physical health by policy context. Immigrants in exclusionist 
states could suffer from higher levels of anxiety and depression, leading to poorer physical health 
outcomes. Also, my research cannot predict the full implications of state policy as time goes on. 
Research will need to examine the effects of policy context on the second generation at a future 
point in time. Exclusionist state contexts have resulted in children growing up with parental 
poverty, parental fear, and parental disconnect from their communities. Poverty and withdrawal 
from public space, including school attendance at times, may result in poorer academic and 
economic outcomes for the next generation. Therefore, the examination of the intergenerational 
transmission of state-level policy effects may be a fruitful area for future research.  
This dissertation has focused on state-level immigration policy contexts, but future 
research should incorporate a vertical element of immigration policy. Some cities and counties 
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have passed immigration laws that contradict the laws passed by their states. Notably, cities like 
Tuscan in Arizona, Austin in Texas, and Charlotte in North Carolina have resisted exclusionist 
state laws. Although less common, cities have passed ordinances restricting immigrants’ rights 
when they are located in an inclusionist state. For example, in 2006, Hazelton, Pennsylvania 
made it illegal for unauthorized immigrants to rent housing. At other times, cities have reinforced 
state efforts. San Francisco has sought to integrate its immigrant population by extending them 
additional rights, whereas Farmer’s Branch in Texas has limited immigrant rights. How do 
contradictory state and local policies impact immigrant assimilation? Are immigrants more 
economically successful if they live in place with welcoming laws at the city and the state level? 
Similarly, future research should consider the interplay between state law and federal 
enforcement efforts. The Trump administration marks a shift in the federal government’s 
commitment to enforcement, the like of which was not seen in the time period under 
consideration. How does California’s resistance to the Trump administration’s enforcement 
efforts affect immigrant outcomes compared to Arizona’s amplification of immigration 
enforcement during the Obama years? Given the Trump administration’s commitment to strict 
immigration enforcement at the federal level, understanding the interaction of city, state, and 
federal laws will be paramount to the understanding of immigrant integration.  
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Figure 6.1 Trends in Third-Generation or Higher, Non-Hispanic White Men’s Logged Wage Levels, 
Controlling for Individual Characteristics, 1998-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Logged wages are in 1999 dollars, adjusted with the consumer price index. 
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, men aged 24-54. 
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Appendix: State-Level Control Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Description Source  Used in 
chapter: 
Local Policy    
Local-level 287g 
agreements 
The percent of the state’s population living in a 
county with a 287g agreement at t-1. Rescaled 
(divided by 10). 
Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement 
for 287g agreements; 
2000 Census for state 
population for years 
before 2005; 2010 
Census for state 
population for years 
2006 and later 
3, 4, 5 
Local-level 
sanctuary policies 
The percent of the state’s population living in a 
county with a sanctuary policy at t-1. A 
Sanctuary policy was measured as a city or 
county that did not honor an ICE detainer 
request, restricted compliance to cases where 
ICE has obtained a warren from the judge, or 
only honored detainers when the locality would 
be reimbursed the cost. Rescaled (divided by 
10). 
Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network 
and Center for 
Immigration Studies 
for sanctuary policies; 
2000 Census for state 
population for years 
before 2005; 2010 
Census for state 
population for years 
2006 and later 
3, 4, 5 
Economic Context    
Unemployment rate Percent of men or women aged 16 or older who 
were unemployed at t-1. 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
3, 4, 5 
Immigrant industry 
employment 
For men – percent of state population aged 16 
or older who worked in agriculture, 
construction, and computer technology at t-1 
For women – percent of state population aged 
16 or older who worked in accommodations, 
food services, and health at t-1 
BLS 3, 4, 5 
Manufacturing 
employment 
Percent of state population aged 16 or older 
who worked in the manufacturing industry at t-
1. 
BLS 5 
High technology 
employment 
Percent of state population aged 16 or older 
who worked in a high tech industry at t-1. 
BLS 5 
Attitudinal Context    
Citizen ideology Berry et al.’s measure of citizen ideology 
ranging from 0 to 100 at time t-1. Higher 
values indicate more liberal. Data extrapolated 
for 2014. Rescaled (divided by 10). 
Michigan State 
University’s 
Correlates of the State 
Policy Project 
3, 4, 5 
Coethnic Group    
Percent change in 
foreign-born 
The percent change in the state’s foreign-born 
population in the previous decade. Rescaled 
(divided by 10). 
U.S. Census Bureau 3, 4, 5 
Coethnic group size The immigrant group’s share of the total adult 
population (age 25+) in the state at time t-1. 
Values for 1997-1999 were calculated through 
interpolation from Census data. 
Individual aggregates 
from ACS 2001-2015 
(5 year rolling 
average); individual 
aggregates from 5% 
Census 1990 & 2000 
 
3, 4, 5 
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Coethnic Controls    
Coethnic group 
education level 
Percent of immigrant group age 25 or older 
with a bachelor’s degree in the US at time t-1. 
Values for 1997-1999 were calculated through 
interpolation from Census data. 
Individual aggregates 
from ACS 2001-2015 
(5 year rolling 
average); individual 
aggregates from 5% 
Census 1990 & 2000 
3, 4, 5 
  
Note: All variables are centered on average values at t-1. 
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